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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is to assess the strategic role and geopolitical significance 
of the Sinai peninsula in the Middle East in general and its importance for British 
colonial policy in particular. As Egypt became progressively more autonomous 
from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century the question of territorial 
sovereignty arose, which moved the Sinai Peninsula from being a barren stretch 
of desert'with little economic value within the Ottoman Empire to becoming a 
disputed boundary region. The construction of the Suez Canal and its 
subsequent control by European powers, headed by Britain, further highlighted 
its strategic position. This led to a series of successful diplomatic efforts on the 
side of Britain, which had occupied Egypt by 1882, to include the peninsula 
within the boundaries of Egypt. After the military confrontation with Turkey during 
the First World War, and the subsequent breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, an 
international boundary separating Sinai from Palestine was established. Egypt 
became officially independent in 1922. However British control of the Sinai 
Peninsula continued until well after the Second World War. 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of Sinai for British colonial policy, which 
was reflected in the great efforts exerted to retain control of the peninsula as 
long as possible. The recognition of this importance was not shared by the 
nationalist Egyptian government. Thus Britain is to be credited for having 
pursued vital diplomacy to establish a recognized international boundary, as 
well as creating an effective administration system to control this remote border 
desert area in the form of the Frontiers Districts Administration (FDA), founded in 
1917. The "reserved clauses" in the unilateral declaration of independence of 
1922 gave Britain the right to provide for the defense of Egypt, which would 
mean that the Egyptian Army would remain under the control of British officers. 
The primary vehicle for government in the Sinai was the Frontiers Districts 
Administration, a department of the Ministry of War. This made it convenient for 
Britain to remain in charge of the peninsula by means of a British officer serving 
as governor of Sinai. This thesis shows that as the number of British personnel 
employed in the Egyptian government was drastically reduced after 
independence, Britain pursued a covert policy to retain as many Englishmen as 
possible in the FDA, for the purpose of continued control over Sinai. Even after 
the Second World War no efforts were spared to try to retain Sinai under British 
control, which became a central issue in the dispute between Britain and Egypt 
over the latter's independence and national sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate and highlight the geo-
political significance of the Sinai Peninsula in Middle Eastern power 
politics and its strategic role in British colonial policy in particular. Sinai 
had been neglected as a key geopolitical entity until this was first 
recognized by the British in the mid-nineteenth Century. There is of 
course a pattern in history that shows that Britain always did have a keen 
interest for geopolitical systems, and, in the case of Sinai, put a lot of 
effort into controlling this territory for the Empire. The main 
chronological emphasis of the thesis is therefore on the period of British 
occupation and subsequent administration of the Sinai between 1882 and 
the Second World War. 
My initial interest in this study was conceived during the period of my 
graduate studies at the American University in Cairo, when I had the 
opportunity to spend several months on field work living with the 
bedouin of southern Sinai. This was at a time when the Sinai Peninsula 
had just been returned to the sovereignty of Egypt (1982) after fifteen 
years of Israeli occupation. The indigenous population had to adjust to 
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yet another new system of administration on the local level, as well as a 
new allegiance towards Egypt, which defined the Sinai in a regional 
geopolitical context. When examining the history of Sinai one is struck 
by the fact that a stretch of rugged desert so limited in size, natural 
resources and population would feature so prominently on the world 
stage of 19th and 20th Century international relations. The peculiar 
entanglement of this territory in military conflict, questions of 
sovereignty, creation of nation states, and the larger regional and 
international politics merits to be studied as a distinct entity in its own 
right. The role of British colonial policy in acquiring and maintaining 
control of the Sinai in particular, as distinct from the occupation and 
politics of Egypt, has so far not been the subject of specific investigation 
and is therefore the primary focus of this thesis. 
Whereas the involvement of Britain in Egypt from 1882 until after the 
Second World War is well documented and researched, very little 
specific academic work has been done on the geopolitics of Sinai as a 
distinct entity. I will show that there was a covert, yet distinct, British 
policy that can be traced throughout the period investigated, from the 
occupation of Egypt until well after the Second World War, to maintain 
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military and administrative control over the Sinai Peninsula. This control 
and de facto British government of Sinai was continued even after the 
official independence of Egypt in 1922, despite Egyptian nationalist 
resentment. 
This study focuses on the following areas: First, how a de facto 
autonomous territory was gradually incorporated into the Egyptian nation 
state as the political power of Egypt eclipsed the domination of the 
Ottoman central authorities from the middle of the nineteenth century 
onwards. Second, the emergence of the strategic role of the peninsula 
after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and its importance for the 
defense of this important waterway. Third, the British early recognition 
of this geopolitical position and the formulation of policy for the creation 
of an effective military administrative system for a remote desert frontier 
area. Finally, this thesis will demonstrate the specific efforts of Britain 
to retain control of the Sinai Peninsula, even after officially granting 
Egypt independence in 1922, through the positioning and retention of 
British personnel within the Egyptian government, particularly in the 
Frontiers Districts Administration which was in charge of the Sinai. 
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As no specific study had previously been conducted on these aspects of 
British involvement in Egypt most of the material used for the core of 
this thesis is from the Consular and Embassy correspondence and other 
British Foreign Office documents kept at the Public Records Office in 
London. It is from these documents that I have systematically 
demonstrated that as British influence in Egypt was being undermined by 
the progressive strengthening of the nationalist government after 
independence in 1922, a covert policy for the continued occupation of 
the Sinai Peninsula emerged. British colonial interest in Sinai, and the 
resulting efforts to hold on to the territory, was highly exaggerated 
considering the natural and human resources the peninsula has to offer. 
It was, however, the strategic location of the Sinai at the junction 
between Asia and Africa, between Mediterranean and Red Sea, that made 
it indispensable for Imperial communications and defense of the British 
Empire. The Suez Canal became a central issue in the rivalry between 
the empires of Europe and the control of this waterway would ultimately 
tip the international balance of power in the favour of Britain. 
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General Pattern of Events 
In order to effectively defend, as well as control, the Suez Canal it was 
necessary to be in control of the Sinai. Since prehistoric times the 
rugged, deserts and difficult mountain passes made the peninsula the 
natural shield of Egypt against invasions from the East. This was 
always well understood by the rulers of Egypt and throughout history 
they maintained military and administrative control of Sinai in their 
hands in Cairo. When Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire the Sinai 
was merely a dangerous stretch on a long highway traversing the 
peninsula, linking Arabia and Asia to the North African Provinces of the 
same empire. The local bedouin governed themselves according to their 
customary law and the caravan routes were protected by forts manned by 
soldiers from Egypt. There was no dispute over the ownership of the 
Sinai, until the height of the reign of Mohammed Al i in the 1840's, who 
as the viceroy of Egypt defied the authority of the sultan in Istanbul over 
the sovereignty of Egypt. Subsequent to his attempt to secede from the 
empire and the settlement of grievances, documents for Mohammed Ali 's 
reaffirmation on the throne of Egypt, confirmed that his administrative 
territory of Egypt includes the Sinai Peninsula. 
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The Suez Canal opened to navigation in 1869 and was at the centre of 
European aspirations from the beginning, but Egyptian financial 
mismanagement of the economy and subsequent bankruptcy of the 
country gave Britain the "legitimacy" for the 1882 occupation of Egypt in 
order to rescue European creditors. British administrators recognized 
early the importance of gaining control of the Sinai as insurance for the 
safety of the Suez Canal and they pursued their objective on both the 
international and domestic fronts. Tensions between Turkey and Britain 
were mounting reflecting the deteriorating relations between the 
European empires culminating in the First World War, as well as the 
"veiled" occupation of Egypt, the prized province of the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1906 the British reacted to a number of boundary incidents 
between Turkish and Egyptian troops in the Sinai by a major show of 
military might, which persuaded Turkey to agree to a formal demarcation 
of an official boundary between Egypt and the rest of the Ottoman 
territories to the East. This move, that was initiated and carefully 
monitored by the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Lord Cromer, 
after detailed consultations with London, would greatly facilitate 
decisions on territorial issues subsequent to the breakup of the Ottoman 
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Empire after the First World War. On the domestic front, British 
officials were in the awkward situation of being only advisors to the 
Egyptian government rather than being directly in charge themselves, as 
would have been the case i f Egypt was a colony, rather than just a 
protectorate. Englishmen were only directly in charge of some ministries 
one of them notably, the Ministry of War. So in order to gain control of 
the Sinai, the British persuaded the Egyptians to move the local 
administration of the peninsula from being under the Ministry of Interior 
to the Ministry of War, thus making a British officer the governor of 
Sinai. A situation which prevailed until after the Second World War. 
In 1915 the British suspicions of Turkey were confirmed when Ottoman 
forces stormed through the Sinai and laid siege to the Suez Canal. It took 
heroic performances and a heavy toll on British lives to recapture the 
peninsula, a lesson that would firm British determination not to lose 
control of the Canal or the Sinai Peninsula again. The Sinai proved to be 
a valuable training ground for British soldiers unacquainted with desert 
warfare and would shape British experience with both military 
campaigns in the desert, as well as skills in administering nomadic tribes 
inhabiting border areas of the Middle East. The knowledge and 
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impressions gained by British officers would also influence their 
perception and execution of Britain's Arab policy after the War. The 
Sinai was also a focus for development and communication links 
between Egypt and Palestine with the building of roads, railway, water 
pipeline, airports and other infrastructure. 
The Middle East went through major adjustments after the breakup of the 
Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I and Britain was 
involved in the forefront of making the decisions over the future of the 
region. One item was very clear on the British agenda : by all means to 
maintain control of the Suez Canal and therefore of Sinai. 
Several problems would face British efforts to maintain control of Sinai 
and the security of its Eastern boundary. New Nation States (Saudi 
Arabia, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, etc.) with unclear policies and security 
were to be formed to replace Ottoman regional governments. The 
Zionist movement intensified its emigration to Palestine particularly 
encouraged by the Balfour Declaration opening the door towards forming 
a separate state, independent of British influence, bordering on Sinai. On 
the domestic front, British administrators were seeing their influence 
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dismantled and were now facing nationalist revolt and an irreversible 
drive towards the independence of Egypt. 
British concern was reflected in the great efforts made at the peace 
negotiations in Paris to settle the international boundary of Egypt in 
favour of good security of both the Canal and Sinai. In Sinai the Desert 
Mounted Corps of the War had given way to the Frontiers Districts 
Administration (F.D.A.) a special division under the Ministry of War that 
was in charge of the border desert provinces of Egypt. But the country 
was in revolutionary turmoil heading towards the declaration of 
independence in 1922. This meant the eventual elimination of British 
officials working inside the Egyptian Government. No area was more 
sensitive to British interests than the military security and the continued 
control of the Suez Canal. Therefore we find that the High Commission 
in Cairo went to great efforts to ensure that the officers in charge of the 
F.D.A. are to remain Englishmen. Even after the takeover of power we 
can trace a distinct policy by Britain to retain at least the control over the 
Sinai province, by having an English officer in place as governor. This 
was achieved by using two strategies : the first; to constantly point out 
the inefficiency of Egyptian Officers in administering desert areas a 
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compared to their British counterparts. And, the second, to focus on the 
claims of discrimination against the indigenous bedouin population by 
Egyptian authorities. In essence Britain used the excuse of being the 
protectors of a prosecuted minority in order to hold on to power. This 
exemplifies a pattern of British colonial policy that was found elsewhere 
in the British Empire. In the case of Sinai this policy proved to be very 
successful. British leadership within the F.D.A. had an excellent record 
of service and the ability of officers to deal with their bedouin subjects 
was greatly highlighted. Also, their achievements in improving the 
infrastructure and the economic and social situation of the Sinai helped 
persuade the Egyptian government to continue to retain British officers 
in Sinai, although their loyalty was more towards the High Commission 
and London than to their Egyptian superiors at the Ministry of War in 
Cairo. 
Britain successfully continued its occupation and administration in the 
Sinai throughout the 1930's and the threat of a new war gave her the 
necessary excuse to reoccupy the country under the disguise of a military 
defense cooperation treaty between Egypt and Great Britain. The Sinai 
remained under direct British administration until well after the war and 
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the last attempts to hold on to it failed during the final negotiations for 
British withdrawal and independence for Egypt. However, the last 
attempts to claim the Sinai for Britain were made in 1946 and again in 
1949 where diverse schemes were brought forward in which Britain 
would enter into a long term lease or even outright purchase of the 
territory to establish naval and air-force bases in Sinai, which would 
make it, as in the words of one contemporary British Politician, another 
"Gibraltar in the Eastern Mediterranean". The schemes failed in the face 
of intense nationalist resentment towards any British military presence on 
Egyptian soil, so the Sinai finally was confirmed as an integral part of 
Egypt under Egyptian sovereignty. This was to be challenged again in 
the Egyptian Israeli conflict, where sovereignty over the peninsula 
became a central issue of dispute. The understanding of these unique 
aspects of British colonial policy and how history came to bear on 
geographical arrangements is in essence the unique aspect of this study. 
In Chapter 1 I wil l first give a geographical description of the Sinai and 
its population highlighting its local, regional and global position. I wil l 
then document that the recognition of the strategic significance of the 
Sinai was a gradual process that went through several historical phases in 
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Chapter 2. The first section covers the early period before the 19th 
Century. In this phase the Sinai was left to govern itself through tribal 
customs internally and on an international level it was part of the 
Byzantine Empire followed by the various Muslim Khaliphates and lastly 
the Ottoman Empire. Sovereignty and rights of government, however, 
was at all times in the hand of the rulers of Egypt and the peninsula was 
throughout the ages administered from Cairo. The extent of Egyptian 
influence over neighboring territories to the East fluctuated according to 
the strength of different governments in Egypt. Whenever a strong 
leader was on the throne of Egypt his domain would extend far beyond 
the boundaries of Sinai into Palestine, Syria and Arabia, but the 
peninsula itself was at all times under Egyptian control. This control was 
however limited to securing the caravan routes for trade and pilgrimage 
through the Sinai by holding a number of forts along these routes. Very 
little direct control was exercised over the bedouin tribes of the area who 
were de facto autonomous from any government until well into the 
middle of the 19th Century. 
The second section deals with the first extension of Egyptian government 
control over the Sinai and the rise of a more structured awareness of the 
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strategic importance of the peninsula in international geopolitics. This 
recognition started with Napoleon's campaign to Egypt, which drew 
British interests to this country and started a century of rivalry between 
England and France over colonial possessions. His scientists were the 
first to document to Europe the wonders of Egypt, which started a wave 
of intellectual, religious and scientific interest in exploring not only 
Egypt but also the biblical lands. Sinai thus became the target of a 
stream of European travelers and explorers. Their reports, although quite 
often very biased, give us an excellent insight into the actual life in the 
Sinai during the early 19th Century. 
During the reign of Mohammed Al i Egypt went through a remarkable 
transformation from a purely rural society to becoming a serious power 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. His expansion of industry, public works, 
communication and military capabilities were soon seen as a threat by the 
European Powers. His military campaigns succeeded in conquering 
Palestine and Syria and he put the holy places in the Hijaz under his 
protection. When Mohammed Al i threatened Turkey and the Ottoman 
sultanate itself the Powers intervened and his influence was limited to the 
province of Egypt. He was invested, however, with hereditary rights to 
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the throne of Egypt and with a high degree of autonomy to rule over the 
country. 
When his rule was confirmed in 1841 by the Ottoman Sultan, the firman 
issued by Istanbul set the administrative boundary of Egypt as a diagonal 
line from Al-'Arish to Suez, thus severing the eastern and southern parts 
of the peninsula from Egypt. In practice this was never the 
administrative boundary because throughout the Nineteenth Century 
Egypt continued to administer all the forts in the Sinai, as well as beyond 
the border the forts of Hejaz along the pilgrimage route, which were not 
handed over to Ottoman control until 1892. 
Although Egypt retained sovereignty over the Sinai, this incident 
signaled the beginning of the struggle over Sinai and Egypt's eastern 
boundary, which would last until well into the twentieth century. The 
spotlight was directed towards the Sinai again when the Suez Canal went 
into operation. Britain by then clearly recognized the importance of the 
Canal for the supremacy of British imperial communications and the 
Sinai as its defensive shield. The events in Egypt would pave the way 
for eventual British occupation. 
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Chapter 3 deals with the British occupation of Egypt and the Sinai until 
the First World War. This phase of developments in Sinai sees a more 
conscious formulation of British security policy regarding the Suez Canal 
and a clear change towards the recognition of Sinai as an integral 
element in this policy. Already before the British attack on Egypt in 
1882 it was recognized that the cooperation of the Sinai bedouin would 
be very useful. Consequently, Professor Palmer was sent out at the head 
of a mission to buy their allegiance. This was the beginning of a long 
relationship between the Sinai tribes and their British rulers, which 
would last until final British withdrawal from Egypt. 
During the following decade Britain consolidated her control over Egypt 
to the dismay of the Ottoman Sultan, who still considered the country as 
a province of his empire. The Ottoman government therefore seized the 
first opportunity to assert its sovereignty over Egypt when a new 
Khedive, Abbas I I , was to be instituted. His firman of appointment 
specifically severed the Sinai Peninsula from his dominion. Seeing a 
possible erosion of control over the Sinai as a definite threat for the 
security of the Suez Canal it was the High Commission in Cairo that 
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protested most diligently and the "firman crisis" was averted by 
exercising British pressure on Istanbul. Relations with Turkey 
deteriorated further in subsequent years particularly after the British -
French treaty of 1904, in which the two powers settled their colonial 
interests in Africa, which was seen by the Ottoman Sultan as a 
confirmation of the sinister intentions of Britain in Egypt. The tensions 
led to the border incidents between Turkey and Egypt and eventually to 
the demarcation of the Sinai-Palestine boundary in 1906. 
Meanwhile Britain had also secured internal control of Sinai by being 
very active on the domestic front towards gaining ownership and 
permanent control of the peninsula. The Sinai had been under the 
administration of the Ministry of Interior until 1906 when it was placed 
under the control of the Ministry of War. This had the advantage that the 
commander in chief of the Egyptian Army was an Englishman ensuring 
that from that year onwards and well until after WW I I the Governor of 
Sinai would also be a British officer. 
It was becoming increasingly evident that relations between Britain and 
Turkey were deteriorating, thus focusing the attention of Britain on 
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further securing the Eastern boundary of Egypt. They adopted a policy 
of development and improvement of facilities throughout the Sinai with 
the understanding that i f the local population could be convinced of the 
advantages of British government, they would be a vital ally in the case 
of military conflict in the Sinai. Britain remained in control of the 
peninsula until driven out by the advancing Turkish army during the 
early part of WW I . 
Chapter 4 covers the events of World War I in Sinai. After the 
successful Turkish invasion of Sinai, Britain became thoroughly 
convinced of the strategic importance of the peninsula and employed 
great resources to regain military supremacy. The campaign for Sinai 
saw the introduction of the Desert Camel Corps and the formation of an 
Arab Legion under British command. British officers became 
experienced in desert warfare and built skills in dealing with bedouin 
subjects, which would enhance their future role as administrators in 
desert areas. Great emphasis was also on the development of 
infrastructure in the Sinai such as the building of the railway, roads and 
communications. This was promoted by Britain in order to strengthen 
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security and government control in the Sinai, but also to link the Suez 
Canal to Palestine and to the railway systems of Asia. 
The vehicle for controlling the Sinai came in the form of the Frontiers 
Districts Administration (F.D.A.) which, formed in 1917, was in charge 
of administering all remote desert areas along Egypt's borders. The 
British protectorate over Egypt ensured that the command of the 
Egyptian Army was staffed by English officers, and since the F.D.A. was 
a department of the Ministry of War, the director of the F.D.A. was 
therefore also a British officer. This chapter will show that a great deal of 
care was taken to make the F.D.A. a very efficient department. Some of 
the best officers were chosen for service with this unit, good education 
and language skills were mandatory for the FDA. Their understanding of 
the bedouin society and their desert environment made British 
administration very popular in Sinai. In fact, when Egypt became 
independent there was great concern amongst the tribes that the new 
nationalist government would discriminate against them because of their 
known collaboration with the British occupation. 
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Chapter 5 deals with post war adjustments in the Middle East and their 
influence on Sinai. The war had transformed the Middle East. The 
breaking up of the Ottoman Empire and its division between British and 
French spheres of influence (Sykes-Picot Treaty) and the formation of 
new nation states, the Balfour Declaration and Zionist Movement, the 
imminent independence of Egypt, were all factors that would again put 
the Sinai Peninsula in the limelight of British Middle East politics. 
British interests in retaining the Sinai were again threatened on the 
international front by new states being formed just beyond its boundary, 
as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Palestine were trying to work out their 
territorial claims. The boundary between Egypt and the former Ottoman 
Palestine would become an international boundary, but this was not to 
happen without another round of discussions over which line the 
boundary would follow. At the peace conference in Paris, British 
negotiators tried to extend the boundary of Sinai to include parts of 
Southern Palestine on the recommendation of Lord Allenby. However, 
French resentment towards what they saw as an attempt to increase the 
territory under British rule prevented any changes to the previous line of 
the administrative boundary demarcated in 1906 and the new 
international boundary was settled. Another challenge to British control 
23 
in the Sinai was to contain the attempts by Zionist to extend their 
purchases of land for colonization across the boundary from Palestine. 
The Frontiers Districts Administration became the primary vehicle for 
perpetuating British rule in the Sinai Peninsula. Britain's fear of losing 
control over Egypt in the wake of revolution and struggle for 
independence meant that new political strategies were needed in order to 
stay in Sinai. The unilateral declaration issued by Britain confirming the 
independent status of Egypt contained several conditions which would 
make it possible for British troops to remain in the country. One was 
Britain's responsibility for external security, which meant that the 
Egyptian army remained under British command. This chapter wil l show 
that there was a conscious British policy for retaining control of the FDA 
in order to secure the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal for imperial 
communications. 
Chapter 6 explores in more detail the British administration of the Sinai 
in the inter-war years. With the emergence of new nation states east of 
Sinai the question of territorial sovereignty and boundary security 
became the paramount concern of the governor of Sinai. As British 
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personnel within the Egyptian administration was being continually 
reduced after independence, the threat of losing control over the Sinai 
became acute. British diplomacy therefore focused on retaining senior 
officers within the FDA. Their efforts were rewarded with the 
conclusion of the 1936 treaty of Alliance between Egypt and Britain, 
which de facto meant that British troops remain in Egypt and the Sinai 
remains under a British governor. This governor was more responsible 
to Whitehall and the Embassy in Cairo than to his superiors at the 
Egyptian Ministry of War. 
Chapter 7 covers the reoccupation of Egypt during World War II and the 
last attempts by Britain to retain the Sinai. Britain by that time had 
formulated its geopolitical interests in the Middle East and part of that 
would be maintaining a permanent presence in Sinai. Officially, Britain 
was committed to grant Egypt full and unconditional independence after 
the war, but this would not include the Sinai. The peninsula was seen as 
an integral part of the Suez Canal security and therefore several schemes 
were put forward to claim it for Britain. The political climate between 
Egypt and Britain by that time had reached an all time low and 
diplomatic attempts to remain in Sinai soon had to give way to a more 
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straightforward approach of offering to lease the peninsula. The last 
attempts to hold on were made in 1949, but eventually Britain had to 
evacuate her troops from Egypt and Sinai reverted to Egyptian 
sovereignty after almost 80 years under foreign administration. 
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Chapter 1 
Geography and Population 
The Sinai Peninsula forms the land bridge between the African and Asian 
continents; it has an area of 60.714 square kilometres and stretches for 430 
km from the Mediterranean coast in the North to the Southern tip of the 
peninsula at Ras Mohammed, which divides the Red Sea into the Gulf of 
Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba. The distance from the Palestine border in the 
East and the Suez Canal in the west is approximately 220 km. Its location 
between the 28th and 31st parallel and the 32nd to the 34th meridians 
places Sinai in the centre of the Middle East and the civilisations of the 
ancient world, (see figure 1, p.28) A number of uninhabited desert islands 
are scattered around the southern tip of the peninsula, the largest of which 
are Tiran and Sanafir Islands which command the southern narrow access 
of the gulf of Aqaba. The northern coastline of Sinai has no suitable 
locations for deep sea harbours due to its shallow and broad tidal strip. 
Also the coast of the Gulf of Suez has only one small fishing port at al-Tor, 
but the gulf Aqaba offers a well sheltered natural harbour at Sharm El-
Shaikh, and smaller fishing ports at Dahab and Nuweiba. 
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The Sinai Peninsula in the Centre of the Middle East Figure 1 
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The climate of Sinai is typical of a desert environment, with temperatures 
in summer exceeding 40 degrees Celsius during the day. The winters can 
be very cool with minimum temperature at night as low as 8 degrees and 
maximum temperatures between 15 and 20 degrees. The central highlands 
around mount Sinai are well known for their very cold winter when 
temperature can reach the freezing point. The whole peninsula has very 
little rain, with an annual average below 20 millimetres, but although 
extremely rare, flash floods can within hours turn the steep valleys of the 
southern Sinai into gushing rivers, that can destroy anything in their path. 
The water marks along the walls of the wadis are a good reminder of the 
dangers of camping in the course of such a dry river. This low level of 
precipitation supports very little natural vegetation. The proverbial thorn 
bushes that grow in the St. Catherine area and very few small palm groves 
are the main exception. 
The peninsula can be divided into three major geographical areas : the 
coastal plain of al-"Arish in the north, the central al-Tih plateau and the 
high mountain region of Southern Sinai. Northern Sinai is a limestone 
plateau sloping gently down to the salt marshes caused by the sinking of 
the shore. The eastward drift of the silt from the Damietta arm of the Nile 
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has slowly widened the northern coast and the ruins of Pelusium, which 
was a port at the mouth of the now dried up Pelusiac branch of the Nile 
during Roman times, are now almost 4 kilometres inland. A dune belt 
stretching from the Bitter Lakes on the Suez Canal to the Palestine border 
is dotted with small palm groves thriving off the shallow water table. The 
bedouin settlement of Qatia forms the centre of these oases where ground 
water is abundant enough to support some agriculture. The wells of Qatia 
were also the last watering station before the wadi al-*Arish, for east-
bound caravans and armies on the ancient Via Maris. 1 (Murray : 1953, 
pp 142-144) 
Today a modern road follows the same route, avoiding the thickest sand 
dunes south of Romani, however, still many sections are buried frequently 
after sandstorms. The same problem was faced by the Sinai railway which 
was in operation until the late 1940's when through-passage by rail from 
Cairo to Beirut was possible. Travel along the Mediterranean shore is 
hampered by the marshes and the Bardawil lake which changes its 
contours with the seasonal rise and fall of the sea level. The road crosses 
the Wadi al-'Arish just south of the town of al-'Arish, which is Sinai's 
largest settlement and administrative centre. The narrow streets of the 
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settlement surround the ruins of its once imposing castle and the town is 
separated from the sea by the largest date palm grove on the peninsula. 
Both road and former railway then cross the most fertile agricultural plain 
of Sinai where grain is grown in winter and melons in summer, until 
crossing the Palestine border at Rafah. The wadi al-"Arish and its 
tributaries reaches far south into the peninsula to its watershed at the edge 
of the Tih plateau forming the largest drainage basin of Sinai. During the 
winter months flash floods frequently carry a heavy load of silt down the 
wadi and obstruct a number of dams that have been erected throughout the 
basin to utilise the scarce water for agriculture. Further south from the 
coastal plain, and almost parallel to the Via Maris, is the main highway of 
the peninsula connecting Ismailia at the midpoint of the Suez Canal with 
al-"Auja in Palestine and onward to Beersheba. Even further to the south 
running parallel is the pilgrimage route, Darb al-Haj, which originates East 
of Suez and crosses the Mitla Pass to Nekhl, now a small settlement. The 
town was an administration centre until the turn of the century, and the 
traditional midway stop for caravans between Egypt and Arabia from 
where the road continues via the wells of El-Themmed and then descends 
the steep slopes toward the Gulf of Aqaba near Ras El-Naqb to Taba. 
Travelling along this road one can see the imposing silhouette of the high 
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mountain range of Southern Sinai beyond the escarpment that forms the 
boundary of the el-Tih plateau which rises to over 1000 metres above sea 
level, (see figure 2, p.33) 
Southern Sinai is reached from Suez by the coastal road running along the 
shore of the Gulf of Suez to the town of Abu Zeneima, which is the centre 
of the oil fields and produces the bulk of the Egyptian output. From there 
a desert track leaves the coast turning inland towards Serabit El-Khadim, 
the site of the Pharaonic copper and turquoise mines. There the ruins of 
the Hathor temple and the nearby Wadi Mukkattab, where the famous 
inscriptions of Sinai were found, are proof of the earliest civilisation in the 
peninsula. These inscriptions represent the "missing link" between the 
pharaonic pictograms and the cuneiform writing of the Phoenicians, and 
thus represent the oldest alphabetic inscriptions known. (Ritter : 1865, pp 
330-334) Continuing South along the coast from Abu Zneima one reaches 
the mouth of Wadi Feiran which connects the coast to the central mountain 
region surrounding the convent of St. Catherine. This valley, which at 
some points is very narrow, is bordered by the highest peaks of Sinai with 
Gabal Katharina and Gabal Musa rising over 2,700m. The road through 
Wadi Feiran also climbs gradually and the settlement at the foot of Mount 
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Figure 2 : The Sinai Peninsula, Terrain and Roads 
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Sinai is over 1,500m above sea level, which gives it a most pleasant cool 
and dry climate throughout most of the year. The valley also supports a 
number of orchards, growing peaches and almonds, in addition to the 
abundant crop of dates. From St.Catherine, a road winding through the 
steep walled wadis runs east to meet the Gulf of Aqaba at Dahab, where 
two oases near the beach form the basis of a bedouin settlement. 
Nowadays Dahab sports a modern tourist resort, but much smaller than 
Sharm El Sheikh, which is located 100 km to the south near the tip of the 
peninsula. An international airport and dozens of hotels have transformed 
Sharm El Sheikh from a tiny former Israeli settlement into the primary 
beach resort of Sinai and the centre of the scuba diving industry. El Tor 
another 100 km to the north-west of Sharm is now the administrative 
capital of the Province of South Sinai. Until the end of the 19th century it 
was the quarantine station for pilgrims making the sea voyage from Jeddah 
to Suez and used to accommodate up to 30,000 people every season. 
Today, a small fishing fleet operates out of this harbour, the only one on 
the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez. 
Further North along the Gulf of Aqaba, about 80km before the Israeli 
border, is the oasis of Nuweiba the site of a bedouin settlement 
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surrounding an old fort located in the northern end of the bay. A modern 
beach resort further south is near the marine terminal from where ferrys 
link the Sinai with Aqaba port in Jordan. In the south eastern mountain 
region the most important oases are "Ain-Hudhra and "Ain Umm-Ahmed 
both home of the prominent Terabin tribe, who's tribal territory stretches 
well across the eastern boundary of Egypt into the Negev desert. The 
South also had substantial wild life, but the larger antelopes such as the 
Ibex and Oryx, as well as ostriches and leopards are now all extinct due to 
heavy hunting with the use of rifles. Presently only some gazelles 
(Dorcas), hyena, foxes and desert rabbits can be found. 
Traditionally the Sinai is the home of a predominantly Bedouin or pastoral 
nomadic population. It is believed that "Bedouin" or "Badu" is derived 
from an ancient Arabic word meaning "original" (or "aboriginal"). In 
Egypt the word "Badu" has come to be used interchangeably with the word 
"Arab" referring to the desert inhabitants outside the Nile Valley. The 
term "Arab" is used to describe nomads regardless of whether they are 
actually descended from ancestors from the Arabian Peninsula or not. 
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Ibn Khaldun believed that nomads preceded agricultural societies in the 
Middle East, thus calling them the original inhabitants of the area. But 
modern research suggests that about the same time as the agricultural 
revolution during which man learned to domesticate animals, pastoral 
nomadism emerged as a consequence of the immediate ecological situation 
of the Middle East, particularly in Sinai which certainly cannot support a 
population on agriculture alone. Nomads started exploiting the vast arid 
zones that were otherwise unfit for cultivation, thus making maximum use 
of the total land available. The bedouin adapted their lifestyle to the 
climatic conditions of the desert by living in tents with a minimum of 
household utensils, which can be packed and easily moved during 
migration. They have also developed a range of special skills necessary 
for survival in their harsh surroundings. Most of these are directly related 
to their herding activities, such as a wide knowledge of geographical 
features and of plant and animal life. (Awad : 1959, pp.25-56) 
From a very early age they learn to distinguish and explain tracks of 
animals and humans which makes them excellent trackers. This along 
with their exceptional sense of direction and ability to find water in the 
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desert has made them far superior to any towns-folk in overcoming the 
hardship of desert travel.4 (Jarvis : 1936, pp. 167-170) 
To survive with their animals in areas of very sparse vegetation a pattern 
of migration has evolved in which the bedouin follow the rainfall with 
their flocks over large areas of the desert, always moving to fresh pastures. 
The size of the grazing area needed for their cyclical migration depends 
on the relative amount of rainfall. The distances travelled during their 
annual migration range from about 60 kilometres in Sinai to 100km in 
Libya. The bedouin of Arabia move even up to 800km every season in 
search of pastures.5 (Cole : 1985) In order to retain control over such vast 
areas, they were compelled to form strong territorial organisations. This 
explains the formation of bedouin tribes which provide their members with 
the necessary access to and protection of pastures and water resources 
during every season of the year. Tribalism can therefore be seen as a 
natural outcome of ecological necessity. The group solidarity or 'assabyya 
is based on a common genealogy in which each tribe ascribes their origin 
and history to a common ancestor. Although no written history of the 
bedouin exists, their genealogy is the base for innumerable folk tales 
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related orally from one generation to the next, and forms a vital component 
of the social life of the tribesmen.6 (Marx : 1978) 
The tribe also provides for the protection of its individual members. As 
every male bedouin is essentially a soldier, their leaders have to rely on 
them for defence, and are therefore compelled to rule them kindly and not 
to antagonise them. This led to the emergence of a highly egalitarian 
system so typical of bedouin tribes, and very much in contrast to the 
sedentary populations of the Middle East. 
Sinai has been traditionally inhabited by almost twenty tribes who were 
also subdivided into smaller clans. Each tribe has its own genealogy and 
tribal history detailing wars, migrations and affiliations with other tribes. 
(Oppenheim : 1941, pp. 135-166) Many scholars have concentrated their 
research on this aspect of Sinai's history and for the purpose of this thesis 
the Sinai bedouin are treated as one social unit in relation to the Egyptians 
on the Nile and other populations outside the peninsula. The exact 
boundaries of tribal territory held by each tribe were not stable and varied 
as tribes made a "hilf ' and formed into larger confederations, raided 
neighbouring tribes and claimed their territories, or migrated (and also 
38 
settled) in an entirely different area of Egypt, or even in another country. 
Fig. 3, p.40 shows the location of Sinai tribes as recorded by G.W.Murray 
in 1935. As tribal territories have more or less stabilised since, his map is 
still generally valid today. (Murray : 1935, p.247) 
The Bedouin have also adapted their manners and customs to the 
necessities of life in the desert. They are known for their hospitality that 
follows ancient traditional rules, as well as their high esteem for such 
virtues as bravery, honour and group solidarity. The bedouin identity is 
most evident in their ethics and values that led to the emergence of a legal 
system called murf. This can be directly related to the specific desert 
environment they live in and to their fundamental belief that the welfare of 
the community takes precedence over that of the individual. xUrf is 
essentially a system of justice based on retribution and restitution: an eye 
for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Its basic logic and characteristics can be 
found again in the Jewish law of the Old Testament and, in fact, it is 
believed that Moses learned from his bedouin hosts during his sojourn in 
the Sinai. Upon the committing of a crime restitution is demanded from 
the individual accused, i f possible. Otherwise, his next of kin is held 
responsible. When a certain specific harm is inflicted, the same will be 
39 
ARAB TRIBES OP SINAI 
SEA 2£2^ITJSRRANEA2v 
B E N I 
PORT SAIO 
S A K H E eiArltf. 
T E R A B I T / 
5A.*H> 
r \AYATDA 
f 
< v 
Ha I 
V 
V J 
/ a n ; 2v 
The Tribes of Sinai Figure 3 
\ 
40 
inflicted on the aggressor in revenge i f he does not pay for his crime in 
money or in kind according to the decisions of a court formed by the tribal 
elders. In Sinai certain sheikhs became specialised in dealing with specific 
disputes, e.g. inheritance, blood feuds, divorce, etc. due to the great respect 
of the tribes for them and their wide knowledge of procedure and 
precedent cases. In complicated cases, a preliminary court would decide 
on who should preside over the trial.9 (Austin : 1925) 
There is no punishment in the sense of modern penal law to prevent similar 
deeds from occurring in the future. The acceptance of collective 
responsibility of the family or tribe of the accused greatly facilitates the 
administration of justice, as in the vastness of the desert it would otherwise 
be almost impossible to track down an individual criminal. These 
fundamental differences between tribal customary law and the Islamic law 
(sharfa), which was practised in sedentary Middle Eastern societies, are 
believed by the bedouin to be of vital importance to ensure tribal harmony 
in their desert environment. 
Although the bedouin have excelled in inhabiting and utilising the deserts, 
they have also entertained a vital and close relationship with urban 
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centres. In the city they found markets to conduct trade and obtain the 
necessary agricultural and manufactured goods. The city dwellers in turn 
depended on the bedouin for transport of their trade between urban and 
agricultural centres. The bedouin not only controlled the highways due to 
their skills and military capabilities, but also possessed the most important 
beast of burden, the camel, for traversing the large deserts. Therefore trade 
and protection of caravans were their most important sources of income 
besides animal husbandry. This income was also frequently 
complemented by raiding and plundering caravans and villages on the 
fringe of the desert. Such practices produced the often violent symbiosis 
of settled and nomadic peoples in the Middle East. 
According to the last Census in 1986 the indigenous population of Sinai 
numbered 200,500 most of whom are bedouin although their degree of 
sedentarisation varies greatly. Approximately half of this population is 
now centred in the towns of Sinai.10 (Mawsu'at Sina : 1992) 
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Chapter 2 
Sinai before the British Occupation 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter wil l show that the Sinai was always part of Egypt 
administered by military control from Cairo and its historical role as the 
"Eastern Shield" of Egypt. It will also document the first recognition of 
the strategic importance of the Sinai and the ensuing rivalry over its 
control between Egypt and the Ottoman government in Istanbul. 
The Sinai Peninsula has been inhabited and well known to the people of 
the ancient Middle East for several thousand years. It has always served 
as the land bridge between Asia and Africa linking the civilisations of 
pharaonic Egypt with those of Mesopotamia and the Levant. Traversed 
by many conquering and reconquering armies in both directions, the 
inhabitants of the peninsula itself have, however, remained outside the 
direct government control of any regime of the time. Nevertheless, the 
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peninsula was part of Egypt and since the early Middle Ages was 
recognised as such by all contemporary historians. 
The Sinai is the eastern shield of the nilotic civilisation that devours, or 
at least weakens, invaders before reaching Egypt proper. The small and 
few pharaonic mining settlements in Sinai, even at times of their best 
production, must have had very low yields to make them of significant 
economic interest to the pharaos of Egypt. The small workers garrisons 
seem to have been used more as penal colonies, as well as, functioning as 
advance warning posts against invaders from the east. However 
throughout the ages the importance of the geo-political position of the 
Sinai for Egypt's defense was recognised and whatever government was 
ruling in Memphis/Cairo manned forts along the land routes to the East 
to control Egypt's access through the peninsula. Various buildings and 
artefacts found throughout the deserts of Sinai, some dating back to 
Pharaonic times, clearly document the continuous and vital economic, 
political, administrative, and cultural/religious links to Egypt along the 
Nile. 
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The central government in Cairo always recognised the indigenous 
nomadic population as being ethnically different from the Nile valley 
inhabitants. Egyptian sovereignty was therefore focused on the control 
of the main trade routes through the peninsula by means of a series of 
manned forts along the way. The archaeological remains in the Sinai are 
overwhelming proof. This left the local nomadic social and cultural 
system intact over the centuries. 
It was not until the 19th Century that the question of who the legitimate 
ruler of the Sinai is would arise. Mohammed Al i , the Viceroy of Egypt, 
soon became the sovereign power in his Ottoman province on the Nile, 
defying the sultan in Istanbul and bringing Egypt towards de facto 
autonomy. Over the first decades of the 19th Century Mohammed Al i 
modernised Egypt to the extent of creating a new autonomous military 
and political power in the Eastern Mediterranean that was able to 
counterbalance the influence of the central government of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Napoleon's march through Sinai and Mohammed Ali's campaigns 
against Syria marked the beginning of the modern age and first 
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recognition of the strategic importance of Sinai for the defence of the 
eastern boundary of Egypt. As a result, Mohammed Al i started 
containing the hegemony of the bedouin tribes and confirmed their 
allegiance to his government. His military control was expanded by 
renovation and manning of the Sinai forts, improvement of the caravan 
routes and institution of regular postal services. This was in preparation 
for the de facto secession of Egypt under his rule from the Ottoman 
Empire. After consolidating his position as the sovereign of Egypt, he 
conducted a series of campaigns into Palestine and Syria and his navy 
went as far as challenging Turkey herself. His expansion was only 
contained after the intervention of the other European powers who had 
come to the rescue of the Ottomans. 
As a consequence of these wars Mohammed Al i wanted to confirm his 
rule over Egypt and founding his dynasty that would remain in power 
until Egypt became a republic in 1953. It was therefore also necessary to 
fix a boundary between his domain and the rest of the Ottoman Empire. 
So the 1840's witnessed a series of political moves to confirm that the 
Sinai was indeed inside the international boundary of Egypt which was 
countered by Turkish political moves to undermine the Egyptian 
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position. Thus the sultan's firman instituting Mohammed Ali's 
hereditary rights as the ruler of Egypt in 1841 included a map which 
designated the administrative boundary of wilayet misr as a line running 
diagonally from Rafah to Suez. This meant that the rest of the peninsula 
was not included in the boundary of Egypt. However, the practical 
reality at the time was different as Egypt was in charge of all the forts 
along the pilgrimage route from North Africa. This not only included 
forts in Sinai east of that administrative line, but also the forts of Hijaz 
along the pilgrimage route. The Egyptian sovereignty over the Hijaz 
forts was not given up until after the firman of 1892 instituting Abbas I I 
on the throne of Egypt. 
The opening of the Suez Canal focused the interest and colonial 
aspirations, of the rivalling imperial powers of Europe on Egypt. The 
control of this waterway linking the Mediterranean to the Red Sea was 
recognised by Britain as her primary link to the colonies in the east. The 
Canal and the adjacent Sinai therefore became vital for the security of 
Imperial communications and continued British dominance in her rivalry 
with other colonial powers by maintaining supremacy of sea power. The 
rise of the "Egyptian Question", after the bankruptcy of the country due 
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to lavish overspending and corruption, led to the establishment of the 
"Dual Control" of Egypt's internal affairs by France and Britain. The 
revolt of the Egyptian army under Ahmed Orabi gave Britain the 
legitimacy needed for a full military invasion and subsequent occupation 
of Egypt in 1882. 
2.2 Early History until 1517 
No evidence has been found of permanent settlements in the Sinai from 
before the Roman period. The Pharaohs only interest in the peninsula was 
as an effective shield against invasions from the East characteristic 
throughout Egyptian history. They did leave their traces though at the 
turquoise and copper mines of Serabit al-Khadim which were active from 
before the invasion of the Hyksos during the 14th Dynasty and were 
redeveloped in 1580 BC during the reign of Senusert I of the 18th 
Dynasty. 1 (Hitti : 1943, p.70) He also commissioned the building of the 
temple and barracks for guards protecting the mines from bedouin raids. 
There one can see a rock tablet depicting King Khufu (the builder of the 
Great Pyramid at Giza) beating the Amu, a nomadic race from the East 
inhabiting the Sinai. Mt.Sinai, the resting place of the Israelites during 
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their exodus in the 15th or 14th Century B.C., is only 80 kilometres away. 
It is therefore highly unlikely that Moses and his people, having just made 
a narrow escape from Egypt, remained unmolested by the troops guarding 
the mines. This fact gave rise to theories that a more northern (and more 
direct) route had been taken by the Exodus, making Jabal Hilal the 
mountain of the lawgiving rather than Mt.Sinai. (Jarvis : 1931, p. 102-
105) 
The only other prehistoric buildings found in the Sinai are a water 
reservoir, canal and protective wall at Ain Gudeis, the biblical Kadesh 
Barnea, built by the Hebrews. Other sources attribute the structures to the 
Nabateans of Petra who controlled the East-West trade routes around 500 
BC and held outposts throughout the area. Many armies crossed the Sinai 
peninsula during ancient times: Assyrians, Hittites, Babylonians, Darius 
the Great, and Alexander who established the Ptolemaic Dynasty, which 
ended with Cleopatra and the Roman rule in 30 BC. 3 (Jarvis : 1931, pp. 
110-112) 
According to the Antonine Itinerary (285-305 AD) the Via Maris was one 
of the most important trade routes of the Roman Empire. It crossed 
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northern Sinai connecting Egypt with Palestine and was lined with a row 
of flourishing towns. About 40 Roman miles apart (the average marching 
distance) these were, from West to East: Pelusium (Tell el-Farama), 
Casium (Katib el-Qals), Ostracine (el-Filusiat), Rhinocolorum (al-'Arish), 
and Raphia (Rafah). Pelusium was an important port at the mouth of the 
now dried up Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Extensive ruins of stone 
buildings, with mosaics and carvings, can still be seen today. The other 
towns were dismantled and their stones used for building material and only 
classical writings record their past splendour.4 (Ball: 1942, pp. 13 8-158) 
During the early Christian period the Sinai became a magnet for pilgrims, 
Pelusium and Rhinocolorum became cathedral and convent cities. 
Convents at Paran (now Wadi Feiran) and Mt. Sinai were built, and the 
Emperor Justinian commissioned the fortification of St.Catherine's 
monastery in 550 AD. He also gave the monastery a party of Bosnian 
slave soldiers for its protection, who are believed to be the ancestors of the 
Jebelyya tribe living in the vicinity. These bedouin later converted to 
Islam, but their offsprings still bear European features, fair complexion 
and green eyes, and are the traditional servants and protectors of the 
convent today. With the thriving of pilgrimage the Sinai bedouin had been 
52 
given an important additional source of income: the protection and 
carrying of pilgrims and supplies along the major travel routes of the 
peninsula. Treaties to this effect made with the bedouin, some dating back 
to 800 A.D., are kept by the monks of St.Catherine's. 5 (Jarvis : 1931, pp. 
225-230) 
In 639 ' Amr Ibn al-'As set off at the head of a small force numbering only 
3500 to 4000 horse-men to conquer Egypt. The Caliph "Umar was 
reluctant to allow him to proceed and sent a letter of recall the venture. It 
stated that i f the Muslim forces should have not yet entered Egypt they 
must return, but i f they were already on Egyptian territory they should 
continue in order not to embarrass the troops by making a premature 
withdrawal. The messenger reached 'Amr at Rafah, and anticipating the 
content of the letter, "Amr did not open it until reaching el-Arish, where he 
read it out to his companions to confirm his ambitious plan. The 
significance of this anecdote is that even at this early date the border 
between Egypt and Palestine was recognised to be at Rafah where it still is 
today. 'Amr celebrated the feast of the year 18 Hijra at el-Arish and was 
joined by many bedouin from Sinai who scented the booty ahead, should 
they join his conquest of Egypt. They also readily embraced Islam, since 
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this desert religion appealed to their egalitarian tribal lifestyle. The ease 
with which ' Amr swept through the Roman towns on his way reflected the 
disarray of the Roman Empire in Egypt, and he was even helped by the 
Copts who hoped to escape the tyranny of Roman administration.6 (Butler 
: 1902,pp.l94-198) 
The Sinai bedouin indirectly prospered from the Muslim conquest of 
Egypt and North Africa due to the development of Darb el-Haj, which 
became the principal pilgrimage route from Suez via Nekhl and Aqaba 
onwards to the Hijaz. The roads through Sinai were improved, wells 
repaired and new ones dug. The bedouin tribes divided the responsibility 
for transport and protection, as well as the supply of provisions to the 
pilgrims, each according to their tribal territory. The Towara did the 
carrying from "Aidab (near Suez) to Jabal Hassana, the Tiyaha onwards 
until Nekhl, and the Uheywat controlled the road between Nekhl and 
'Aqaba. Also trade flourished between the provinces of the Muslim 
Empire and the Tarabin, Sinai's largest tribe profited from caravans on the 
road from Nekhl to Bersheeba, and from Nekhl to a\- Arish and Ghazza. 
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But with the increased traffic also came tribal disputes, and raiding became 
a particular menace to tribes and travellers alike. During the reign of the 
Omayyad and Abbasid caliphates it was virtually impossible for the 
government in Egypt or Palestine to control the Sinai bedouin. The 
nomads refused to pay any taxes, plundered travellers and merchants, and 
frequently raided into Egypt and Palestine lifting cattle and destroying 
whole villages. Many attempts were undertaken to restore order, but peace 
would not last long before rebellion breaks out again. When the Khaliph 
el-Ma'mun came to Egypt with 4000 Turkish solders in 829 he even found 
Cairo itself besieged by the bedouin. (Lane-Pool: 1968, p.37) 
It was not until Ahmed Ibn-Tulun established his reign over Syria in 878 
that the Sinai trade and pilgrimage routes became somewhat organised and 
safe. On the other hand, the numerous military campaigns of that period 
which traversed the peninsula always put the bedouin in a state of great 
excitement, which resulted in an increase of raiding and inter-tribal 
warfare. This state of affairs did not change much in the following two 
centuries. The Shi" a revolution and the establishment of Fatimid rule in 
Egypt did not affect the tribes of the Sinai who remained Sunni Muslims 
and enjoyed their freedom, not giving allegiance to any one of the 
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competing parties. They continued with their activities in the caravan 
trade and were not influenced until the dawn of the age of the Crusades. 
The main significance of the Crusades for the bedouin in Sinai was that the 
Christian armies drove a wedge between the Muslim centres of power 
cutting off Egypt from Syria. They had soon recognised the strategic 
importance of gaining access to the Gulf of Aqaba and proceeded to build 
fortresses at Shobek, Kerak and Eyla (Aqaba). Also the magnificent castle 
on Gazirat Phara'on, just south of Taba, served to control the head of the 
gulf and was the launching point for the brief naval expedition of Renaud 
de Chantillion to attack the ports of Quseir and Jeddah by carrying his 
disassembled ships across the desert. Salah el-Din imitated the feat in 
1170 and had ships carried across the Sinai and assembled there to be used 
in supporting his land troops in recapturing Eyla. (Jarvis : 1931, pp. 123-
125) 
For the tribes of Sinai the turbulent troop movements caused great 
agitation, and this period was characterised by turmoil and insecurity. But 
more significant for them was the fact that from 1060 until 1268 when the 
Mamluk sultan Beybars repelled the Crusaders, caravan traffic and 
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pilgrimage across the peninsula practically ceased. During this time 
pilgrims and traders preferred the much safer route down the Nile Valley, 
then traversing only a short stretch of desert to the Red Sea port of Quseir 
and onward by ship to Arabia. This curtailed the main legitimate income 
of the bedouin and caused a great deal of hardship, so they had to rely on 
their flocks and the limited agriculture for survival, which led to an 
increase in raiding activity.9 (Holt: 1986, p.81) 
Salah el-Din, being himself a Kurd, serving his Seljuk Sultan, had brought 
Turkish slave soldiers to Egypt. They soon not only controlled the 
military, but the influence of their officers grew to the extent that they 
became the effective rulers of the country, and the Mamluk dynasties were 
born. Their power was based on their superb military skills and 
organisation. Egypt's army and navy was revived, fortresses reconstructed, 
and the Mongol invasion halted. Also, the power of the bedouin was 
greatly reduced throughout the country. An Arab revolt in 1253 was 
severely crushed. Where the Mamluks were not able to control the 
bedouin directly, they played off different tribes against each other, thus 
reducing their power.10 (Irwin: 1986, p.27, 140) 
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Egypt's countryside was organised under the iqta" system : a feudal 
organisation in which Mamluk officers and notables, each heading their 
own private army, were given agricultural land from which they extracted 
the peasants' surplus and paid dues to their sultan's treasury. In return the 
Mamluks protected the peasant population from bedouin raids, and, as a 
result, many plots that had been deserted were brought back under 
cultivation.11 (Irwin: 1986, p. 141) 
Under the Sultan Beybars, the Mamluk empire stretched from Sudan in the 
south all the way to the borders of Persia, where the Mongols had also 
been pushed back. An extremely efficient postal system for its time had 
been introduced, which ensured good communication with every corner of 
the Empire. This general state of stability has also brought peace and 
safety to the Sinai highways, bedouin attacks almost ceased in fear of the 
sultans army. But also the resumption of trade along the caravan routes 
gave the Sinai tribes a good source of income. 
Sea trade through the Red Sea to China, India and Ceylon flourished, and 
the bedouin benefited from the caravans that transported spices to the 
Mediterranean for onward shipping to Europe, and copper from Europe 
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destined for India. Additional income for the bedouin came from joining 
the Mamluk army on their numerous campaigns into Palestine and Syria, 
returning with ample booty. The Mamluks also employed bedouin 
horsemen for the barid (postal service) between the provinces, and as 
1 "J 
patrols for the highways. (Irwin : 1986, p.50) 
The heyday of the bedouin came under al-Nasir Mohammed Ibn-Qalawun 
(1310-41) who was infatuated with horses and Arabs. He sent his three 
sons to Kerak to be trained by the bedouin. The amir akhur (emir of the 
stables), which traditionally was a rather unimportant position at the court, 
was elevated to cover the sultan's relations with Arab tribal chiefs. 
(Irwin: 1986, p. 115) 
The initial stability of the early Mamluk Empire was later undermined by 
internal rivalry of factions. Not only the two main divisions were fighting 
(the Bahri Mamluks of Turkish origin stationed on Roda island in the 
Nile, against the Burji Mamluks of the Citadel who were mostly 
Circassians), but also emirs throughout the countryside were battling to 
control land. Conditions further deteriorated with incidents of plague and 
famine. The central government soon had no more control over individual 
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lords, and could no more enforce law and order, and oppose insurgencies 
from the bedouin tribes. 
The bedouin again experienced a decline of the caravan trade when Vasco 
da Gama discovered the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, 
and the India trade passed into Portuguese hands. Previously Arab traders 
(and Mamluk ships) had controlled the East-West transit trade for 
centuries, a great part of which passed through the Sinai, bringing great 
wealth to its people. Even the great efforts of Kansuh El-Ghuri, who ruled 
the country at the time and managed to improve conditions in Egypt, could 
not stop the Portuguese expanding their control in the Red Sea when they 
occupied Aden in 1513.14 (Lane-Poole : 1968, pp.350-351) By 1517 
Egypt's defences had practically disintegrated and the country was easily 
conquered by Selim I to become part of the Ottoman Empire. 
2.3 : Ottoman/Mamluk Sinai 1517 -1800 
When Selim I came to Egypt he brought with him a powerful army 
equipped with artillery, and soon broke the remaining resistance of 
Mamluks and bedouin alike. The Ottomans also introduced a new political 
60 
order : all land became state property, and was assigned to administrators 
to exploit in the name of the sultan, with revenues going to his treasury. 
Administrators received a fixed salary from the state and therefore lacked 
the incentive to extract maximum returns from the peasants. Local 
security, formerly in the hand of Mamluks, was provided by salaried 
troops. The large costs of this administration soon exceeded revenues and 
the state had to resort to a system of tax farming called iltizam, to make 
ends meet. The only available and suitable landlords were still the 
Mamluks, who soon resumed their former positions of power throughout 
the country.15 (Shaw: 1968, p.91-95) 
To pacify the bedouin the Ottoman government also appointed tribal 
sheikhs as multazims, and gave them control over some villages. This led 
to the first great wave of sedentarisation of nomads, especially in Upper 
Egypt. But it also undermined the egalitarian tribal structure, as sheikhs 
became hereditary feudal lords, while tribesmen were reduced to share 
croppers or even simple agricultural labourers. This process was a gradual 
one, and varied in direct relation to the power and stability of the central 
government in Cairo. In some districts such as Behnasa the tribes 
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remained in control until the middle of the seventeenth century. (Shaw : 
1968, p.101) 
The lack of agricultural land and peasant communities in the Sinai forced 
the government to resort to other methods to control the tribes there. Some 
were resettled to the eastern provinces of the Delta such as Sharqiya, 
where until now the majority of the population is of bedouin origin. Selim 
I had put a prominent Arab shaikh, "Abd al-Da'im ibn Badar, in charge of 
the province, thereby both obtaining ready money, and putting an ally on 
his exposed Syrian flank. 
Yet more bedouin arrived from Arabia to occupy the emigrants place in the 
Sinai deserts. The Egyptian government recognised the importance of 
controlling the peninsula that divided the Empire in such a strategic 
position. Therefore, the government in Cairo employed two main policies 
to achieve its goal : first, extending its military control over the Sinai by 
constructing forts along the major caravan routes; and second, buying the 
goodwill of the tribes with generous allowances for protecting and 
transporting the annual pilgrimage through the peninsula. 
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The Sinai slowly came under control of the Egyptian government and 
fortresses were constructed by the Ottomans at "Ajrud (near Suez), al-
x Arish, Khan Yunis, Nekhl, al-Tur, and "Aqaba. Some of these had existed 
before or during the Crusades and were only improved, but it was the duty 
of the governor in Cairo to provide for their staff and maintenance. From 
1595 onwards the Egyptian treasury had to pay for the cost of troops, 
usually between 50 and 200 men, garrisoned in each fort. Their purpose 
was to secure the vital roads that connected Egypt with Palestine and 
Arabia, from bedouin raids. A special body of infantrymen called the 
"Azab, Turks that were among the original conquerors, were used to staff 
forts throughout Egypt.17 (Shaw : 1962, p.191, 211-2, 394-5) But also 
other foreign recruits were used. A group of Moorish soldiers for example 
was stationed at Nekhl. Traces of their dark features can still be found 
amongst their descendants in the area today. In any case, the forts served 
their purpose well and highway robbery was greatly reduced. 
By the 18th Century the annual pilgrimage had developed into a massive 
operation, with tens of thousands of pilgrims from all over North Africa 
participating, which necessitated a likewise elaborate organisation to 
conduct them safely through the Sinai to the Hijaz. Etigh-ranking officers 
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of the Ottoman army were assigned to more important and remunerative 
positions in the administration, one of these was Emir al-Hadj. It was his 
responsibility to organise the pilgrimage caravan, arrange for its provisions 
and transport and provide for its safety during the course of the journey. 
Beasts of burden and guides were recruited from the tribes according to 
their respective territory along the course of the caravans. They were 
commissioned to improve the wells, and transport advance provisions to 
the forts. In 1538 Emir al-Hadj was provided with 450,000 paras for the 
expenditure of the operation, this sum had risen to 3,662,893 by the year 
1742. Although the caravan was accompanied by 500 soldiers in addition 
to the ones stationed at the forts, whose number had reached 2000 in the 
18th Century, part of this sum was paid to the bedouin tribes on the way to 
secure their protection. When the Emir failed to pay this tribute and 
keeping the money to himself, which did occur on numerous occasions, the 
caravans were raided and plundered. The power of the bedouin was so 
highly feared that a special guard of 300 men accompanied by relatives of 
the pilgrims was sent to Azlem with provisions to meet the pilgrims' 
caravan half way on their return journey. (Shaw : 1962, pp. 242-3, 394-
5) 
64 
Apart from al-' Arish, that had been a small port since Roman times, al-Tur 
the present seat of administration for South Sinai developed to be the mid-
way rest point for ships sailing between Suez and Jeddah. The Ottomans 
had established a small garrison there, but the town itself was controlled by 
the Towara tribe. They also held a monopoly on transporting Christian 
pilgrims and provisions between the coast and St.Catherine's monastery. 
This is documented in a series of treaties between the Towara and the 
monks of the convent recorded in the Kitab al-Umm kept by the Qadi of 
al-Tur (1592-1851).19 (Oppenheim : 1943, p. 137) 
One can conclude, that throughout the Mamluk period, and even later, well 
into the 19th century, the bedouin of Sinai never paid taxes and remained 
an expenditure item on the balance of the Empire's treasury. Whereas the 
rest of Egypt, including most of her bedouin, by 1800 served the purpose 
of their Ottoman rulers in exploiting the country's wealth, the Sinai 
retained a high degree of de facto autonomy. 
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2.4 First European Encounters : Napoleon 
The landing of Napoleon's troops near Alexandria in 1798 was the first 
step towards a long history of European involvement in Egypt. Not only 
would the French invasion and the subsequent opening to the West of a 
hitherto traditionally Islamic society transform the social and political 
fabric of the country, but it also marked the beginning of awareness of 
the European powers of the economic and geopolitical importance of 
Egypt. It can be rightfully argued that it was this French invasion which 
first aroused the interest of Britain in Egypt, and the rivalry between the 
two powers contributed significantly to the actual occupation in 1882. 
One of the most ambitious plans in history for the conquest of the Orient 
was the dream of the Corsican general who set out for Egypt in 1798. 
Egypt being at that time in a state of internal disarray and decline under a 
corrupt Mamluk Sultanate offered little resistance to the well equipped and 
disciplined French forces. Although the English had warned of an 
impending invasion Napoleon had little trouble landing near Alexandria, 
taking the city and moving onwards through the delta towards the west 
bank of the Nile near Cairo. He brought with him a choice of 30,000 
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soldiers accompanied by scientist and engineers with the hope to advance 
through Egypt, Syria and Persia to ultimately conquer India from the 
British. (Herold : 1963, pp.2-4) He hoped to enlist locals along the way 
and thus enlarge his forces to be capable of accomplishing this grand feat. 
Having taken Cairo after an easy battle with the Mamluks he set out in 
January 1799 for the advance into Asia through the Sinai Peninsula. On 
his way he would have to overcome Turkish forces that manned the forts 
from Sinai through Palestine and Syria. So he sent off an advance party 
into the Sinai of about 600 men led by his General Lagrange who 
succeeded after three days in establishing an outpost at Katia. He faced 
little resistance from the Turks and proceeded to recruit the local bedouin 
to form a Camel Corps that would provide the necessary transport for the 
French desert expedition. Another French party set out by sea travelling 
close to the coast towards al-'Arish. Three weeks later Lagrange was 
joined by 13,000 men consisting of infantry and cavalry under Generals 
21 
Kleber and Reynier who pushed onwards to al-'Arish. (Herold : 1963, 
pp.267-268) Although they had no problem pushing the enemy forward 
they found the town heavily fortified and the troops at their disposal 
insufficient. The narrow streets inside and surrounding the fort made it 
very difficult to storm the town without suffering heavy casualties. When 
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Kleber arrived one week later the siege of al-"Arish was still unsuccessful 
in breaking the Turkish resistance who were meanwhile supported by an 
additional force that had arrived from Khan Younis in Palestine and set up 
camp just outside the town towards the east. Kleber ordered a night attack, 
which proved to be a partial success, and quite a number of Turks fled 
eastward to Ghazza. On February the 10th, Napoleon set out to join his 
troops in al-'Arish to find the town still holding out. He ordered the large 
guns to advance and proceeded with a heavy bombardment, but still could 
not break the resistance of the barricaded troops inside. Not wanting to 
lose more men, he resorted to diplomacy by sending a letter to the 
Commander of the fort Ibrahim Nizam Bey, offering him an unharmed 
retreat, which was accepted by the defenders. Having taken al-'Arish, 
Napoleon advanced on the 21st of February along the Mediterranean coast 
to take Ghazza and onwards to lay siege to the fortress of Acre. (Al-
Jabarti: 1801) 
Acre proved to be impossible to take due to the reinforced and much larger 
Turkish force guarding it and the support of the British fleet under the 
command of Sir Sydney Smith. This was the turning point of Napoleon's 
campaign which shattered his dreams of conquering Asia, so he had to turn 
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back and retreat towards Egypt. By June he was back in al-'Arish with his 
troops and although they had only suffered moderate casualties the plague 
broke out and started extracting a heavy toll from amongst the French. He 
left a force of about 500 men under the command of Colonel Cazal in 
charge of the fort at al-'Arish and another guard at Katia to prevent an 
advance of the Turks and withdrew back towards the Nile Delta. 
Meanwhile England and Russia allied themselves with the Turks with the 
aim to oust the French from Egypt and reinstating control over the imperial 
eastern trade routes considered so vital to Britain. Realising the 
hopelessness of his situation Napoleon left General Kleber in charge of his 
forces in Egypt and left for France after evading the British blockade of his 
navy. The Turks had prepared a huge army of some 70,000 men to expel 
the French from Egypt while a British Expeditionary force was on its way. 
Realising the impossible situation Kleber entered into negotiations for a 
withdrawal from Egypt and an armistice was arranged. This was broken by 
the Turks in Sinai and at al-"Arish the small French force soon found itself 
facing an onslaught of some 30,000 Turkish troops aided by British 
officers that laid siege to the fort. Cazal and his men put up a heroic 
resistance to the overwhelming Turkish forces and endured several days of 
merciless bombardment causing heavy casualties, but finally had to 
69 
surrender. Kleber continued negotiations at al-'Arish and partly on a 
British battleship anchored offshore and pleaded with Sir Sydney Smith 
for being allowed an honourable withdrawal from Egypt. Britain refused 
to accept such generous terms and asked for unconditional surrender. By 
March 1800 the Turkish force under Youssef Pasha reached Egypt and 
defeated the French at Mataria near Cairo. Kleber was assassinated later in 
Cairo and was succeeded by his deputy General Menou who in turn was 
defeated by Sir Ralph Abercrombie near Alexandria. The British had also 
sent another force from India under General Bird who joined the fighting 
and the French were finally defeated and capitulated on the 31 st of August 
1801.23 (Elgood : 1931, pp. 207-251) 
2.5 The Reign of Muhamed Ali and the Rise of the "Eastern 
Question" 
One of the young officers who had come with the Turkish army to expel 
the French was Mohammed Ali , the ambitious future ruler of Egypt. By 
clever diplomacy and sometimes ruthlessly cunning methods he took 
advantage of the disarray of affairs in the country and in a few years had 
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effectively established himself as the paramount ruler even defying the 
authority of the Porte in Istanbul. The French General had brought 
modern science to the country, but his stay was cut short by the 
disastrous campaign through the Sinai and destruction of his navy by 
Admiral Nelson, and it was left up to Mohammed Ali the Ottoman 
Viceroy of Egypt to put grand modernisation schemes into practice. 
He succeeded in transforming Egypt from a rural backward country in 
1802 to a nation that by the 1830's would challenge the Powers 
themselves in supremacy over the Eastern Mediterranean. Mohammed 
Ali 's grip over power in Egypt soon made it evident that he is in fact a 
sovereign ruler of an increasingly independent country. This meant that 
the administrative boundary of his territory was being increasingly 
defined, and under his reign Egypt's administrative control extended not 
only over the Sinai peninsula, but also included several forts on the 
eastern shore of the Gulf of Aqaba protecting the pilgrimage route to 
Mekka. It can be ascribed to the reign of Mohammed Al i that the Sinai 
bedouin tribes were first brought under the control of the Egyptian 
security forces and the movement of caravans across the peninsula 
became safe and orderly. His campaigns in Syria and the Levant were all 
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too successful and the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul had to resort to the 
help of France and England to restore his control over the rebellious 
province of his empire. By 1841 Mohammed Al i had to concede the 
conquered territories back to Istanbul's control, but was in return 
rewarded with hereditary rights to the throne of Egypt, thereby 
advertedly further confirming the country's semi-independent status. 
The successors of Mohammed Al i continued his policy of becoming 
more and more independent of Istanbul and the Sinai Peninsula was 
increasingly being developed and integrated into Egypt's administration. 
When Mohammed Al i established himself on the throne of Egypt, Sinai 
was also under his authority. Yet the bedouin of Sinai were largely 
administering themselves ruled by their tribal sheikhs. The town of al-Tur 
was under the administration of Suez governorate, the fort of Nekhl and 
other forts in Sinai were under the authority of the Egyptian treasury and 
the administration of al-"Arish was taken care of directly by the Ministry 
of Interior Affairs. When the Wahabi uprising started in 1811 Mohammed 
Al i was put in charge of subduing the revolt by the Porte in Istanbul. He 
contemplated on whether to send his troops by land through the Sinai 
desert but due to the limited water resources opted for sending them by sea 
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from Suez to Yanbu. He thus founded the Boulaq shipyards and started 
constructing ships which were transported in parts to Suez where they 
were assembled. The fleet then transported 8,000 men under the command 
of his eldest son Tousson Pasha to Arabia where they established an 
operations base in Yanbu and then proceeded onwards to Mekka and 
Medina. After a series of intensive battles Mohammed Al i had to go to his 
rescue in 1814, he performed the holy pilgrimage but could not subdue the 
revolt of the Wahabis. Tousson returned with him to Egypt and shortly 
after succumbed to a serious illness and died in Cairo. So in 1816 he sent 
his second son Ibrahim Pasha who proceeded to Arabia with a new army 
down the Nile valley to Qena and crossed the Red Sea from Qusseir to 
Yanbu. This time the campaign was a success and Ibrahim reached Nejd 
the capital of the Wahabis where he captured their leader "Abdullah, who 
he sent back to Egypt and then onwards to Turkey to be executed in 1818. 
Ibrahim was rewarded by the Sultan with the title Wali of Makkah (Keeper 
of the holy places).24 (Al-Rafii: 1947 pp. 95-127) 
In 1821 Greece, which was under Turkish rule at the time, revolted and 
started its fight for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan 
asked Mohammed Ali for help, who had just subdued the revolts in Sudan, 
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and a fleet carrying 16,000 men was sent for Greece again under the 
command of Ibrahim Pasha. The campaign was successful and Ibrahim 
subdued many cities and town in Greece until the Great Powers England, 
France and Russia intervened and beat the Egyptian and Turkish navies at 
the famous battle of Navarin in October 1827. Turkey had to grant 
independence to Greece and Ibrahim returned to Egypt. Mohammed Al i 
was compensated by the Sultan for his efforts and expenses by granting 
him the rule over the island of Crete. (Dodwell: 1931 pp. 69-93) 
But Mohammed Al i had even greater aspirations, he wanted to conquer 
Syria and all the lands in between, which resulted in complete 
deterioration of his relations with the Ottoman Porte. He took a 
disagreement with the ruler of Acre as a pretext and sent a fleet, as well as 
a 24,000 strong ground force via the Sinai Peninsula under the leadership 
of his son Ibrahim, to put siege to Acre, which fell in May 1832. Ibrahim 
proceeded to conquer Damascus and continued towards Asia Minor after 
subduing the Turkish forces at the battle of Horns and was now threatening 
the very existence of the Ottoman Empire. The conquests of Ibrahim 
greatly alarmed the European powers as they had been warily watching the 
expansion of Russia's influence in the Balkan and Asia minor, what 
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became known as the "Eastern Question". A victory of Mohammed Ali's 
forces over the Turks they feared would lead Russia to intervene and 
consequently occupy the Dardanelles and control the entire Black Sea. In 
order to preempt against Russia's single action, Lord Palmerston rallied 
the support of Prussia and Austria to join England in an alliance to counter 
the Egyptian threat. A strategic move which was seen as necessary at that 
time to prevent the powers from falling out amongst themselves in 
containing Russia's ambitions. The Egyptian army in Syria could not 
withstand the combined power of the Europeans and finally Mohammed 
Al i had to give in and restrain his rule to Egypt and evacuate Syria and 
Palestine.26 (Weigall: 1915, pp. 73-77) 
European intervention broke Mohammed Ali's expansion, but it was also 
with the support of Lord Palmerston that he was granted the hereditary 
rights to the Throne of Egypt. It was by no means altruistic motives that 
drove Britain's policy, but it was seen as favourable to support Egypt's 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire which would decrease Turkey's 
influence and maintain the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean 
in favour of Britain. The British navy had also been expanding its bases in 
the Indian Ocean, Red Sea (Aden) and Persian Gulf creating a chain of 
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harbors and trade posts along the route to India. Even before the Suez 
Canal was built Egypt had already been recognized as the land Bridge 
between the Mediterranean and the East and was therefore drawn into the 
wider schemes of British long range colonial policy.2 7 (Dodwell : 1931, 
pp. 147-153) 
It thus came as no surprise that Mohammed Ali had the support of Britain 
when he disputed the eastern boundary of his domain. The firman of 1841 
installed Muhammed Ali and his dynasty as the hereditary rulers of Egypt 
in return for the payment of an annual tribute, but restricted the Egyptian 
army to 18,000 men. 2 8 (White : 1899, p. 450-3) A map accompanied the 
Sultan's firman which showed the eastern (administrative) boundary of 
Egypt to be a straight line from Al-'Arish to Suez, thus excluding the 
whole of southern Sinai from Egypt's territory. However, this was never 
the case in practice as Cairo continued to run all the forts in Sinai and the 
Hejaz forts until 1892. It also came accompanied by a map showing the 
territory of Egypt, the eastern boundary of Sinai shown as a straight line 
from Suez to Rafah, leaving most of the Sinai outside Egyptian territory. 
Again it was with British intervention that Egypf's administration would 
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include all of what is present day Sinai in addition to the forts along the 
eastern shore of the gulf of Aqaba. (Kliot: 1986, p. 153) 
2.6 The Reign of the Khedives and the Rise of the "Egyptian 
Question" 
Mohammed Al i fell i l l in 1848 and instituted his son Ibrahim as his 
successor. But Ibrahim did not last more than a few months on the throne 
before he also became seriously i l l and died in November 1848, and 
Mohammed Ali died shortly after in 1849. The grandson of Mohammed 
Al i , "Abbas Pasha, became the ruler of Egypt in 1848, until his 
assassination in 1854. Despite his reclusiveness and aversion towards 
foreigners he was a great supporter of modernization and introduced the 
first railway to Egypt. Said Pasha followed on the throne of Egypt and it 
was in his reign that one of the greatest works of the century was started, 
the construction of the Suez Canal, which had the greatest impact on the 
future of the Sinai Peninsula. 
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Said Pasha was succeeded by the son of Ibrahim, Isma'il Pasha, in whose 
time the Suez Canal was completed. Isma'il upon being confirmed as the 
ruler of Egypt in 1867 managed to have the line of succession altered to be 
premogeniture in his own family in exchange for raising the annual tribute 
to be paid to Turkey to 682,000 pounds, from 377,000 paid during the 
reign of Mohammed Ali . (Cromer : 1911, p. 667) The Suez Canal was 
inaugurated in November 1869 with some of the grandest celebrations the 
world has ever seen at the time. Isma'il provided the most lavish 
entertainment and hospitality to his guests that had arrived from all over 
Europe. About halfway on the course of the 176 Km long canal he built a 
new city to carry his name, Isma'ilia. On the other side of the Canal 
another settlement was founded which would become very famous during 
the First World War called Kantara. Isma'il had endless projects and plans 
for the modernisation of Egypt which he pursued uncontrollably. He built 
thousands of schools, hospitals, museums, railways, roads and bridges, 
telegraph lines and a modern postal service transforming Egypt to match 
the most advanced European powers of the time. But the spree of rapid 
expansion was also matched by his extreme squandering of money on 
feasts and presents until he effectively drove the country to bankruptcy. 
Large loans were procured from usurious European lenders and his 
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inability to service them finally opened the door to European 
intervention.31 (Weigall: 1915, pp. 102-114) 
The Eastern Question had intensified after the Crimean War (1854-58) and 
the opening of the Suez Canal created another Bosphorus right on Britain's 
trade route. This intensified the interest of Britain in gaining control of 
this vital waterway in order to expand her supremacy of the sea. When the 
Egyptian economy collapsed the creditor nations forced Isma'il to share 
his hitherto absolute power by forming a council of ministers under Nubar 
Pasha as Prime Minister which included two European Ministers, an 
Englishman, Mr Rivers Wilson as Minister of Finance, and the French 
Monsieur de Blignieres in charge of Public Works. Thus the "Dual 
Control" was born in 1876 and the Commission of Public Dept was set up 
to supervise the repayment of loans, one of its members was Major Evelyn 
Baring (who later became Lord Cromer). Isma'il, not being used to having 
to share his powers with a cabinet, did his best to obstruct their work 
which was not taken kindly to by Europe and upon their pressure the 
Sultan finally dismissed Isma'il and his young son Tewfik was instituted 
as Khedive of Egypt. His reign lasted until 1892, during which the Orabi 
revolt almost toppled the throne of Egypt were it not for British military 
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intervention which led to the occupation of Egypt in 1882. (Dicey : 
1902,pp.287-335) 
2.7 The Domestic Situation in Sinai 
The modernisation and progress of Egypt during the 19th Century had 
very little effect on the state of affairs in the Sinai itself until the 1880's 
when a more formal administration was set up for the peninsula. Thus 
most first hand information we have from earlier periods is from European 
travellers and adventurers that traversed the desert. One of the earliest 
well known traveller was Johann Ludwig Burkhardt whose vivid accounts 
of his journey in 1810 give us a good insight into bedouin life. He was 
followed by a number of other famous explorers such as Alexandre 
Dumas, Carl Ritter and Richard Burton. Although their accounts are often 
exaggerated and biased we can synthesise a general picture of affairs in 
Sinai at the time. 
During the campaign of Napoleon, and also of course when the various 
armies of Ibrahim Pasha crossed the Sinai, bedouin were always involved 
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in some way as trackers, guides and carriers with their camels. They 
invariably changed sides either acting for the French or Egyptians invaders 
or helped on the side of the Ottomans as the opportunity arises. The frenzy 
of activities across the Sinai provided them with a great deal of legitimate 
and other income at various times, but their true allegiance never lasted 
long with any one side. The greatest impact of the various military 
activities was probably the fact that they got hold of large amounts of 
modern weapons and ammunition which they put to good use in raiding 
caravans and inter tribal warfare. The tribes of Sinai, as all other bedouin 
in the Middle East, each have their own tribal area known as derak, the 
boundaries of which have been over centuries the subject of feuds and 
litigation. The ambiguous boundaries of these territories give the perfect 
excuse for disputes arising over grazing rights, the ownership of plots of 
palm trees or the rights to the waters of a particular well. The fact that 
their flocks of camels freely roam the desert in search of pastures make 
them the frequent target of theft, again the perfect reason for another tribal 
war. It is difficult to separate fact from fiction when such disputes are 
analysed in a historical context as no written records exist. The accounts 
of famous battles are passed on verbally and tend to be elaborated in 
colourful stories of heroic feats and are the centrepiece of evening 
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entertainment around the campfire. Yet some larger battles can be seen to 
have a historical foundation and they shape the traditions and relationships 
between the various tribes until modern times. The highways of Sinai at 
the beginning of the nineteenth Century were by no means safe for 
travellers or trading caravans. Merchants were always at the mercy of the 
bedouin and had to pay for safe passage to every tribe on their way. 
Protection money from the caravans was one of the most significant 
sources of income for the inhabitants of Sinai, although they did frequently 
render actual services also in the form of hiring out their camels to carry 
goods and people through their respective tribal territories. Under 
Mohammed Ali the bedouin started feeling the strong arm of authority, as 
he made a great effort, particularly in the course of his Syrian campaigns, 
to make the roads through Sinai safe. Thus Burkhardt writes : "At the 
time when Mohammed "Ali, Pasha of Egypt, had reduced all other 
Bedouins on the Egyptian hadj road to complete subjection, the "Omran 
still proved obstinate. In the year 1814 they attacked and plundered a 
detachment of Turkish cavalry near Akaba, and in 1815 they pillaged the 
whole advance corps of the Syrian pilgrim caravan from Medina to 
Damascus."33 (Burkhardt : 1831, pp.221-2) The Sinai bedouin by no 
means limited their raiding to the confines of the peninsula itself but also 
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attacked caravans on the Suez-Cairo road and well into Palestine and 
Arabia. 
Ibrahim Pasha before proceeding with his campaign in Syria had renovated 
and improved the wells at Katia, Bir el-'Abd and at Shaikh Zuwaid and 
appointed ^ghqfirs (guards) for each in charge of their upkeep. He also 
instituted a very efficient and regular postal service that carried mail by 
camel across the Sinai to Palestine and Syria, with stations at Kantara, 
Katia, Bir al-'Abd, al-'Arish, Rafah and Ghazza. 
His successor, Abbas Pasha seemed to have a special liking for the Sinai 
where he had a spa built at the sulphuric springs near al-Tur and 
constructed the first road linking the coast to the convent of Saint 
Catherine. He acquired some orchard lands from the convent and 
compensated the monks lavishly by granting them ownership of some very 
fertile land in the delta in exchange. He had planned to build a summer 
palace in the high valley of St.Catherine's and a paved road linking it to al-
Tur, but his plans did not materialise by the time of his death.34 (Dicey: 
1902, pp.20-25) 
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During the reign of Said Pasha the most important project in Sinai was the 
building of the quarantine station at al-Tur in 1858. The pilgrimage route 
from North Africa led almost exclusively by land through the Sinai 
Peninsula but towards the second half of the 19th Century more and more 
pilgrims preferred to take the sea route from Suez to Arabia. The port at 
al-Tur was consequently expanded and improved and due to its secluded 
position was a good choice for a suitable quarantine station. But the 
station was not fully utilised until its expansion and modernisation in 1893 
when it was brought up to an internationally acclaimed standard of the 
time as will be mentioned later.35 (Shukeir : 1915) 
2.8 Conclusion 
Egypt continuously controlled the Sinai since pharaonic times. During the 
th 
19 century law and order was progressively extended to the highways and 
towns of Sinai. By the 1880's the peninsula was well integrated into the 
territory controlled by the Egyptian government with its eastern boundary 
well defined as being a line running from Rafah on the Mediterranean to 
Taba, a small bay just west of Aqaba on the Red Sea. The highways, 
border and forts were under the control of the Egyptian army, while the 
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civilian administration based at Sinai's capital of the time, Al-'Arish, was 
controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The bedouin population was largely 
autonomous and managed its own affairs under their customary law and 
tribal traditions. However the international geopolitical position of the 
Sinai had been given very little attention by the Egyptian government. It 
was the British who first recognized the unique strategic position and 
geopolitical importance of Sinai in the wake of Mohammed Ali's 
conquests, the rise of the Eastern Question, accelerated Imperial expansion 
and colonial rivalry. They then consistently pursued international 
diplomacy towards Turkey, manipulating policy to ensure the inclusion of 
the Sinai in Egypt's territory, in order to secure British naval supremacy 
and along the route to Asia through control of the Suez Canal. 
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Chapter 3 
The British Occupation 1882 until World 
War I 
3.1 Introduction 
The protection of British investors' interests and the protection of 
foreigners' lives during the Orabi revolt may have been the official 
reasons for Britain's occupation of Egypt, but there were also more far 
reaching geo-political considerations involved. The Suez Canal had by 
that time proven to be of key importance for British imperial 
communications with colonies in Asia and its control became vital in the 
mind of late 19th century strategists. The security of the Suez Canal, 
however, also necessitates the control of its eastern shores and the Sinai 
Peninsula. 
The first years of the veiled occupation saw the British more preoccupied 
with the affairs of Egypt's debt and internal politics, but soon the split 
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with the Ottoman Empire started to emerge. Turkish displeasure with the 
occupation of Egypt and souring of relations with Britain over other 
issues gave rise to a "Turkish Threat" on the eastern boundary of 
Britain's most cherished possession. The rising importance of the Suez 
Canal to Imperial communications made British control of the Sinai 
imperative policy. "Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt ... The 
Mediterranean may be compared to a bridge, uniting Great Britain with 
India and the Far East, of which Egypt is the keystone."1 (White : 1899, 
p.103) 
Importance of control over Egypt and the Suez Canal intensified with the 
widening of the "Eastern Question" which used to be localized to south 
eastern Europe. The Powers were contesting Russia's grab for 
Constantinople as the Ottoman Empire was crumbling. They were 
reacting to Russian expansion in Central Asia, the German entrance into 
the pursuit of colonial ambitions, the rise of Japan as a military and 
commercial power in the Far East, and America's entry into the Far East 
with the occupation of the Spanish Philippines in 1898. Al l this shifted 
the Eastern Question towards Asia and the Pacific and made British 
naval communications even more important. Britain's continued military 
91 
control of the Canal was of course in direct contravention of the Treaty 
of Neutrality signed in 1888 by the European Powers which was to 
guarantee free access and navigation to all shipping regardless of 
nationality. The control of the Sinai Peninsula became an integral part of 
this policy. 
Two matters became central to British colonial policy for the Sinai: 
One, encountering the Turkish claim to their "province" by furthering the 
creation of an international boundary between Egypt and what would 
later become Palestine in order to legitimize any future territorial claims. 
The urgency became particularly evident as to contemporary statesmen 
future armed conflict seemed unavoidable. Marking their exact claims 
beforehand was a feature of colonial territorial policy of Britain. Two, 
devising a system of efficient military and administrative control for the 
Sinai peninsula with direct communications to British authorities, 
became a policy issue that entertained decision makers up to the highest 
levels in London. 
The Ottoman sultan tried again to sever the Sinai from Egypt's control in 
the firman of 1892 instituting 'Abbas I I as the ruler of Egypt. This was in 
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reaction to the British occupation, which Istanbul saw as an infringement 
on their rights over their territory, and now after 10 years it did not look 
like the British presence was of temporary nature. With the personal 
efforts of Cromer and British intervention the firman crisis was overcome 
and Egypt remained in control of Sinai, but had to relinquish the 
administration of the Hijaz forts to Turkey. 
Deterioration of relations with Turkey by 1906 and agitation on the 
boundary led to the "Taba Incident" and another incident at Rafah that 
was resolved just short of military confrontation. The British having by 
then recognized the strategic importance of retaining supremacy in the 
peninsula reacted by a show of power. In reaction to the two incidents, 
they sent a destroyer in both cases to counter a small party of Turkish 
infantry. The skirmishes resulted in the setting up of a boundary 
commission and the subsequent demarcation of the boundary in 1906. 
Although still only an administrative boundary between two provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire it was very significant that Britain should go to such 
trouble to demarcate this boundary. 
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Secondly, on the domestic front, British control over Sinai was achieved 
by changing the administration of the province to be under the Ministry 
of War. It was at British urging that the administration of Sinai was put 
under the Ministry of War rather than the Ministry of Interior as had 
previously been the case. Since the commander in chief of the Egyptian 
Army was an Englishman it would therefore be easier to retain direct 
British control over the Sinai through the Army. More attention was to 
be paid to the development and administration of Sinai than before the 
1906 border incident and a British officer became the governor of the 
Sinai, a position that would remain English until after the Second World 
War. Also an improvement of infrastructure and general development of 
the peninsula under British administration was to bond the Sinai bedouin 
to their British masters. 
This chapter wil l show that the control of the Sinai peninsula had become 
an integral part of British security policy in the Middle East leading 
towards the outright military confrontation with Turkey during the First 
World War, who entered the war on the axis side and attacked the Suez 
Canal. 
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3.2 Britain's Occupation of Egypt and International 
Diplomacy to secure Posession of Sinai ° The Boudarv of 
1906 
By the time the British occupation of Egypt began in 1882 the Sinai 
peninsula had been firmly controlled and integrated into the administration 
directed by Cairo. The influence of Egypt's Khedive extended over the 
boundaries of Sinai to include forts in the Hejaz. The peninsula enjoyed a 
good deal of modernization and the trade routes running through it had 
been secured. It had also been noted for its strategic importance for the 
security of British imperial communications and this would be the pretext 
for occupying the Sinai for another 70 years. 
As a consequence of the disastrous financial situation brought about by the 
squandering of Ismail Pasha the Khedive of Egypt, and the turmoil of the 
Orabi revolt that followed, Britain had to intervene in order to protect 
European investments in Egypt, most importantly of course the Suez 
Canal, the access to India and Asia. Their first encounter with the Sinai 
was of a rather unfortunate nature. In the wake of the impending invasion 
of Egypt, the British sought to protect their eastern flank by pacifying the 
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Sinai bedouin and win them over to their side should military action be 
necessary in the peninsula. So they sent Professor Henry Palmer 
accompanied by Capt. Jil an engineer, Lt. Charleston from the Royal Navy, 
a Syrian interpreter and nine camel drivers headed by Mutir abu Safin from 
the Laheiwat tribe of Sinai. Officially they were supposed to purchase 
camels for the British campaign, but their real purpose was to bribe the 
bedouin to stand against the Ottomans and cut the telegraph line between 
Egypt and Syria. The Navy allocated 20,000 pounds for the undertaking 
of which Palmer took 3,000 pounds with him on the expedition. The 
Arabs of Sinai were in a very excited state at the time having heard of the 
Orabi revolt and believed the British occupation to be near its end. The 
party was attacked by robbers from the Howeitat and Terabin tribes, with 
an intriguing involvement from Mutir and the Englishmen were killed and 
the money stolen in an ambush in Wadi Sudr on the 11th of August 1882. 
When the Orabi revolt was subdued a mission under the command of 
Colonel Sir Charles Warren was sent to Sinai to investigate and they 
returned with the culprits who were tried in Tanta. Five were executed and 
another seven received long prison terms. The remains of Professor 
Palmer and his party were also found and transferred to London where he 
was buried in St. Paul's Cathedral, a marble plaque details the 
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circumstances of his death. Colonel Warren published a book about the 
incident and a map detailing the location of Palmer's murder is kept at the 
Public Record Office in London. 
Nevertheless, the invasion of Egypt and subsequent occupation of the 
Canal and Sinai succeeded and the country came under direct British 
administration. Although the British were in Egypt with the consent of the 
Ottoman Sultan, by the late 1880's the Ottoman government had become 
very suspicious of the motives of continued occupation and started to 
demonstrate its sovereignty by issuing orders to Cairo regarding territorial 
arrangements. As a first move the Porte asked for the return to its 
sovereignty of the forts in the Hijaz which had until then been 
administered by Egypt. When Mohammed ' A l i was confirmed as the 
hereditary ruler of Egypt by the Ottoman Sultan, the firman was 
accompanied by a map on which the Eastern boundary of Egypt was drawn 
as a line from Suez to Rafah. The Pasha never recognised this as being the 
boundary of his country, but designated a straight line from Rafah, about 
45 Km east of al-"Arish, down to the Red Sea coast in north western 
Hijaz. The territory included all the forts of north-western Arabia from al-
Wagh to Aqaba, as well as the whole of the Sinai peninsula. However, 
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when Turkey asked them to be handed over, Egypt did not resist, since it 
was just spending money on the upkeep of these garrisons. It was 
therefore decided to comply with the orders of the sultan and withdraw 
from al-Wagh and Moweilah in 1887/8, followed by Aqaba in 1891 and 
the Eastern boundary of Egypt became an almost straight line from Rafah 
to a point just 5 Km South of Aqaba on the gulf of Aqaba.2 (Rizk : 1989, 
p. 46) 
When Abbas Hilmi I I followed Tewfiq Pasha as the ruler of Egypt in 1892 
the Sultan sent his firman to confirm him as Khedive of Egypt, but again 
attempted to sever the Sinai Peninsula from his sovereignty. The British 
High Commissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), keeping in mind 
the strategic importance of the peninsula, refused to accept the firman and 
it was not announced until a correction from the sultan was sent by 
telegram on the 8 t h of April 1892 conceding all of Sinai to Egypt. In order 
to avoid future misunderstandings Lord Cromer sent a note to the British 
Ambassador in Turkey to inform the Ottoman government that no firmans 
are to be changed that concern the affairs of Egypt without the consent of 
Great Britain. The Khedive visited al-Tur in June 1896 and another visit 
to al-'Arish in 1998. During this second visit he inspected the border post 
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at Rafah and had an inscription made on the granite pillars that demarcate 
the boundary to commemorate his visit. These pillars would become an 
important evidence in the boundary dispute of 1906 between Egypt and the 
Ottomans.3 (Rizk : 1989, p.64-66) 
By the mid 1890's Cromer had restored Egypt's finances and the 
continued British presence was now being questioned, not only by the 
Ottomans, but even by the British themselves. Cromer evidently favoured 
the withdrawal of Britain from Egypt and even solicited the support of 
Gladstone who had also advocated independence on many occasions since 
1882. Gladstone, then in opposition, wrote to Cromer in 1896 siding him 
against the imperialist attitude of the government in London that favoured 
the continued occupation for geopolitical reasons : " I am totally devoid of 
power. My opinion has always been the same; that we ought to quit Egypt 
after having fulfilled the work for which we went there with honour and 
profit to that country. So far as I know that time arrived some years ago."4 
(Mansfield: 1973,p.l64) 
In 1898 Kitchener reconquered the Sudan officially in the service of the 
Khedive, by a mandate confirmed by the Ottoman Sultan, the Khedive's 
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overlord. "Legally the Sudan was simply a province of the Turkish 
Empire, reconquered for the Sultan by British aid." But Britain 
announced that "henceforth these reconquered provinces should be under 
the explicit joint control of England and Egypt; and the suzerain rights of 
Turkey were tacidly ignored." 5 (Weigall : 1915, pp. 196-7) The final 
confirmation of Turkish suspicions came when England and France signed 
the entente cordiale in 1904, a treaty which provided for a settlement of 
colonial territories between them, in which Morrocco was allocated to 
France in return for control over Egypt to be left for Britain.5 (Mansfield : 
1973, p. 166) 
The High commission in Cairo meanwhile succeeded in positioning a 
British officer in charge of the Sinai in 1905, when Mr Bramley became 
the inspector for Sinai and started modernising the administration, which 
included the organisation of a local mounted police force and the building 
of the flood dam in Wadi aKArish. Egyptian nationalism under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kamel had become very active in attacking the 
British occupation at every possible occasion. Some local papers, opposed 
to the British occupation, claimed that Britain was sending her troops to 
Sinai to build forts on its border to cut it off from the Ottoman Empire. 
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When this news was conveyed to the Sultan by the Governor of Syria he 
ordered the establishment of military posts at Kusaima and Kuntilla which 
are both inside the boundary of Sinai. The Ottoman troops in Bersheeba 
had already been upgraded previously in 1899. Cairo being suspicious of 
the Ottoman movements ordered Mr Bramley to position troops at Ras 
Nabek to monitor the activities on the border. When Bramley found that 
the location was not suitable due to a lack of water he continued with his 
men to the Gulf of Aqaba, where he was met by the Turkish commander of 
the Aqaba fort, General Rushdi Pasha, who asked him to withdraw from 
this area. Bramley complied to avoid a military confrontation, but 
consequently Egypt asked the Sultan to form a joint Egyptian-Turkish 
commission to demarcate the exact course of the boundary between Egypt 
and Syria, this was refused.7 (Rizk : 1989, p.68-70) 
Egypt, having been alarmed by the Ottoman actions, sent a small force by 
sea under the command of Miralay Sa'd Ri f at Bey, the former military 
governor of the Sinai, to land at Taba and secure the boundary. When they 
arrived they found Rushdi Pasha's soldiers had taken defensive positions 
round the bay of Taba, so he had to withdraw to avoid unnecessary 
bloodshed. So on the 17th of February 1906 the British destroyer Diana 
left Suez commanded by Capt. Fips Hornby, who was accompanied by the 
Egyptian representative, Na'um Shoucair Bey, headed for Taba. They 
picked up Mr Bramley and his men at Phara'on island and continued 
towards Aqaba. They observed the Turks still occupying Taba, with a 
backup force of had more than 2,000 men entrenched at Aqaba ready for 
battle. Nevertheless, the overwhelming firepower of the destroyer, and the 
smooth negotiation skills of the Egyptian delegation, soon persuaded 
Rushdi Pasha that it would be better to solve the problem diplomatically. 
Having made their position clear, the destroyer then retreated to Phara'on 
Island to wait for the joint Turkish-Egyptian delegation that would settle 
the boundary issue. Rushdi Pasha was under the impression that the 
British were pursuing some dark and ulterior motive in Sinai and sent 
troops to Taba to stir up trouble. Naum Bey continued to meet him during 
the following days and explained that the primary reason why the Egyptian 
government wanted to mark the exact course of the boundary was to 
control cross border raids by the bedouin, which occurred frequently, with 
the culprits often fleeing to Palestine or Hijaz after committing crimes in 
Sinai and vice versa. As for the British they were helping to improve the 
economic and administrative situation of the peninsula with the only 
probable long term motive of securing the safety of the Suez Canal. The 
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Turkish delegates finally arrived in Cairo and continued from there by sea 
to Palestine and onwards to Aqaba, but then left without meeting their 
Egyptian counterparts. This angered both the Egyptians and British and 
the border negotiations were moved to take place between London and 
Estana. Turkey made several proposals for a new border : one was a 
triangular line joining al-'Arish with Suez and Aqaba, leaving the Tih 
plateau area of Central Sinai under Turkish administration; and another 
proposal was a line down the middle of the peninsula from al-" Arish to Ras 
Muhammad. Egypt continued to insisted that the border should follow the 
old line from Rafah to Taba.8 (Shoucair : 1916, pp. 588-594) 
Shortly after the incident in Taba the Turks sent troops to Rafah in April 
1906. There they removed the ancient granite border pillars and replaced 
several Egyptian telegraph poles with Turkish ones inside Egyptian 
territory, and then set up a military camp there. The Egyptian government 
again sent Shoucair Bey from the Military Intelligence Department as the 
Egyptian representative, and Captain Weymoth as the British 
representative, and they embarked on the destroyer Minerva from Port 
Said to investigate. They picked up a party of Arab sheikhs who were well 
familiar with the Rafah area and the position of the pillars, as well as 
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several desert policemen from al-'Arish and continued towards Rafah. 
There the Arab experts identified the correct former location of the pillars 
and testified that they had been removed by the Turkish soldiers two 
weeks earlier. Furthermore they had witnessed the replacement of the 
telegraph poles. Shoucair Bey then met with the Turkish commander at 
the site who, despite being confronted by the bedouin witnesses, denied 
that there ever were any boundary pillars at this location. He claimed that 
there were many pillars scattered in the area which were remains from the 
ruins of an ancient temple. Seeing that any further negotiations on this 
basis would lead to no results, Shoucair returned with the destroyer to Port 
Said. In the following days there were hot discussions in the Egyptian 
press on the legitimacy of Egypt's owning the Sinai or whether it should be 
returned to Turkey like the Hijaz forts. Also the implications of British 
intervention between the Ottoman Porte and Egypt, which was still 
officially a province of the Empire,were debated feverishly. To put an end 
to the speculations either way Britain issued an ultimatum to Turkey on the 
3 rd of May 1906 to evacuate its troops from Taba and Rafah and reinstall 
the boundary pillars to their old location within ten days or she would see 
to it that this was done, i f necessary, by the use of force. It was suspected 
at the time also that Germany had some role behind the scenes in 
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instigating the Turks to cause trouble in the Middle East. Even i f this was 
the case the Porte soon realised that Germany would not come to Turkey's 
help militarily and ordered his troops to withdraw in the last hours before 
the ultimatum expired and two new border pillars were erected at the 
location of the old ones. This was followed by a message from Turkey 
that they never intended to rescind their agreement of 1892, but they had 
only issued orders to their military representatives in Aqaba, Ghazza and 
Bersheeba to investigate the course of the boundary. They agreed that the 
boundary should be defined along topographical features that coincide 
approximately with a straight line between Rafah and a point at least five 
Kilometres south of the fort at Aqaba.9 (Shoucair : 1916, pp. 594-602) 
Upon this Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, issued the order on 
22.5.1906 to form a commission headed by Ibrahim Fathi Pasha and 
Miralay Roger Owen, aided by Na'um Shoucair Bey to meet with the 
Turkish envoys and proceed to finalise the border between Egypt and 
Palestine. This Egyptian delegation, augmented by two British surveyors 
and a number of other assistants, arrived in Aqaba by sea on 26.5.1906 to 
meet Rushdi Pasha and the Ottoman representatives and proceeded with 
the survey of the Aqaba area. It was agreed that the boundary should start 
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at a hill just East of the Taba bay and proceed along the peaks of 
mountains that coincide approximately with a straight line to Rafah. This 
being the best solution from a military point of view. So the two 
delegations proceeded following the surveyors as they marked the course 
of the boundary along prominent landmarks until they reached Rafah on 
the 28th of June 1906 and determined the location of the border on the 
Mediterranean to be at 35 '52 "8 degrees East and 29 '36 "1 degrees North. 
This boundary line coincided almost exactly with a straight line as agreed 
upon, but still it was disputed by the Turkish side who suggested that an 
administrative boundary should be established, which would give 
consideration to the allocation of tribal territories of the area. This would 
mean that some areas inside Sinai should be administered by the Ottomans 
for tax purposes. The Egyptian delegation of course protested against such 
a settlement and the matter was raised to their respective higher 
government entities.10 (Rizk : 1989, p.70-82) 
It was not until the 13th of September 1906 that the two boundary 
commissions received the final decision arrived at between Turkey and 
Britain. It was decided that the Ras Naqb area to the East of Taba to be 
included in the Ottoman territory, but that "Ain Gudeis and Kosaima 
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should belong to Egypt. From then on the boundary should follow an 
almost straight line to Rafah. Boundary pillars should be erected along the 
entire course of the frontier. The bedouin tribes along both sides of the 
border should have the same access to wells as prior to the settlement. 
Ottoman soldiers should be allowed to use wells that would be located 
within Sinai, just west of the border. Land ownership rights of the bedouin 
tribes along the boundary should be respected by both parties. 
These guidelines were incorporated into the final settlement signed by the 
dual commission on the 1st of October 1906. Documents and maps were 
drafted accordingly and the major points of the agreement were further 
defined in detail according to the survey. Boundary pillars were to be 
erected along the entire course of the frontier each within visual contact of 
the other and are to be kept in good condition by both sides. Access to 
water sources should be granted to the bedouin residing on either side of 
the frontier, but Ottoman soldiers wishing to use wells West of the 
boundary were not to cross while carrying weapons. Land ownership of 
bedouin on either side of the border are to be respected.11 (Shoucair : 
1916, pp. 604-614) 
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Finally the actual boundary pillars were erected as agreed starting on the 
31st of December 1906 at Taba and the last one of the 91 pillars war 
completed on the 9th of February 1907 at Rafah, each being within visual 
range of the other. The issue of this border would again become the 
subject of heated discussions and international diplomacy after the First 
World War in the light of the division of the Middle East between Britain 
and France. But for the time being Egypt had established police posts at 
Themmed, Kuntilla, Kosaima and Rafah to protect its border and things 
remained calm until the Ottomans entered the first World War on the side 
of Germany in August 1914.12 (Shoucair : 1916, pp. 614-615) 
3.3 The Advent of Modern Administration in Sinai 
The efforts of the Egyptian government to control the Sinai during the 
early part of the 19th Century concentrated on the upgrading and securing 
of the various forts along the main transit routes through the peninsula and 
there was very little interaction between the government and the local 
inhabitants until the 1880's. The main administrative posts were 
developed later towards the end of the 19th Century at the locations of 
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traditional trading centres and settlements. The most important being : al-
'Arish, Sheikh Zuweid and Rafah along the Northern coast; Nekhl, 
Themmed, Kuntilla and Koseima along the central route through the 
peninsula; al-Tur on the Gulf of Suez, and later police posts were 
established at Nuweiba and Taba. Two towns which were not under the 
Sinai administration but are nevertheless closely related to activity in the 
peninsula are Kantara on eastern bank of the Suez Canal opposite Isma'ilia 
and just beyond its eastern border the town of Aqaba. 
Although quite a number of forts were built during the Middle Ages all 
over Sinai there were only three main ones in operation when Mohammed 
"Ali became ruler of Egypt in 1805, al-"Arish, al-Tur and the fort of Nekhl. 
Then he conquered Arabia and later Syria, so the forts in these territories 
were also put under his administration. However, after his war with 
Turkey he had to return Syria and Hijaz in 1840 to the Ottoman Sultan. 
His forces only continued to hold the forts located immediately along the 
pilgrimage route in Sinai and Arabia, until these were also neglected when 
the pilgrimage went by sea starting in 1885. Since the Sinai pilgrimage 
route was no longer used the Egyptian government issued cabinet decree 
no. 133 of 21.May 1885, announcing their decision to put the 
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administration of the forts of Hejaz and Sinai under the responsibility of 
the Ministry of War, instead of the Ministry of Finance, as had previously 
been the case. Thus the director of the Intelligence department in Cairo 
became the overall governor of Sinai. [It should be noted here that the 
Sinai Peninsula remained under a military administration well into the 
latter part of the 20th Century, until the end of Israeli occupation in the 
1980's]. Al-Tur was prior to that administered as part of Suez governorate 
when it was joined to the al-Tih area's administration in 1893 and a 
military officer was appointed as commander of the Sinai Peninsula, with 
his headquarters at Nekhl. Both Nekhl and al-Tur were administrative 
centres and had a police post with an officer as director. When the 
Egyptian troops evacuated Aqaba in 1892 they set up a police post at Taba 
for some time, but due to the shortage of water built the fort at Nuweiba' in 
1893 to administer the gulf of Aqaba area. Since the retreat of Ibrahim 
Pasha's army from Syria in 1843 the military was withdrawn from the fort 
at al-'Arish and a civilian director was appointed answering to the 
Ministry of Interior. This state of affairs remained unchanged until the 
border incidents of 1906 when the Eastern frontier of Sinai was settled. 
From then on the three directorates of al-'Arish, al-Tur and Nekhl were 
consolidated under one military command based at Nekhl. In order to 
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patrol the Palestine frontier effectively further police posts were 
established at Kuntilla, Themmed, Kosaima and Nuweiba", each headed by 
a deputy director recruited from the local bedouin. An irregular police 
company was stationed at each location composed of infantry and camel 
mounted troops.13 (Shoucair : 1916, pp. 285-288) 
As for the judicial administration of Sinai, legal disputes between the 
bedouin were heard by the traditional ^urf courts, except for the towns of 
al-'Arish and al-Tur, which each had a judge appointed by the regular 
court in Suez. After 1884 only minor cases involving sentences up to one 
week imprisonment or a maximum fine of 15 pounds were decided in 
Sinai, larger cases had to be referred to the municipal court responsible for 
Sinai which was located at Zakazik, Sharkiya province. In 1911 the first 
Ministerial decree regarding the reorganisation of the court system in Sinai 
was issued by Isma'il Sirri Pasha, Minister of War. This stipulated that a 
specialised tribunal court should be formed in aKArish that would look 
into a much larger scope of cases. This would be headed by the military 
governor of Sinai assisted by a number of respected bedouin elders. These 
courts were then responsible for all civil and criminal cases in which the 
sentence does not exceed one year imprisonment or a 100 pound fine. 
Larger cases were still referred to the district court at Zakazik.14 (Shoucair 
: 1916, pp. 288-296) 
The government of Sinai, as previously mentioned, was the responsibility 
of the Ministry of War in Cairo and therefore the Commander in Chief of 
the Egyptian Army was in effect the highest authority of the peninsula. 
Since the occupation of Egypt this position was usually held by a British 
officer : Sir Francis Granville 1885-1892, General Kitchener 1892-1899, 
Sir Reginald Wingate 1899- 1914. The actual administration of Sinai was 
the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Department within the 
Ministry of War, which was also usually headed by an Englishman : Sir 
Wingate from 1894 until he became Commander in Chief of the army in 
1899, followed by Count Callahan, Lord Edward Cecil, General Roger 
Owen, General Stark, and General F. Clayton who served during the First 
World War. The Directors of Sinai, or later Governors, were appointed by 
the Military Intelligence Department: Sa d R i f at Bey 1892-1900, Hamed 
Mukhtar Bey 1900-1904, Mohammed Kamil Bey 1904-1905, Mr W.J. 
Bramley 1905-1906. After the boundary incidents of 1906 the strategic 
importance of the Sinai Peninsula became increasingly clear to the British 
and they made sure that the peninsula would continue to be administered 
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by an Englishman. In 1911 the position of Director was upgraded to be 
Governor of Sinai. Colonel Parker ruled the Sinai, first as Director then as 
Governor, from 1907 until 1912 and again after the War from 1918 until 
1923. He was succeeded by C.S. Jarvis who remained Governor until 
1935 followed by G.W. Murray who stayed until the Second World War.1 5 
(Shoucair : 1916, pp. 302-310) 
3.4 Economic and Social Development of Sinai under British 
Administration 
The largest settlement since ancient times was always aKArish, which is 
located about halfway between the Suez Canal and Ghazza and was built 
on the ruins of the Roman town of Rhinoculorum. The Arabic name is 
said to be derived from the thatched palm reed roofs ("Arish) so typical of 
its houses. The little town consists of a number of narrow streets clustered 
around its ancient fortress which has featured in many battles and has been 
inhabited since prehistoric times. The fort is located on the southern edge 
of the settlement on a hill with its gate opening out towards the market of 
the town. The fort was in constant use throughout the 19th century and 
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also became a Turkish stronghold during World War I , when the imposing 
four corner towers were each equipped with a powerful Krupp cannon. 
Several inscriptions are carved into the stone at the gate and inside the fort 
dating from various points in history commemorating the battles or visits 
by Sultans and other dignitaries in Turkish or Arabic and the older ones in 
Roman and even Hieroglyphic. The fort, as it stood in the 19th Century, is 
believed to have been expanded in the 16th Century on the foundations of 
the older antique fort. Since before the reign of Mohammed "Ali the 
administration of al-'Arish was directly under the Ministry of Interior until 
1906 when it was put under the Ministry of War. The town also had the 
only secondary school in the peninsula at the time, a hospital and a court 
that was under the higher court of Sharkia Province. According to the 
census of 1907 the population of the town stood at 5,851 almost all being 
settled bedouin, and are engaged in trade as well as agriculture. The main 
produce was barley, melons , cucumbers, citrus fruits and dates from the 
famous palm tree orchards, which are still the main crop today. Several 
shrines of Muslim shaikhs are found in al-" Arish and the town has lovely 
well kept gardens. 
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Rafah is a small border post 65 Km east of aKArish with about 200 
inhabitants who were mainly engaged in border trade, or smuggling, as the 
case may be. The police post there was not established until 1907 after the 
boundary between Egypt and Ottoman Palestine had been fixed. Also on 
the route from the Suez Canal to the Palestine border is the settlement of 
Katia approximately 50 Km north-east from Kantara, which often served 
as an advance post for military purposes. It has a number of palm groves 
around its wells tended by their bedouin owners. 
Almost exactly in the centre of the peninsula halfway between Suez and 
Aqaba is Nekhl, which for centuries served as the most important rest 
point on the pilgrimage route. In the 19th Century it became the 
administrative capital of Sinai. A company of soldiers was stationed at the 
fort of Nekhl in charge of securing the safe passage of pilgrims, traders 
and travelers. The inscription at the gate mentions Sultan Kansuh al-Ghuri 
as the builder of the fort in 1516. Its location, on a hill in the middle of a 
wide plain flanked by mountain ranges on the North and South sides, gives 
it a perfect commanding position for controlling this important East-West 
route, as well as the junction with the Wadi al-" Arish draining from the al-
Tih plateau towards the Mediterranean. Since the reign of Mohammed 
"Ali the fort was upgraded and a weekly postal service connected it to 
Egypt and Palestine. The importance of the location was always 
connected to the three wells, which have abundant water throughout the 
year, to supply even large caravans. In 1906, under the British 
administration of Wilfried Jennings Bramley, a dam was built about two 
kilometres South of Nekhl to hold the flood waters of Wadi al-'Arish and 
put a large area in the Wadi under cultivation. Nekhl continued to serve as 
the centre of administration throughout the British occupation and well 
into the middle of the 20th Century. After 1906 administrative police 
posts were also established at Themmed, Kuntilla and Kosaima to control 
the eastern approaches of the peninsula.16 (Jarvis : 1931, p. 126) 
On the western coast of Sinai the most important settlement is al-Tur 
located 220 km South of Suez. For centuries the little town served as the 
starting point for visitors to the convent of St.Catherine's about 150km 
inland. The fort at al-Tur dating back to the 16th century, probably also 
built around the same time as Nekhl, held a very important register called 
Kitab al-Omm. This was administered by a court scribe and contained all 
the land deeds made out between bedouin tribes of the area and treaties of 
various kinds with the monks of St.Catherine's. Unfortunately, the 
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existence of this book has only been passed on verbally and no trace or 
copy of it remains today. It was said to contain records of alliances entered 
into between the tribes and also rights to the protection of the Convent and 
carriage of goods and pilgrims between al-Tur and St.Catherine's, which 
was always an important source of income for the bedouin. 
1884 was the last season in which the pilgrimage caravans went by road 
from Suez via Nekhl to Aqaba and onwards to Arabia. Until then the 
provision of camels and guides for the pilgrimage was one of the most 
important economic activities for the Sinai bedouin, and the rights were 
divided up very carefully between the tribes of the area. When this 
legitimate activity was progressively curtailed by the increasing popularity 
of the more comfortable sea route, the bedouin could only resort to 
smuggling and raiding to compensate for the income. Money earned from 
the sale of livestock to mainland Egypt and Palestine, together with some 
trade in tobacco and coffee was not enough to sustain a living. This led to 
large outward migrations from Sinai and the population dropped by half by 
the beginning of the 20th Century. 
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In 1858 the first quarantine station was built at al Tur to house pilgrims 
traveling between Suez and Yanbu or Jeddah and it was expanded and 
modernized in 1893. The station was equipped with the most modern 
facilities of the time : Three jetties across the coral reef connected arriving 
ships with the fumigation rooms and a narrow gauge railway took pilgrims 
to their living quarters; a water supply plant and electricity generation unit; 
four clinics, a pharmacy and post office; telegraph and telephone line was 
added in 1907. Regular steamer service connected al-Tur to Suez twice 
weekly and more often during the Hajj season. The centre could hold tens 
of thousands of pilgrims at the same time and the statistics show that 
between 1900 and 1914 358,341 persons passed through it, the highest 
number was the season of 1907 when 43,271 pilgrims used the facility. 
Most illnesses were noncontagious diseases but some cases of yellow fever 
and very rarely also plague had to be isolated.17 (Shoucair : 1915, pp. 134-
138) 
As for the finances of Sinai the military administration gradually increased 
the budget allocated to developing the peninsula from 3,857 pounds in 
1906 to 14,711 pounds in 1914. Apart from salaries for the police and 
administrators, the various bedouin sheikhs were given a salary by the 
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government. Previously this was meant as compensation for providing 
carry camels and provisions for the annual pilgrimage. After these 
services were no longer needed the government continued to make these 
payments and the sheikhs were responsible for keeping peace and order 
within their tribal boundaries and were held personally responsible for any 
robbery committed in their area. This was very much in line with bedouin 
tradition where the tribe held collective responsibility towards outsiders 
for any crime committed by one of their members and could therefore be 
seen as an extension of this age-old system of justice. Considering the 
environmental and geographical factors it was also the most efficient and 
economic way for the government to control public order in Sinai. 
The inhabitants of Sinai enjoyed special privileges granted to them by 
Mohammed "Ali in recognition of their difficult life in a hostile 
environment, and in return for their loyalty to Egypt against any intruders 
from the East. This was in form of an exemption from the compulsory 
military service and an exemption from paying taxes on the usage of land 
for palm groves or other agriculture. Only the Bardawil lake was rented 
out annually by public auction from which the government gained about 
100 pounds every year. The government also had some other income in 
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the form of customs duties paid for livestock transiting through the Sinai 
coming from Syria and Iraq, which was then sold east of the Suez Canal. 
In 1906 over 27,000 camels and 54,000 head of sheep passed through 
customs at Kantara and Suez with the government collecting 8 % import 
duty on the estimated value of livestock.18 (Shoucair : 1915, pp. 297-299) 
Regular weekly postal services in Sinai date back to the early 19th Century 
and continued to be carried by Camel, except al-Tur which was serviced 
by a steamer line that stopped there between Suez and Jeddah. The first 
telegraph line between Egypt and Syria via al-'Arish was completed in 
1865 and the line to al-Tur went into operation in 1896. When the Eastern 
boundary of Egypt was fixed in 1906 a telephone line was installed linking 
Suez with Nekhl, Themmed, Kuntilla, Kusaima, al-" Arish and Rafah. This 
enabled the governor of Sinai based in Nekhl to have direct 
communications with all the major police posts of the peninsula.19 
(Shoucair : 1915, pp. 297-299) 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown that until the late 1890's Britain's presence in 
Egypt was officially and legitimately to restore public order after the Orabi 
revolt in 1882 and protect foreign investments and residents, as well as 
supervise Egypt's finances until the public debt is settled. By 1900 it was 
clearly evident that these objectives had been met, and from then on it was 
Britain's geopolitical goals of imperial supremacy that became the primary 
focus in Egypt : to retain control of the world's most important shipping 
route, of which the Suez Canal was the vital link. To maintain the 
security of the Canal the Sinai had to be also controlled by Britain. 
Although the Porte at fist approved of Britain's presence in Egypt, 
relations with Turkey soured progressively, coming close to a military 
confrontation in 1906. It was at Britain's initiation that the eastern 
boundary between Egypt and the rest of the Ottoman Empire would be 
clearly demarcated, thus including the Sinai in Egyptian territory. Once 
this had been achieved a British officer was put in charge of the Sinai, a 
position that would be held by an Englishman until after the Second World 
War. 
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But not only was Britain very active on the international front in securing 
the Sinai for Egypt but a domestic strategy was implemented through 
which British administration would be deeply implanted in the peninsula. 
Having consolidated the administration of Sinai to be under one central 
command headed by a military officer, great attention could be given to 
the economic and social development needs of the governorate. Several 
positive policies were thus implemented which improved life for the local 
inhabitants tremendously. The underlying logic was that i f the local 
population starts to see the benefits of British government they would 
render their support at times of war or other threat from abroad. A number 
of achievements can be credited to the British occupation of Sinai in the 
period before World War I such as the unification of the entire peninsula 
into one governorate, which streamlined and standardized administration. 
The foundation for organized judicial proceedings were laid incorporating 
the traditional rurf system of law, which for the first time brought order to 
the bedouin tribes and greatly reduced armed disputes. Public security was 
greatly enhanced by the formation of an organised police system, with 
posts throughout Sinai to enforce law and order and reduce smuggling. 
The local tribal chiefs were involved in this administration and annual 
allowances were provided for the sheikhs of the bedouin tribes. Also the 
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economic situation progressed with improvements in the infrastructure of 
the peninsula, such as the building of rest houses for travellers, renovation 
of the forts of Nekhl and al-'Arish, digging of modern wells and 
improvement of existing ones at Rafah, Nekhl, Kuntilla, aKArish and al-
Tur, building the dam in Wadi al-'Arish and expanding the agricultural 
land available in the area and linking the main administrative centres by 
paved roads, telegraph and telephone. Thus the Sinai had been brought 
into the realm of modern administration, and when the First World War 
started the peninsula was firmly under British control. 
123 
NOTES Chapter 3 
1 White, Arthur Silva. "The expansion of Egypt under Anglo-Egyptian 
condominium". Methren, London : 1899, p. 103 
2 Rizk, Yunan Labib. "Taba - Qadiyat al-'Asr". Cairo : 1989, p.46 
3 Ibid., pp.64-66 
4 Mansfield, Peter. "The British in Egypt" Wiedenfeld & Nichoson, 
London : 1971, p. 164 
5 Weigall, Arthur E.P.Brome. "A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 
1914". William Blackwood and sons, Edinburgh and London : 1915, pp. 
196-197 
6 Mansfield : 1971, op.cit, p. 166 
7 Rizk : 1989, op.cit., p.68-70 
8 Shoucair, Na'um Bey. "Tarikh Sina' wal Arab". Cairo : 1915, pp.588-
594 
9 Shoucair : 1915, op.cit., pp. 594-602 
1 0 Rizk : 1989, op.cit., p. 70-82 
1 1 Shoucair : 1915, op.cit., pp. 604-614 
1 2 Ibid, p. 614-615 
1 3 Ibid., p. 285-288 
124 
1 4 Ibid., pp. 288-296 
15 Ibid., pp. 302-310 
1 6 Jarvis, Claude Scudamore. "Yesterday and Today in Sinai". William 
Blackwood & Sons, London : 1931, p. 126 
1 7 Shoucair : 1915, op.cit, pp. 134-138 
1 8 Ibid, pp. 297-299 
1 9 Ibid, pp. 299-301 
125 
Chapter 4 
Wold War I in Sinai 
4.1 Introduction 
By 1914 Britain had clearly recognized the strategic position of Sinai and 
the need to defend the Canal from Turkish attack. Two factors shaped 
British policy towards Sinai and also influenced the military history of 
British engagement in the Middle East. 
One, during the Sinai campaign it had become clear that the Sinai's 
terrain was more suitable for mounted infantry than tanks which led to 
the formation of the Camel Corps and the development of a symbiotic 
relationship between British officers and the bedouin. The Sinai 
Campaign and the subsequent British/Arab conquest of the former 
Ottoman provinces had for the first time given the Imperial Army a test 
training on how to master the adversities of the Middle Eastern deserts 
with their bedouin inhabitants. Fueled by the heroic tales of British 
officers like T.E. Lawrence and the successes of the Arab legion this 
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relationship would influence British military strategy in the Middle East 
for the half century to follow. 
Two, Britain's larger Imperial scheme started to unfold and the grand 
plan of the British Empire in the Middle East would include roads and 
railway linking Egypt to Syria, Iraq and beyond became a British dream 
to be realized. A formulation of an Arab policy for the future of the 
Middle East inspired statesmen of the time. The Sinai would be the link 
between the African and Asian parts of the British Empire and it 
benefited from the War and the attention it received. In Sinai the war 
meant the building of the railway, roads, airfields, pipeline, telegraph and 
telephone communications. 
This chapter deals with the events of World War I in Sinai, and how 
British policy towards the peninsula was formulated. When the 
importance of Sinai to British interests became increasingly evident no 
measures were spared to recapture the peninsula from the Turks who had 
invaded the Sinai early on in the War. The British also entertained a keen 
interest in the bedouin and their desert environment, which was put into 
practice by forming the Camel corps and the Arab legion. Great emphasis 
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was also put on the infrastructure development in the Sinai. A spree of 
construction during the War created roads, a railway, water pipeline and 
modern communications. The economic improvements and better living 
conditions were also directed towards serving British policy in gaining the 
trust and loyalty of the bedouin. 
Finally, from the experiences of the War Britain developed a special 
administration that would be suitable for controlling frontier desert areas 
inhabited by bedouin in the Middle East. This would materialise in the 
form of the Frontiers Districts Administration, a department in the 
Egyptian Ministry of war, which would be commanded by British officers 
and would become the primary vehicle for retaining British control in the 
Sinai until the Second World War. It is evident from the records of the 
High Commission in Cairo that great emphasis was put on the quality of 
personnel recruited for the Frontiers Districts Administration, as these 
British officers in charge of the deserts would serve as role models and 
their strong leadership would bind the bedouin to the British 
administration rather than to the Egyptian government in Cairo. 
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4.2 Military Campaigns in the Sinai 
It was evident from the start of hostilities between Turkey and Britain in 
the Middle East that the former was i l l advised to enter the war and its 
efforts were doomed to failure. The main reason why Germany pushed 
Turkey to engage in fighting in Sinai was not with the hope of 
reconquering Egypt, but more to occupy Britain and divert her military 
resources from Europe and therefore relieve the pressure on the Germans 
on their Western front. When war was declared in July 1914 the Allies 
tried to persuade Turkey to remain neutral and not to side with Germany, 
but to no avail. Germany had persuaded them to engage on two fronts, one 
army would attack Russia in the Caucasus and another would launch 
attacks from Iraq and Syria on the British in Egypt with the aim to block 
the Suez Canal. The British reacted by proclaiming their protectorate over 
Egypt, and the secession of the country from the Ottoman Empire. The 
Khedive Abbas Hilmy, a sympathiser of the Ottomans, was in Turkey at 
the time. He was deposed during his absence and replaced by his pro-
British uncle Hussein Kamil who assumed the title of Sultan to reflect the 
new status of Egypt.1 (Newman : 1928, pp.206-207) 
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The Ottomans recruited armies from their provinces, Baghdad, Basra, 
Mosul, Kirkuk, Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, until they had more than 
120,000 men at their disposal for their campaign. They also pushed 
forward the construction of a railway with great speed, one line would 
connect Asia minor with Damascus and onward to Medina in the Hejaz. 
At Deraa another line branched off from the Hejaz railway to Haifa and 
down the Mediterranean coast, a line connecting Jaffa with Jerusalem, and 
a branch running towards the south via Nablus to Bersheeba. When 
Turkey officially entered the war on the 30th of October 1914 their 
commander in Syria, Marshall Zaki Al-Halabi, was not very enthusiastic 
and believed that a campaign against Egypt would not be very successful 
since he had failed to collect enough camels and could not persuade the 
bedouin tribes to join him. So he was replaced by Ahmed Jemal Pasha as 
commander in Chief who proceeded to reinforce Ottoman defences on the 
coastline and brought the troops from Mosul to Aleppo to be his rear 
guard. He then prepared three Arab battalions from Syria and two Turkish 
ones from Izmir and Estana, together some 60,000 men for the attack on 
Egypt. To this army he added 9,000 men from Syria and about 1,000 from 
Hejaz to bring the total number to engage in Egypt to 70,000 men. Heavy 
long range artillery was brought in from Estana and over 8,000 camels 
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were collected for carrying of rations and ammunition. The army also 
included a number of doctors and engineers, and 36 specially constructed 
boats that would be connected to form pontoon bridges across the Suez 
Canal. Meanwhile Turkish, German and Austrian agents were instigating 
unrest and opposition to the British inside Egypt and they also managed to 
persuade the Senussi tribes from Libya to harass Allied forces in the 
Western Desert. The British launched long range operations to contain the 
provocative actions in the Western Desert and on the domestic front 
arrested many Germans and Turks and others were deported to Malta. By 
1915 Britain had come in control of the major shipping lanes in the 
Western Mediterranean and landed thousands of troops in Egypt in 
preparation for action in the Sinai. The peninsula had been partially 
evacuated in the Autumn of 1914. Troops were withdrawn from aKArish 
on 24th of October, Nekhl was evacuated on the 30th of the same month 
and the Turks occupied the Eastern part of Sinai and the central al-Tih 
plateau.2 (Jarvis : 1938, pp. 144-146) 
But the defences on the Suez Canal zone were multiplied and British 
troops spread throughout Egypt to every town and village in the Delta and 
also southward all the way to the Sudan. The free spending soldiers 
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brought a boom to the Egyptian economy and more than compensated the 
country for the slump in cotton prices at the time. The Sinai was 
evacuated after the major wells were blasted to make the difficult terrain of 
its desert into a buffer between the canal and the Turks. They also 
destroyed the flood dams on the north-western coast of Sinai and flooded a 
huge area extending as far south as Kantara. Trenches were dug on both 
sides of the canal and were manned with some 50,000 men, with another 
backup force of 40,000 stationed mainly at Zakazik and other towns in the 
eastern Delta. Patrol boats were launched on the Bitter Lakes and heavily 
armed trains patrolled along a railway line connecting Port Said with Suez 
along the entire length of the Canal. The Royal Air Force was brought in 
and started reconnaissance flights over Sinai and all other possible 
measures were taken for the defence of Egypt.3 (Wilson : 1939, pp. 138-
139) 
Anyone familiar with the history of military operations across the Sinai 
had no doubt at all that the Turks were going to experience a heavy defeat, 
not only because of the defences that had been erected. The difficult 
terrain and inhospitable weather, with the lack of water has proven for 
many centuries to be the best defence Egypt had for its Eastern front. 
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From Alexander to Napoleon every campaign in the Sinai was doomed and 
could only be carried out i f naval support was available. Alexander had to 
conquer the ports of Palestine and Syria first before he could venture 
through Sinai supported by the Phoenician ships travelling parallel to his 
army, and Napoleon's miserable experience I have already mentioned 
earlier. Also Ibrahim Pasha's army did not venture through the Sinai until 
a naval invasion of Syria was successful. He himself also preferred to 
make the trip by sea. But in order for a successful naval campaign to be 
launched from Syrian ports every general throughout the ages realised that 
he must also control Cyprus. Even Ptolemeus knew this and made all 
effort to occupy Cyprus before attacking Phoenicia. But the Turks in 
World War I had no other choice but to take the land route to Egypt since 
Cyprus then was firmly in British hands. Furthermore, there is no place in 
Sinai that was suitable to establish a base camp were troops can rest and 
consolidate their strength before launching an attack on Egypt. So every 
invading army must carry its entire food rations, ammunition and water 
supply needed for the entire campaign, back and forth for over 250 km 
each way, because the existing wells can not support an army of any 
significant size. In the best case, i f the campaign was to be held during 
winter and it coincides with ample rains in that year, the maximum number 
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of troops that could make it would not be more than 20,000. Even then 
they would be under enormous psychological stress hoping not to run out 
of water, marching through inhospitable terrain to reach the canal 
exhausted in order to face a much larger and well rested defensive force 
there. 
These considerations did not deter the Ottoman army from starting their 
move through Sinai at the end of January 1915. (see figure 4, p. 135) The 
most direct route from Palestine to the Suez Canal is the Northern road 
from Rafah via al-'Arish and Katia to Kantara, since al-"Arish can offer 
the largest water resources, but Jemal Pasha knew too well that he would 
suffer heavy losses i f he moves that close to the coast, well within the 
firing range of British naval artillery. He therefore chose a more central 
route from Jerusalem to Bersheeba where he set up his headquarters for the 
whole campaign. There he divided his army into three sections and each 
would take a different route to the Canal. A small force composed of 
Syrian volunteers and bedouin led by Mumtaz Bey advanced along the 
coastal road and occupied al-'Arish and continued via Katia to Kantara. 
Another section headed south-east to occupy Nekhl and advance towards 
Suez along the hadj route to attack at the Suez bridge. And the bulk of his 
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Map 3 
TURKISH ATTACK ON SUEZ CANAL. 
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forces took a central route via Bir al-Hammad, Bir al-Gifgaf and al-Khabra 
to attack near Isma'ilia. When he reached al-Khabra he again split his 
forces, a small party led by Kaman Bey continued towards the bridge near 
Isma'ilia and the rest moved under his own command to Kathib al-Nasari 
located within three hours marching distance of the Canal at Serapeum and 
Tousson. The Turks had been accompanied by several German officers 
who co-ordinated the Turkish attack to be simultaneous at all four points 
of the Suez Canal front in the morning of February the 3rd, 1915. Only 
20,000 men had actually reached the front line, but they probably 
speculated that they might be lucky and catch the British and Egyptians off 
guard and that maybe the internal unrest in Egypt would ferment to 
outright rebellion and the Ottomans would stand a chance. Even i f no 
victory was to be won they would have achieved their ulterior motive of 
having diverted British resources from the war in Europe.4 (Crutwell : 
1939, pp. 351-352) 
One can deduce that Jemal Bey must have had orders to attack regardless 
of any circumstances, because when he reached the Canal he did not 
bother to send reconnaissance teams to assess the strength of the 
defendants as is customary in warfare. Also, when he actually attacked he 
only sent in about half his troops. This advance party was mainly 
composed of Syrians and other Arabs, and held the Turkish soldiers back 
at a distance of about 5 Km inland. In any case, they ended up as cannon 
fodder for the defending forces across the Canal that reduced them by the 
end of the day to a pitiful lot. The strongest attack came at the battle of 
Serapeum where the Ottoman army fought bravely as even the British later 
conceded. Their six inch artillery even managed to hit the "Harding" a 
British destroyer before it was silenced, and even launched some attack 
boats, but nevertheless by 6 p.m. the exhausted attackers had to withdraw 
and the British did not even find it worthwhile to pursue them into Sinai. 
Only a small party stayed in the trenches on the eastern bank of the Canal 
for the night and continued sniping at the defensive positions. So, on the 
morning of the following day, February 4th, the British launched a counter 
attack which at first was met with heavy fire, but when assisted by 
reinforcements stormed the Ottoman positions at bayonet point and 
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy before capturing the rest of about 250 
men. The Ottoman losses in this battle came to 1250 dead, 2000 wounded 
and 750 prisoners of war. As for the defending British and Egyptians their 
losses were not more than 60 men wounded or killed. 5 (MacMunn & Falls : 
1928,pp.37-46) 
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Having already suffered a great deal on the way through the Sinai to 
Egypt, Jemal Pasha saw it wiser to withdraw his forces and save their 
energy for the long road back to Bersheeba and not attempt to challenge 
the Suez Canal line another time before having reinforced his army with 
many more men and equipment and continued building the railway further 
into Sinai. Meanwhile the British had landed their troops in Iraq and the 
Russians made headway from the North and were now both threatening 
Baghdad which made another Turkish attack on Egypt even more 
questionable. Still the Suez Canal was further reinforced with artillery and 
trenches and troops on the Eastern bank as well making it into one of the 
strongest fortresses of the time.6 (MacMunn & Falls : 1928, p. 47) 
When part of Jemal Pasha's army had reached Nekhl on their way to the 
Suez Canal a small party of about 70 men had split off and headed towards 
the Gulf of Suez to attack al-Tur. When the Commander in Egypt heard of 
this expeditionary force he ordered the evacuation of al-Tur and the 
quarantine station there and all civilians were brought to Suez or Cairo. 
He then sent a company of 200 men for the defence of al-Tur. One side of 
the quarantine station was fortified and the troops were joined by a party of 
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300 Ghurkas under the command of the former governor of Sinai Colonel 
Parker. The Ottomans were led by a German officer and had reached al-
Tur on the 18th of January and took their positions on the hills 
surrounding the town. They had persuaded about 100 of the Sinai bedouin 
to join them promising them ample booty to be had in al-Tur. This 
expedition was even more risky than the attack on the Suez Canal, because 
these Ottomans were at a distance of seven marching days from their last 
camp at Nekhl and over 20 days away from their headquarters in 
Bersheeba. When they reached al-Tur they had run out of food and water 
and forced the monks of the convent there to hand over their supplies. 
Colonel Parker with the Egyptian and Indian force arrived by sea and after 
midnight on February the 12th they moved onto the Ottomans who were 
camped in the wadi. They split at dawn, with the Egyptian Party 
confronting the enemy, as the Ghurkas attacked them from behind. The 
Ottomans were taken by surprise and suffered great losses, with the 
remaining 20 men being taken prisoner, while the Ghurkas only lost one 
man. The commanding German officer managed to escape capture, as he 
had left earlier with a group of bedouin to Abu Zneima where they 
destroyed the warehouses of the Manganese Mining Company. (Shoucair 
: 1915, pp. 749-750) 
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By the end of 1915 Salonika had replaced the Dardanelles as the focus of 
Allied-Ottoman confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean. When more 
British and ANZAC reinforcements arrived in Egypt the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force absorbed the rest of the Mediterranean Expeditionary 
Force after the evacuation of Gallipoli and offensive operations across the 
Sinai were planned. Sir Lloyd George, British Prime Minister at the time, 
recorded in his memoirs that he had advocated strong and decisive military 
action against the Turks in Sinai in order to break their resistance and sway 
the balance of the War into Britain's favour. His views, however, were not 
shared by the war-time cabinet's military advisors such as Sir William 
Robertson. Their position was "that the Egyptian campaign was useful so 
long as it went no further than the defense of the Suez Canal, but that these 
operations later became objectionable, for they absorbed troops which 
should have been sent to the Western Front, where every available man 
was needed to assist in the great struggle then approaching its decisive 
phase." "Decisive phase" is hardly an accurate description of the mud-
crawling strategy of the Flanders campaign. I f one-fifth of the men 
sacrificed in a venture which every General in the British Army (except 
Haig) condemned had been sent to Allenby, the Turk would have been so 
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completely crushed that he would gladly have accepted peace terms. But 
Sir William Robertson's resistance delayed and hampered the Sinai and 
Palestine campaign.8 (George : 1934, p. 182) 
Lloyd George held the view that had the Turks been overthrown at an 
earlier stage of the war, it would have led to the collapse of the Central 
Powers on the Balkan Front, and brought about an earlier end to World 
War I . Sir Archibald Murray, the commander of British forces in Egypt, 
although having been denied any additional forces or supplies, finally 
received his orders to advance into the Sinai. The first Allied offensive 
started in April 1916 with the pursuit and engagement of the Ottomans at 
Katia on the 23rd of the same month. The battle of Rumani took place on 
the 4th and 5th of August 1916, then the British moved forward to take al-
"Arish with little resistance after having heavily bombarded the town from 
the sea. On the 23rd of December they clashed again with the enemy at 
Magdhaba and drove the Turks towards the border, taking over 1,200 
prisoners and reaching Rafah in early January 1917.9 (George : 1934, pp. 
1821-1823) 
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The extremely difficult desert conditions and absence of roads suitable for 
motor transport made the movement of supplies, artillery and ammunition 
a major problem. Water supplies were another serious restriction on any 
larger movement of men and camels and the British did not want to be 
caught in the same mistake as the Turks on their way to Egypt. The 
advances in Sinai were determined more by the construction of the military 
railway and a piped water supply alongside the tracks, than by the 
availability of the required forces. Therefore, careful preparations were 
made, the railway was rapidly pushed forward and the famous Desert 
Camel Corps was formed and trained near Isma'ilia. Kantara became an 
enormous military town stretching over five kilometres into the Sinai 
Desert and became one of the best known stations for almost every soldier 
to have served in the Middle East theatre.10 (Crutwell : 1934, pp. 352-354) 
It was not until March 1917 that the Palestine Campaign was launched 
with an attack on Ghazza, which proved extremely difficult to subdue. 
The first battle of Ghazza on the 26th and 27th of March went 
inconclusive and another attack with more reinforcements was launched 
17th to 19th of April, again without success. The Sinai Military Railway 
had been completed through the entire peninsula and more men and 
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material arrived. General Edmund Allenby took over the command in 
June as GOC (General Officer Commanding) and the breakthrough came 
at the third battle of Ghazza and the capture of Bersheeba between the 27th 
of October and the 7th of November 1917. Meanwhile T.E. Laurence 
made his famous campaign by organising the Arab revolt in the Hejaz and 
moving with irregular bedouin forces northward to capture Aqaba and 
onwards through Transjordan to Damascus, thus successfully flanking 
Allenby's troops' advance into Palestine.11 (MacMunn & Falls : 1928, p. 
279-372) 
4.3 Formation of the Arab Legion 
In April 1917 Sir Mark Sykes, after considering the political and military 
value, suggested the formation of an Arab legion composed of Arab 
prisoners of war and Syrians residing in Egypt, the troops would be 
recruited from prisoners of war camps in India, Mesopotamia and Aden 
and would be primarily used to assist the bedouin forces of Sherif Faisal in 
Arabia against the Turks. The formation of such a force had several 
advantages : from a political point of view it can serve as a rallying point 
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for Arabs deserting from Turkish control out of conviction rather than 
cowardice and would stimulate enthusiasm for the Arab movement and 
unity. Militarily it would give the British a force capable of being used in 
the Hejaz at any time without breaking their policy of not landing 
European troops on sacred soil. In case of an impending advance of Arab 
tribes across the Jordan and onwards to Damascus the Arab legion can 
serve as a liaison between the Bedouins and regular British forces. During 
any further advance into Syria it would be an inducement to desertion by 
Arabs from the Turkish enemy ranks. The need for such a force had been 
obvious to the War Office since Makka and Medina were threatened in the 
summer of 1916and the time of implementation had arrived.12 (FO 
141/746/4833 Arab Legion for Hejaz 1917/18) 
The scheme was rapidly advanced and troops were brought from away as 
far as India to be trained and equipped at Isma'ilia and Suez before being 
sent to Arabia. The formation of this Arab legion has also been supported 
by M . Picot and was to be under a joint British-French command, with 
both providing advisory officers. Also the cost would be shared between 
the two colonial powers. Soon British-French rivalry in expanding their 
spheres of influence and mistrust on both sides overshadowed the Arab 
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legion, particularly since the French had already started a Legion of the 
Orient recruited from areas which were to become French under the Sykes-
Picot agreement. Also the Arab officers themselves resented being 
commanded by Europeans and preferred to be under direct control of the 
Arabian King Hussein and Sherif Faisal. Due to the unexpected successes 
of the Bedouin troops under T.E. Lawrence the Arab Legion never made it 
to Arabia proper but joined the conquest of Syria at Aqaba in November 
1917. In the turmoil to follow the Legion soon dissolved into the larger 
Sherifian Arab forces. By 1918 the last allowances for services were 
disbursed by the British government and the Arab Legion as well as the 
Arab office in Cairo was disbanded.13 (FO 141/746/4833 : 1918) 
4.4 The Egypt Palestine Railway 
The first official proposal for the construction of a standard gauge from 
Kantara to Rafah, Haifa and up the valley of the Litani river to join up with 
the existing Horns-Aleppo railway came in a letter addressed to the High 
Commissioner of Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, on 15.3.1915. The proposal 
included an estimation of cost, approximately L.E. 4,114,000.14 (FO 
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141/512/623) In anticipation of prosecuting the war effort across the Sinai 
peninsula the building of a railway between Kantara on the Suez Canal and 
the border of Palestine at Rafah started in March 1916.15 (FO 
141/478/2201) The first section of this standard gauge railway between 
Kantara and Katia was driven diligently. In view of its importance all 
other railway needs in Egypt were made subservient and the line went into 
operation by the summer of 1916. (see figure 5, p. 147) Much rolling 
stock and materials was withdrawn from the Egyptian State Railways and 
manufacturers in Manchester worked around the clock to keep up with 
supplies of engines and wagons. By 1917 the line had been completed all 
the way into Palestine and at its peak time was operating 1,200 wagons 
and burning 40,000 tons of coal per month. 1 6 (FO 141/478/2201) 
Not only troops were moved along this line, but it was vital in supplying 
everything from weapons and ammunition, fuel, food and all other items 
necessary for the upkeep of the British forces in the Palestine Campaign. 
To enable thoroughfare traffic from the heart of Egypt a special swing 
bridge was constructed across the Suez Canal at Kantara in 1917. In 
consequence of the rapid advance of the British forces in Palestine it 
became necessary by November 1917 to double the line and plate layers 
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were brought in from as far away as the Sudan to complete the job. 1 7 (FO 
141/478/2201 : 1917) 
One of the most important factors in the rapid success of the Palestine 
campaign was the ingenuity and diligence of the railway engineers and the 
thousands of Egyptian labourers that completed this railway in record time 
and operated it throughout the war under the most severe climatic 
conditions. Yet as important as the railway may have been during the war 
it rapidly lost favour with the various responsible authorities as soon as its 
military importance ceased. By mid 1918 negotiations were on their way 
to withdraw all military personnel operating the railway and handing its 
facilities over to the Egyptian State railways. Negotiations on costs, terms 
and conditions continued until well into 1919 when they met a relapse in 
the light of the political unrest in Egypt under the Zaghloul uprising and 
drive towards independence. Consequently, Lord Allenby decided to 
delay the handover, and the Kantara - Rafah section remained under 
military control until the end of that year. 
Although the railway's geopolitical importance was recognised by the 
colonial government, particularly in view of Britain obtaining the mandate 
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for Palestine, it was clear that this line is of little commercial use 
considering the small volume of traffic during peace times. Several other 
problems would face its operation as well : The military staff after 
demobilisation would only stay on i f high wages are paid and the local 
labour situation was not secure. The State railways would want their 
rolling stock back, which was supplied under wartime emergency 
measures. The line runs parallel to the sea coast, so that coasting steamers 
would successfully compete for freight, and the port of Haifa was to be 
improved and expanded to enhance this alternative sea route. The railway 
runs through waterless country, which means that the pipeline constructed 
during the war would have to be maintained which creates problems for 
the Suez Canal Company since the pipes in the bed of the Canal prevent 
them from dredging. Alternatively the railway would have to provide 
condensers or run tanks of water on each train, all of which are very 
expensive alternatives. One section of the line runs along the Bardawil 
flood lake fisheries which were inactive during the war. Should these be 
put into operation again it would threaten flooding of the tracks at several 
points and would therefore necessitate to raise the tracks and reinforce 
them, again at considerable cost.18 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1919) 
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Another matter was the high cost involved in running the railway that was 
estimated to be about 650,000 L.E. annually not including the capital 
expenditure needed for a new Suez Canal bridge or tunnel, rolling stock, 
etc. This is held against an estimated income of only 200,000 L.E., which 
would mean an annual loss of 450,000 pounds which the State Railways 
suggested the War Office in London should pay i f they wish to retain the 
line for strategic purposes.19 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1920) Even the bridge 
over the Suez Canal was to be demolished. The Suez Canal Company 
gave its consent to building it in 1917 on the condition that it would be 
removed after the war. Already the company was not allowing regular 
thoroughfare traffic and would keep the bridge open to allow the passage 
of ships at most times. As an alternative they proposed a high level bridge 
or a tunnel, but considering the economic viability this plan was never to 
see the light of day. By the December 1920 the bridge was to be removed 
and all railway traffic was moved by the rail ferry at Kantara. The ferry 
was able to move five loaded railway carriages at a time and made the 
round-trip in about 30 minutes, but since this traffic was subordinate to the 
passage of ships it became a very slow and cumbersome undertaking, 
especially since the Suez Canal Company would allow the ferry to operate 
for three hours a day only.2 0 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1920) 
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Egypt was least interested in the continuation of the railway across the 
Sinai, not so the British army and the government of Palestine. Sir Herbert 
Samuel the High Commissioner in Jerusalem at the time protested heavily 
to the Foreign office regarding the removal of the Kantara bridge stating 
that the railway is vital for supplies from Egypt and the alternative sea 
route is impractical through heavy weather.21 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1920) 
The argumentation continued through 1921 with the Egyptians holding 
firmly to their view that the railway was of no commercial value and the 
State Railways were not interested in taking it over or operating it even i f 
they would get it free of charge. In April 1921 it was suggested by the 
Palestine government to dismantle part of the double track to be used as 
materials for repairs near Haifa and in fact operated the Kantara-Rafah 
section on behalf of the British army during that year.22 ( FO 
141/478/2201 : 1921) The situation prevailed through 1922 with the 
Palestine government operating the line and sharing costs with the War 
Office pending the outcome of the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations regarding 
the independence of Egypt and the consequent take-over of the railway. In 
April 1922 it was agreed with the Egyptian government that the Air 
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Ministry would substitute for the War Office in the agreement with the 
Palestine government for the operation of the Sinai railway. This also 
involved the operation and maintenance of the telephone and telegraph 
lines running alongside the train tracks.23 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1922) 
Things remained unchanged for the following few years until the end of 
1926 when the railway moved into the spotlight of discussions again and a 
suggestion was made by the Palestine government to lease the Kantara-
Rafah line for a period of twenty years. As mentioned above the Egyptian 
government back in 1920 was not interested in operating the Sinai railway 
because of financial considerations and the British government was eager 
to get rid of it at that time for the same reason. Yet the situation changed 
in Palestine with an increase of Zionist activity and Jewish immigration it 
became a priority to try to expand the sphere of influence of the Palestine 
government. The original arrangement for the operation of the railway 
included a provision that the Egyptian government has the right to rescind 
that informal agreement with a six months notice period, new ways were 
being investigated to get around this agreement. 
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It has been the policy of the British administration to "let sleeping dogs lie 
a little longer", as has been literally mentioned more than once in official 
correspondence, but once the matter has been stirred up a wave of 
consultations and discussions followed involving the Foreign Office, High 
Commissions in Cairo and Jerusalem, War Office and Suez Canal 
Company. Opinions had greatly changed since 1920 : the Army Council 
now regarded the railway of higher strategic importance as before. 
Whereas the main entry port to Palestine is the port of Haifa the Army 
wants to retain the railway to have a direct link with British forces on the 
Suez Canal should rapid mobilisation be necessary in case of war or 
maintenance of internal security. With the Suez Canal having become the 
main artery of Imperial East West traffic the attitude of the British changed 
dramatically and plans were drawn up to prevent by legal and diplomatic 
means a take-over of the Sinai Railway by the Egyptian authorities. By 
January 1928 Abdel Hamid Suleiman Pasha stated that the Egyptians were 
definitely determined to take over this railway even i f they had to pay for 
it. This raised great concern with the British army over the proper 
continuity of services and proper maintenance.24 (FO 141/478/2201 : 
1928) 
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To further complicate matters the Egyptians were planning on complying 
with the wishes of the Suez Canal Company of moving the railway ferry 
from Kantara and to construct a new terminal at Port Said. This would 
involve the extension of the existing tracks from the railhead at Kantara to 
Port Fouad at the northern entry of the Suez Canal. The British were now 
putting in their best efforts to delay any further decisions regarding the 
Sinai railway and to diffuse the situation as much as possible. The 
deviation of the railway to start at Port Said would mean that mainly 
passenger traffic would be using the line linking the Suez Canal to 
Palestine and onwards to Syria. Due to cost considerations cargo traffic 
would be more inclined to use the alternative sea route. A technical study 
was drawn up and the matter became the subject of great controversy and 
concern involving everyone all the way to Sir Austin Chamberlain in 
London.25 (FO 141/478/2201 : 1928) 
In the subsequent months all efforts were made to distract the Egyptian 
government from raising the issue and a strategy was laid out to employ all 
diplomatic negotiation tactics in order to retain effective control over the 
Sinai railway. In case the Egyptians would raise the issue an unattractively 
high price would be asked, previous ambiguous points in the agreements 
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would be argued and the matter would be made part of the greater 
settlement between the Egyptian and British government, thus delaying the 
take-over indefinitely. In general, the view in London was that the railway 
should by all means remain under the supervision of the Palestine 
government, which Britain was hoping to dominate for a much longer 
time, after their influence in Egypt ceased. 
4.4 The Frontiers Districts Administration (F.D.A.) 
It was clearly recognised at an early stage of the First World War that 
controlling vast areas of the deserts surrounding the Nile valley forming 
Egypt's borders would necessitate a very specialised type of 
administration, very different in scope and function to the administration 
of settled areas. This was due to two main factors : One was the military 
or police control of the boundaries themselves against infiltration and 
contraband activities, and secondly the effective civil administration of the 
bedouin inhabitants of these deserts, who are ethnically and culturally very 
different from sedentary Egyptians. The unhospitable terrain and 
enormous distances between settled oases and water sources made the use 
of modern transport inferior to the qualities of the camel, the traditional 
beast of burden. Different culture and administration of law as 
traditionally practised by the desert Arabs made it impossible to directly 
copy the systems used in settled Egypt which would alienate the bedouin 
and would lead to them to evading any effective government control. 
Little attention had been paid to these aspects by various central 
governments in Cairo, who limited their control to positioning a number of 
garrisons along the main caravan routes, leaving the rest of the country 
effectively outside government jurisdiction. The deserts were always a 
suspicious and undesirable place for any Nilotic Egyptian to be avoided i f 
possible. Military or any other government service in the desert was seen 
as a punishment, an asylum from civilisation. This was the situation until 
the early Twentieth Century and effective control was not introduced until 
these areas came under British administration. It was a small number of 
British officers whose love for the desert and their romantic 
preconceptions of its nomadic dwellers that shaped the first real 
government of Egypt's deserts. They developed an in depth understanding 
of the physical terrain and its limitations, as well as a system of 
government based on such values of chivalry, honour and discipline so 
well accepted by the Arab tribesmen as being their own. 
This understanding was well reflected in the various policies that were 
implemented under British control in Egypt's deserts, and particularly in 
the Sinai Peninsula, which remained under British administration until 
well after the Second World War. The first aspect of military control was 
characterised by the formation of the famous Camel Corps, which would 
prove so effective in early desert warfare before the introduction of 
motorised transport capable of surmounting the difficulties of the terrain. 
This also meant that it was necessary to integrate the bedouin into these 
forces in order to make use of their special knowledge of their camels and 
the Desert. 
The Camel Corps was first started in 1916 in preparation to pursue and 
engage the retreating Turkish forces across the Sinai, but it was soon 
detached from the Egyptian Army proper and was transformed into the 
Frontiers Districts Administration (F.D.A.) in May 1917. The formation of 
the F.D.A. can be credited to General Sir Archibald Murray Commander of 
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. 
In charge of the Sinai Peninsula at the time was Lt. Col. Wilfried Jennings 
Bramley. He had been Governor of the Sinai before in 1905-1906. He 
was appointed Governor of Sinai again in 1913 until he was ordered to 
evacuate the peninsula in September 1914, owing to the irnminence of war 
with Turkey. He was personally very interested in the Arabs and the 
desert, which in turn accounted for his popularity with the bedouin. After 
the Sinai was evacuated many bedouin remained loyal to the British 
despite subversive efforts by the Turks and he brought with him to Suez a 
large number of tribesmen from Nekhl and A l ' Arish that would later form 
the core of his Camel troops. These mounted troops were concentrated in 
Kantara on the Suez Canal the main operational base of British forces 
during the Palestine campaign against Turkey. From November 1914 until 
the recapture of Sinai and victory at Rafah Bramley was employed as 
Chief Intelligence Agent for the Suez Canal defences and together with his 
bedouin agents he would prove crucial to the success of the British war 
effort. 2 6 (FO 141/710/3072) 
Thus the Frontiers Districts Administration was formed in 1917 as a 
special military administration for all the areas along Egypt's frontiers. 
158 
And was divided into three commands : the Western desert, The Eastern 
and Southern Desert, and the Sinai Peninsula. It was headed by an 
Egyptian officer reporting to the Egyptian Minister of War. The post of 
Assistant Director was filled by an Englishman and so were the posts of 
Governor of each of the three districts. It was common for Egyptian 
ministries and government departments at that time to employ British or 
other foreign personnel. The newly acquired ex-Turkish territories of 
Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq were put under the Occupied Enemy 
Territories Administration (O.E.T.A.). Allenby had recommended not to 
mix the administration of the newly occupied territories with the already 
administered border districts.27 (FO 141/783/5289) 
Bramley's ideas on the necessary qualifications of British officers for 
service in the F.D.A. are well represented in the guide lines issued by the 
Ministry of War in 1920. Consequently the following memorandum was 
sent from Cairo through the Foreign Office to Gen. Murray in London as 
guidelines to help in interviewing and selecting suitable officers for the 
F.D.A. on 29. January 1920. 
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" Qualifications for Officers to serve in the F.D.A. Camel 
Corps 
- Subaltern officers of the regular forces, preferably only 
infantry or cavalry are required 
- They must be unmarried and should be between the ages of 
22 & 26, and be of an active nature 
- They must have seen active service in some field of 
operations 
- It is desirable that they should have had a public school 
education 
- Those with Camel Corps experience and with some 
knowledge of Arabic should be given preference 
- Their medical classification should be A. 1." 
The pay for officers was at the following rates : 
a- Basic salary p.a. L.E.300 
b- Bonus subject to modification L.E.I88 
total L.E.488 
c-Desert allowance varying from l/8th to l/3rd of salary plus 
20% according to the locality in which the officer is 
stationed.28 (FO 141 436/10229 : 1920) 
One major feature was that a good educational background and total 
dedication was required. Officers that want to get married would have to 
hand in their resignation. Officers were also required to learn Arabic and 
were required to pass an examination before being eligible for any 
promotion.29 (FO 141 436/10229 : 1920) These measures insured that 
British officers in the F.D.A. would serve as role models to impress the 
bedouin and command their respect and loyalty. 
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Since the founding of the F.D.A. it has been assumed that all expenses of 
positioning of British officers are borne by Britain and are regarded as a 
good insurance against turmoil on the Egyptian borders. In May 1920 the 
War Office raised objections in regard to the incidence of the cost of the 
pensions of officers seconded to Egypt. They stated that by pre-war 
arrangement pension contributions for officers lent by the British to the 
Egyptian government were borne by the British government up to a limited 
number of officers only. Since this number had already been exceeded and 
the F.D.A. wanted to further expand its work, they could not agree to bear 
the additional cost and wanted the Egyptian government to pay. 
These comments were highly opposed by British representatives in Egypt 
pointing out that i f the Camel Corps had already existed in 1915 the 
Senoussi invasion of the Western Desert would never have succeeded. 
This would have saved the British millions of pounds which they later had 
to spend on restoring order. I f they tried to reduce pay or pensions in any 
way the quality of officers attracted to the job would sink and again defeat 
the purpose. 
In the words of Brigadier General Major Wallace, Deputy Director of the 
F.D.A. : "... the candidates for posts with the F.D.A. must be officers with 
sound professional training ... We should I imagine, i f we cannot get 
Regular Officers, have to fall back on the failures of life and derelicts. ... 
To turn to the larger issue the training and experience that would accrue to 
officers when serving with the Camel Corps would be most beneficial. 
Any officer who spends five years with this force would have such an 
experience of deserts that no matter how difficult the country he may be 
asked to traverse in his subsequent career, he will feel at home in it." 
(FO 141 436/10229 : 1920) He also recommended that no change would 
be made with the officer's pension arrangements paid by the British 
government, since during the period they serve in Egypt the whole pay 
they would otherwise have drawn from British funds would be saved to the 
British government. 
In November 1920 Allenby went personally to the War Office in London 
to explain the urgency of the matter : " I am to state, for the information of 
the Army Council, that the Frontiers Districts Administration require these 
officers immediately, and, i f their appointment is deferred until the future 
political status is finally settled, the efficiency of that Administration may 
be seriously impaired."31 (FO 141 436/10229 : 1920) Continued British 
control inside the F.D.A. would insure that the Sinai Peninsula is to remain 
under a British governor, an aspect that was seen as vital for the strategic 
position of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean and her control of the 
Suez Canal. 
The officers of the F.D.A. in their capacity as Governors were also 
responsible for all aspects of civil government in their provinces. Thus 
they administered local courts which applied bedouin systems of justice 
known as ^urf rather than the laws of mainland Egypt. The main feature of 
bedouin law is that it is remedial in nature and criminals are not usually 
punished by imprisonment for crimes committed. Thus a bedouin 
convicted of a crime such as assault or even murder would have to pay 
restitution to the aggrieved party, usually in the form of camels and goats, 
rather than face a prison sentence. Several governors such as A.C. Parker 
and his successor C.S. Jarvis (Governor of Sinai 1922-1936) held their 
own courts in the traditional Arab manner by forming tribunals of tribal 
elders and handing down "bedouin" sentences. This made the bedouin 
willing to come to the government for justice instead of taking it into their 
own hands. 
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The British administrators were also very much concerned with 
developing their areas economically by establishing trade centers and 
creating opportunities for employment for the bedouin. One such center 
was the town of Burg Al "Arab west of Alexandria, which was a lifetime 
project for WJ. Bramley. This was a fortified little town, which he 
developed, and which became an important centre of administration and 
commerce for the bedouin of the Western Desert. In 1923 he reported 
famine due to harvest failure for four consecutive years and urged the 
government to allow the sale of land to merchants within the walls of Burg 
AfArab under the condition that they must build a house on it. This 
would provide his bedouin with jobs and income as construction workers. 
He also persuaded the ministry of wakfs to build a mosque in order to 
make the place a religious and educational centre. (FO 141/710/3072) 
Another means for the locals to earn income was to be employed into the 
service of the F.D.A. itself. The bedouin made excellent scouts, policemen 
and drivers with special knowledge of the desert. Their service was seen 
by the British officers as far superior than recruits. It was even suggested 
to form a specialized Arab battalion on a voluntary basis. The battalion 
would be split into companies each raised and stationed in a different 
district : one company in Sallum District, another in Sidi Barrani and a 
depot at Matrouh. Al l officers below Yusbashi should be Arabs. Their pay 
should equal the normal police in addition to providing them with tents for 
their families. This would highly economize on police expenditure at 
Barrani and Matrouh.31 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1926) 
In consequence of their insight and dedication the British governors 
enjoyed great respect and loyalty amongst the Arabs in Egypt's deserts and 
their achievements in creating an atmosphere of law and order and 
improving living standards could not be denied. Nevertheless, the 
independence of Egypt would eventually change things in the desert. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The outbreak of the First World War with Britain and the Ottoman Empire 
on opposing sides would bring major changes in the Middle East. As soon 
as Turkey joined the Central Powers Britain announced her protectorate 
over Egypt, turning the Suez Canal Zone into one of the largest garrisons 
for British, ANZAC and Indian troops, as a launching pad for the expected 
165 
hostilities in the Sinai and Palestine, as well as being a back-up depot for 
military activities in the Mediterranean. The pro-Turkish Khedive was 
deposed during his absence and replaced by his anglophile uncle, Hussein 
Kamil, who from then on assumed the title of Sultan, reflecting the newly 
"independent" status of Egypt. 
The Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, although coming as no surprise, 
confirmed the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Sinai, and 
strengthened British determination to establish permanent control of this 
peninsula. To achieve their objectives the British devised several policies 
in preparation for the military campaign to re-conquer the Sinai from 
Turkey and maintain control over this vital sea-route to their colonies in 
Asia. First, some significant infrastructure developments were 
implemented such as the railway, water pipeline, roads and 
communications. Second, was the experience in desert warfare gained 
from the campaign, particulary the cooperation between irregular bedouin 
Arab troops and the British Army. This led to the development of the 
mounted Camel Corps which significantly contributed to the success of the 
Palestine Campaign, and the formation of the Arab Legion, which 
augmented British troops in the conquest of Palestine, Jordan and Syria. 
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And thirdly, the experiences in Sinai gave birth to the formation of the 
Frontiers Districts Administration, a specialized military government for 
Egypt's boundary desert areas, which would become the primary vehicle 
for securing continued British presence in Sinai. 
The events during World War I underscored the British concern with 
security of the Suez Canal and Sinai became an integral feature in Britain's 
colonial policy. This is clearly reflected in the keen interest in developing 
administration and infrastructure in the peninsula and the reaffirmation of 
British military control. However, the spectre of independence of Egypt 
was looming over British rule and this necessitated a rethinking of strategy 
which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Post World War I Adjustments in the Middle 
East 
5.1 Introduction 
The war had shown that the security of Egypt, or more particularly that of 
Imperial communications through the Suez Canal was a paramount 
element in British world policy. The geopolitical significance of 
continued British control of the Sinai Peninsula had become 
unquestioned, but new problems and threats to British interests emerged. 
After the War three concerns for Britain often put the Sinai Peninsula in 
connection with the safety of the Suez Canal at the top of the agenda of 
the British Parliament. On an international front was the establishment 
of newly independent nation states just beyond the boundary of Sinai and 
the Zionist movement's push towards establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. Inside Egypt was the threat of independence, which would 
undermine British control of the Sinai. 
The first factor threatening the boundary of the Sinai and thus of the Suez 
Canal arose after the Sykes-Picot Treaty for the division of the Middle 
East after the war. The eminent formation of new nation states in the 
region made the settlement of Sinai's international boundary along the 
lines of 1906 a primary concern of British statesmen involved in the 
1919 peace conference. Britain's "Arab Policy" would lead to the 
establishment of new Arab States in the former provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire : Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. 
A second threat to the Sinai came from the British commitment towards 
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The increase of Zionist 
migration after the Balfour Declaration was challenging British authority 
in Palestine. Therefore, fixing the eastern international boundary of 
Sinai in respect to Turkey's ex-territory of Palestine became a major 
policy issue. Britain also contained attempts of Zionist colonization of 
land in the Sinai itself as this would have posed a serious threat to British 
security interests. 
On the Domestic front Britain faced nationalist uprising and the expected 
independence of Egypt would reduce the presence of British officials in 
the Egyptian government. The preparation for the eminent independence 
of Egypt and the implications of losing direct control over the 
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administration of Sinai and the Canal Zone for the security of the Suez 
Canal, by then the most important Imperial waterway, became a central 
subject in London. 
Britain's policy to counter these problems was first to secure the 
international recognition of Egypt's boundary at the 1919 peace 
conference in Paris. The delegation headed by Lord Balfour made a 
great effort to secure the status of Sinai and the boundary based on the 
recommendations of British officers in Egypt. This chapter wil l show the 
intricate diplomatic moves and countermoves that finally secured British 
interests in Sinai. 
On the domestic side Britain's policy to remain in control of the Sinai 
was to somehow persuade the Egyptian government that the Sinai should 
remain under a British governor. The independence of Egypt would 
mean the loss of direct British control over the government and the 
reduction of British officials employed by the Egyptian government. 
However, the so called "reserved clauses" of the unilateral declaration of 
independence in 1922 would provide that Britain was still responsible for 
the defense of Egypt, giving her the legitimacy to retain control over the 
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Sinai through her clout inside the Ministry of War in Cairo. The primary 
vehicle for continued British control over the administration of Sinai was 
a division of this ministry, the Frontiers Districts Administration, in 
which a number of Englishmen held the top ranks. This would enable 
Britain to retain control not only over the vast desert areas in the south 
and west of Egypt, but also enjoy complete control over the Sinai and 
thus, all eastern approaches to the Suez Canal. 
The British argued that retention of British control over the 
administration of the Sinai through continued control of the F.D.A was 
absolutely necessary for two reasons : One, was the inefficiency of 
Egyptian officers in desert service and their adversity to the harsh living 
conditions versus the superiority of well trained British personnel. And, 
secondly, highlighting the preference of the local bedouin population for 
British military officers to rule over them, pointing out concerns over 
discrimination of ethnic minorities under the nationalist government. 
The bedouin particularly resented the conscription system of the 
Egyptian army and the different legal system implemented, clearly 
showing their preference for traditional law as administered by the 
British governors in Sinai. This attitude of the bedouin greatly helped 
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continuation of Britain's control and the British employed their famous 
"divide and rule" policy to undermine the authority of the central 
governments of newly formed nation states to control boundary 
minorities. Protecting the interests of such ethnic minorities often helped 
the efforts of British diplomats in legitimizing the continued presence of 
British administration in areas of geopolitical interest. 
5.2 Formulation of Britain's Arab Policy 
In recognition of the great help the Arab forces under T.E. Laurence 
rendered to Britain and the role they had in bringing about a much speedier 
victory over the Turks Britain expedited the formulation of the "Arab 
Policy". The main line of thinking was that eventually independence 
should be granted to the Arabs and they should be allowed self 
determination. Yet some geopolitical aspects had to be solved, a task 
which would prove much more complicated than the principle itself. 
Consideration had to be made for the conflicting aspirations of Britain and 
France for control in the Middle East. How the actual inhabitants of the 
different former Turkish provinces viewed what constitutes independence 
and self determination was another matter. The first official 
communications regarding independence and the rise of the "Arab 
Question" was around September 1918. " I am suggesting to French Govt, 
that in view of recent developments we should now recognize belligerent 
status of our Arab Allies fighting for independence from Turkish rule. 
This formula while recognizing Arab National movement and identifying 
all Arabs therewith, will not give impression that we wish to impose King 
Hussein upon Syria."1 (FO 141/776/70 : 1918-1928) 
But what would constitute the future Arab State and which government 
would be recognized by all Arabs in Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Arabia 
proper, as well as the various smaller tribal entities along the Persian Gulf 
and Southern Arabia as a legitimate paramount leadership was the most 
complicated problem that would face British diplomats for years to come. 
The British government therefore proceeded very cautiously in 
recognizing any particular Arab ruler as their favorite to govern over this 
vast area in the Middle East. The two most prominent Arab leaders King 
Hussein and Emir Feisal were informed first of the British plans and an 
official statement was issued in October 1918 accordingly, it was 
communicated by Lord Allenby the Commander in Chief of the allied 
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forces : " I am authorized to inform your Highness that the British and 
French Governments have recognized officially as allies the Arab forces 
fighting with them against a common enemy...The Arab Flag is now flying 
over Damascus."2 (FO 141/776/70 : 1918-1928) An official telegram of 
congratulations from King George to the King of the Hejaz followed on 
5.10.1918, but still there was no mention of independence and self 
determination until an actual policy was formulated. The first suggested 
framework came to the Foreign Office in a secret communication from the 
Residency in Egypt and it may be interesting that this early outline would 
be reflected in the overall course adopted for British Policy during the 
peace negotiations throughout 1919 and for many years to follow. 
By 1918 the British had formulated a clear policy towards dividing up the 
former Ottoman provinces under her control and the eventual formation of 
nation states. This policy was summarized in a report prepared by the 
High Commission in Egypt and is contained in the papers of the residency. 
The main features of the British plan were as follows : 
Moslem Government where there are large Moslem 
majorities is a necessary but transitional stage, essential to 
satisfy Islamic sentiments : but theocratic systems will be 
generally combated and gradually discarded for National ones 
except in Hejaz, which can be preserved as an archaic 
enclave. Racial (Nationalist) ideals require to be cultivated 
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and utilized as a counterpoise to Islamic (reactionary) 
political tendencies. 
King Hussein to be the symbol of Arab racial aggregation and 
dignified as such throughout (Asiatic) Arabic-speaking 
countries. His political power outside Hejaz to be completely 
restricted by the grant of separate constitutions and by 
agreements with local governments and ruling chiefs. His 
religious significance to be recognized by the mention of his 
name in Friday prayers in Mosques throughout the entire 
region. 
Skeleton Constitution 
In Heiaz - Central (theocratic) Moslem Government and 
Conservative theological centre. 
In Yemen and Asir - Local government in correspondence 
with Central (Hejaz) Government. 
Interior of Arabia - Tribal system under Chiefs in friendly 
relations with King of Hejaz. 
Damascus Region (with direct access to sea) - An 
autonomous province, under a constitutional regime, of the 
Central Government. 
Palestine - Nominally International. Zionist finance. 
Coastal Syria - Arab Local Government under French 
tutelage. 
Mesopotamia - Under British tutelage with Arab facade. 
Flags. 
Central Government flag to be flown in Hejaz and Damascus 
Province and, where possible, South Western and Central 
Arabia. Elsewhere this flag to be flown alongside of an 
European flag or a local flag. In latter case it might be 
possible and would seem desirable to avoid use of Central 
Government flag. 
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Foreign Affairs. 
Of all areas directly (politically) subordinate to Central 
Government to be conducted in theory through King Hussein, 
who should be consulted on such matters as would affect 
future of region taken as a whole. External affairs of 
European-controlled areas and, i f possible, of Damascus 
Province, to be in the hands of Power, or Powers, controlling. 
Finance. 
Al l settled portions of area to contribute in proportion to their 
local budgets to expenses of Central (Hejaz) government. 
This contribution to be apart from payments in connection 
with Pilgrimage. Subsidies to Native Rulers and 
Governments, where necessary, to be paid direct by Power 
controlling adjacent settled area or Government."3 (FO 
141/776/70 : 1918-1928) 
So this was the blueprint of policy formulated as early as October 1918 
which would guide British negotiations throughout the peace conference 
that would last for more than one year. It is noteworthy that there were two 
elements that were central to British thinking. One, the British wanted to 
curtail as much as possible the influence of French control in Syria under 
the guise of Arab sovereignty; and, second, the understanding that the 
Arabs will have to be divided according to individual national aspirations 
of each future country. This, of course, raised the crucial issue of where to 
draw the political and administrative boundaries of the future Arab Middle 
East. 
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5.3 The Svkes - Picot Ttreatv 
At the Sykes-Picot Treaty in 1916 Britain and France agreed that after the 
War they would divide up the former territories of the Levant belonging to 
the Ottoman Empire between them. Syria and Lebanon would become 
French and Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine and Transjordan would be 
British. The British government had also agreed to give the Zionist 
Organisation Palestine as a Jewish national home. 
After the defeat of Turkey and the peace negotiations in 1919 boundaries 
were to be drawn for territories now ruled by the O.E.T.A. (Occupied 
Enemy Territory Administration). In December 1919 the northern 
boundary was first fixed to separate Syria from Turkey. The boundary 
separating British from French territory, known as the Sykes-Picot line 
was a more complicated matter. The general line of strategy for Britain 
was to keep their railway access from the Mediterranean ports of Palestine 
to their territories held in Mesopotamia, and the security of a vital oil 
pipeline running from Iraq to Haifa had to be secured. The co-operation of 
the Arab sheikhs of the area was therefore of critical importance and the 
High Commissioner in Jerusalem was much preoccupied with this task. 
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Confidential telegrams from the O.E.T.A. officer to the General 
Headquarters in Cairo highlight the problematic : "Cession of Tel El 
Arbein to Ajlun and extension of Sukhur El Ghor to O.E.T (South) has 
been approved by G.O.C in C. I could not wire Military governor Galilee 
for Southern boundary Sukhur El Ghor, exact location of which is 
immaterial provided railway and bridges are in our area."4 (FO 141 
435/10168 : 1919-1925) 
Prince Feisal, who was holding the settlement of Deraa which was north of 
the Sykes-Picot line and disputed by the Damascus government, asked for 
British assistance. Other Sheikhs of that area, as well as Arab tribes West 
of the Jordan river represented to favour British rather than French 
occupation. Yet the Foreign Office in London thought it unwise to occupy 
any places in the French sphere although it would clearly represent a 
strategic advantage. 
British officers in Palestine also favoured occupying the lands east of the 
Dead Sea and Jordan valley to give them better control of Palestine and its 
water resources, as well as the desired access to Mesopotamia. The 
Foreign Office suggested to the High Commissioner of Egypt that the 
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"Eastern boundary of Palestine will be fixed by agreement between us and 
the French down to the Sykes-Picot line but south of that line by 
agreement between us and the local authorities." And they asked : "Where 
is Emir Zeid now ? Is there any prospect of his being accepted as Emir in 
the area between Palestine and Hejaz south of the Sykes-Picot line ? I f so 
it might be desirable to negotiate boundaries etc. with him." Cairo 
consulted Jerusalem on this matter and the answer received by telegram on 
the following day summarises the general line of thinking which led to the 
annexation of Trans-Jordan to Palestine and eventually to the 
establishment of the State of Jordan as separate from Arabia. So the High 
Commission wrote back to London : 
"Records here define Sykes-Picot line as line Tiberias-
Bosrah-Eski-Sham, map 1 in 250,000 shows Deraa south of 
this. As to the country southwards present Jordan line is very 
bad line strategically, economically and politically. ... 
Information here emphasises conclusions. Territory up to 
Hejaz railway could be administered through tribal 
organisation supervised by two British district Governors and 
small staff. Police force drawn from tribes with British 
officers. Country [is] agriculturally rich, [therefore] revenue 
could cover cost of administration, road building schemes and 
leave considerable surplus after this year for general expenses 
of Palestine. This year's small cost of administration could 
be met by certain taxes still uncollected and obtainable 
without difficulty. Very small number of troops required as 
occupation greatly desired by the tribes and economies in 
garrison of Palestine facilitated by better frontier. Political 
effect on all sections of the population west of Jordan [is] 
excellent because final recognised occupation would prevent 
raids being organised, would enable small parties of robbers 
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to be arrested, would prevent possibility of a stoppage of 
Palestine food supplies as happened last year with disastrous 
effect on prices and would prevent another power 
establishing influence there. After fall of Damascus fortnight 
ago leading Trans-Jordan Sheikhs came here [to] invite 
British occupation. Are now leaving Jerusalem at no answer 
and disturbed at constant reports of French propaganda 
through Trans-Jordania. Could summon them all to fresh 
meeting where formal invitation would be given by them. 
These conclusions embody unanimous opinion of all my 
officers with knowledge of the country, and I can give 
assurance that occupation can be effected without fighting 
and maintained without additional expense. Am advised 
present tranquillity of the country due to general expectation 
of British occupation. I f decision delayed inter-tribal quarrels 
and disturbances almost inevitable with probable 
development of French activity. Zeid is in Haifa. Will go 
with Feisal to Europe when ship available and enter Oxford. 
Sheikhs and tribes east of Jordan utterly dissatisfied with the 
Sherifian Government most unlikely would accept him on 
even less efficient basis and even smaller resources. It would 
mean continuos disorder on our border. Zeid carries little 
weight and lacks personal qualifications needed to establish 
authority. I suggest that the Hejaz railway and the sparse 
population eastward could be under control of the King of the 
Hejaz i f undesirable to bring within our sphere.5 (FO 141 
435/10168 : 1919-25) 
Many inter-departmental committee meetings were held in London 
between August 1920 and March 1923 before the final draft of the Anglo-
French agreement regarding the boundaries of Palestine was ready. A lot 
of lobbying came from the Zionist Organisation to secure a maximum of 
territory for its project of a Jewish National Home. Important points of 
concern were the inclusion of water sources of the upper Jordan River and 
184 
around lake Tiberias which were evidently located North of the Sykes-
Picot line in French territory. 
Priority throughout the negotiations was given to establishing the northern 
and north-eastern boundaries of Palestine and the northern and eastern 
boundary of Mesopotamia, which necessitated involving the French 
administration. It was perceived of lesser importance to fix the Southern 
boundary of Palestine since Egypt was under British control anyway, or 
the eastern boundary of Trans-Jordan, which would be settled later when 
the tribal situation in Arabia was clearer. Yet the Zionist Organisation 
pressed for definition of all borders and they also claimed an access to the 
Gulf of Aqaba / Red Sea. The original Sykes-Picot agreement vaguely 
defined the southern border of Palestine and the High Commission in 
Egypt made note of this on 12.03.1920 as follows: 
"b) Arab Contras. Syria to be under French mandate, with southern 
boundary from mouth of IHUN, thence running north to railway so as to 
include AINTAB, URFA, MARDIN, and GAZIRAT IBN OMAR on 
TIGRIS. 
Mesopotamia to be under British mandate including Mosul, 
boundaries still to be determined, British mandate over Palestine with 
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boundaries as defined in accordance with phrase "DAN to 
BEERSHEBA".6 (FO 141 435/10168 : 1919-1925) 
At the committee meeting held on 31.08.1920 Colonel Meinertzhagen 
presented his suggestions for a boundary of Palestine which became 
known as the Meinertzhagen line : "South of the Dead Sea his [Col. 
Meinertzhagen's] decision has been influenced by Dr. Weizmann, who was 
anxious to have a Palestinian port at Aqaba. Aqaba would be of no use to 
anyone for fifty years. I f it were included in Palestine it was true that it 
would exclude any future State lying to the east of Palestine from an outlet 
in the gulf. Further than this the line was the same as the old boundary 
between Sinai and Palestine. Egypt could not be asked to give up the Sinai 
boundary."7 (ibid.) 
5.4 The Balfour Declaration and the Zionist Movement 
Right after the Balfour Declaration promising the Jews of Europe the 
creation of their own National Home in the British protectorate of 
Palestine the first wave of immigrants arrived. Loans and financial 
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assistance were organized for the purchase of land previously in Arab 
ownership. Al l tactics were used regardless of being unethical or not to 
get hold of as large an area as possible. The British administration assisted 
greatly in diverting land which had no formal title deeds or whose 
ownership was disputable towards Jewish deeds. "The Jewish National 
Fund in the Hague collected over [a] million francs from all parts of the 
world [with the] object [of] purchasing land [in] Palestine as inalienable 
property [of] Jewish people."8 (FO 141/803/4759 : 1917-1920) 
Naturally great resentment to the zealous efforts of the Zionist 
organizations was soon expressed by the majority Arab population which 
felt betrayed by the British whom they had helped during the war against 
the Turks. Now the British were giving away Palestine to alien European 
immigrants who have no traditional claim to land in the Middle East. The 
Zionist Organization in Egypt was instrumental in furthering their cause 
and acting as a liaison between Britain and activities in Palestine. In the 
year to follow the true intentions of the Zionist movement, i.e. the 
colonization and control of Palestine was becoming more and more 
apparent, and the darkest suspicions of the Arab population was 
confirmed. Soon the Jewish immigrants were pressing the British 
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government to grant them preferential treatment over the original 
inhabitants.9 (FO 141/803/4759 : 1917-1920) 
By 1920 open hostilities and demonstrations against the Zionist movement 
swept Palestine and Syria, but with the backing of Britain it had 
entrenched itself in the very heart of the Middle East and the Arab-Jewish 
conflict was born. 
The main driving force behind the Zionist movement was its ability to 
mobilize substantial monetary funds from all around the world to further 
its aims in acquiring as much land as possible in Palestine and providing 
emigrants with the necessary starting capital to succeed in their new 
homeland. Also the Zionists of Egypt managed to collect large sums of 
money from their members and sympathizers to fuel the movement. The 
British on the other hand seemed to be taking a diplomatic course by 
which they were trying to conciliate the Arab and Jewish camps, and 
probably believed the intentions of the Zionists to be honest. It is well 
documented in consular correspondence that they at least tried to promote 
an atmosphere of mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence. The 
well organized propaganda of the Zionist organizations gave the British 
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confidence that they are their allies of choice in a future independent state 
of Palestine. The only worries were that several leaders of the Bolshevik 
movement so violently opposed to royalist principles are themselves Jews 
and outspoken Zionists. The British authorities pushed for these elements 
to be excluded from any activity in Palestine. However, Britain had 
actively promoted inclusion of Jewish settlers in their war efforts against 
the Turks, as this was perceived to give a future legitimacy for claiming 
Palestine as their permanent homeland.10 (141/805/4759: 1917-1920) 
The Balfour Declaration of 2.Dec.l917 gave a new boost to the Zionist 
Organization in Egypt and their application to publish a weekly journal 
was approved by the High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Francis Reginald 
Wingate, after having consulted with the Foreign Office in London about 
the matter. Extreme caution and close censorship of the periodical was 
suggested. The first issue of the French language "La Revue Sioniste" was 
published on 4 Jan. 1918 by the Zionist Organization of Egypt, whose 
president was Mr J. Mosseri. After disagreements within the organization 
he resigned and the publication was temporally suspended. He was 
succeeded by Mr. Joseph Cicurel in June 1918 after receiving approval 
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from Dr. Weizmann following the latter's visit to Cairo.11 (FO 
141/790/5825 : 1917-1918) 
The Zionist efforts finally bore fruits in May 1920 when the British 
government formally gave its support to the Zionist cause of converting 
Palestine into a Jewish National Home. The Egyptian Zionists sent a 
formal letter thanking the King of England for his support and formally 
accepted the Protectorate of Great Britain over Palestine. (FO 
141/802/4759 : 1920) 
5.5 Jewish Colonization of Sinai 
A rather lesser known fact is that the Zionists also had designs for 
colonizing the Sinai Peninsula from as early as 1908 and used British 
sympathy to further their scheme. Their target was a stretch of land 
between A l 'Arish and the newly established border between Egypt and 
Turkish Palestine at Rafah, the only agriculturally usable land in Sinai. 
The project would have involved the creation of a colony for settling an 
initial 100 families of Jewish immigrants from Russia. 
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In early 1908 The Anglo-Palestine Development Company, a Zionist 
organization based in Jaffa, sent their representative Samuel Frumkin, a 
British subject, to source out the possibilities of purchasing Land from the 
local Bedouin in Northern Sinai. He initially approached Mr Knesevich 
the British Consular Agent at Ghazza for help and was sent onwards with a 
recommendation to meet the British Inspector of A l ' Arish, Beamish Bey. 
The latter and his superior Col. Parker, Governor of Sinai, initially had no 
objections to the plan, but warned that they may meet with resentment 
from the local Bedouin. Thus Mr. Knesevich, being an unpaid consular 
officer allowed to trade, was commissioned to purchase 50,000 "deunums" 
on behalf of the Zionist organization and he acquired an initial 10,000 
"deunims". He wrote in his report for 1908 : "The only hope of 
improvement here is the advent of Europeans and with them European 
methods of agriculture. I have strongly recommended British Jews to start 
a colony in this district, and they empowered me to buy sufficient land for 
the purpose. I endeavored to secure for them a tract of land near the 
frontier..."13 (FO 141/683/9355 : 1910-12) 
Although it had been represented to the British authorities that the land 
purchases were conducted on behalf of British Jews, and are therefore in 
the interest of Britain, an application to settle 100 Russian Jewish families 
was made in December 1909. This stirred up British concern as it would 
have jeopardized their own relations in Egypt, so they took to great pains 
to discourage any further progress on the grounds that unsettled land 
ownership titles will lead to disputes between the bedouin and settlers. 
This, however, did not deter Mr Frumkin who sent an emotional appeal for 
support to Sir Eldon Gorst, High Commissioner for Egypt in April 1910, 
but to no avail as the Department of Intelligence in Cairo had warned the 
Residency of possible adverse repercussions.14 (FO 141/683/9355 : 1910-
12) However, the Zionists would not give up their plan easily and they 
mobilized the press in London to appeal to public sentiments claiming that 
they are being discriminated against by British administrators in Egypt. 
The issue would dog the High commission in Cairo for years, but they 
stood firm in face of Zionist pressures in London, although they repeatedly 
had to justify themselves. Thus Sir Milne Cheetham explained the whole 
affair in a detailed report in June 1911 and his successor Viscount 
Kitchener summed up the position again in a report to the Foreign office in 
October 1912.15 (ibid.) 
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But there were also British officials that openly advocated Jewish 
colonization of the Sinai Peninsula. The champion of their cause was 
Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, who was a member of the Paris Peace 
Delegation. He summarized his views on the future of the Sinai in a letter 
to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, in order to persuade him to 
include Sinai in the proposed Jewish state : 
Paris, 25.3.1919 
My Dear Prime Minister, 
You asked me yesterday to send you an unofficial letter on 
the subject of the sovereignty of the Sinai. I regard this 
question as supremely important - not at the moment but in 
years to come. May I enter more fully into the question than I 
was able to do yesterday. 
We are very wise in allowing the Jews to establish their 
national Home in Palestine; we have also freed the Arabs 
from the Turkish yoke and we cannot forever stay in Egypt. 
This Peace Conference laid two eggs - Jewish Nationalism 
and Arab Nationalism; these are going to grow up into two 
troublesome chickens : the Jew virile, brave, determined and 
intelligent; the Arab decadent, stupid, dishonest and 
producing little beyond eccentrics influenced by the romance 
and silence of the desert. The Jews, despite dispersal, have 
distinguished themselves in the arts, music, science and gave 
Britain one of its distinguished Prime Ministers. 
In fifty years time both Jew and Arab will be obsessed by 
nationalism, the natural outcome of the President's self-
determination. Nationalism prefers self-government, however 
dishonest and inefficient, to government by foreigners, 
however efficient and beneficial. Nationalism moreover 
involves the freedom of the State but ignores the freedom of 
f 
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the individual; it is a sop to professional politicians and 
agitators, and may involve gross injustice to the people. 
A national home for the Jew must develop sooner or later 
into sovereignty; I understand that this natural evolution is 
envisaged by some members of H.M.G. Arab nationalism 
will also develop into sovereignty from Mesopotamia to 
Morocco. 
Jewish and Arab sovereignty must clash. The Jew, i f his 
immigration programme succeeds, must expand, and that can 
only be accomplished at the expense of the Arab, who will do 
his utmost to check the growth and power of a Jewish 
Palestine. That means bloodshed. 
The British position in the Middle East today is paramount; 
the force of nationalism will challenge our position. We 
cannot befriend both Jew and Arab. My proposal is based on 
befriending the people who are more likely to be loyal friends 
- the Jews; they owe us a great deal and gratitude is a marked 
characteristic of that race. Though we have done much for 
the Arabs, they do not know the meaning of gratitude; 
moreover, they would be a liability; the Jews would be an 
asset.... 
With Jewish and Arab nationalism developing into 
sovereignty, and with the loss of the Canal in 1966 (only 47 
years hence), we stand a good chance of losing our position in 
the Middle East. My suggestion to you yesterday is a 
proposal to make our position more secure. 
Previous to 1905 the Turkish-Egyptian frontier ran from Rafa 
in the north to the neighbourhood of Suez. The whole of the 
Eastern and Southern Sinai was part of the Hejaz province of 
the Ottoman Empire. [Which is not true, of course, as has 
been discussed previously in this thesis.] In October 1906 
Egypt was granted administrative rights in Sinai up to a line 
drawn from Rafah to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba, Turkey 
expressly retained the right of sovereignty. General Allenby 
with British forces, unaided by the Egyptian Army, conquered 
and occupied Turkish Sinai which, by right of conquest, is at 
Britain's disposal. This bare statement can be verified by the 
Foreign Office. 
I f Britain annexes Turkish Sinai, the following advantages 
accrue: 
1. It establishes a buffer between Egypt and Palestine. 
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It gives Britain a strong foothold in the Middle East with 
access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. 
It gives us room for a strategic base and, with Jewish 
consent, the best harbour in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
It not only places us in a position whence we can frustrate 
any Egyptian move to close the Canal to British shipping, 
but it enables us to build a dual canal connecting the 
Mediterranean with the Red Sea. 
No question of nationalism can arise in Sinai, as its nomad 
inhabitants are but a few thousand. 
R. Meinetzhagen 1 6 (Bernstein : 1980, pp. 18-20) 
Although private purchases of land by Zionists continued on a small scale, 
the Sinai was spared from becoming a Jewish colony and further 
expansions were halted. The recommendations of Col. Meinertzhagen 
were not followed and the British did not claim the Sinai as their own, but 
the same line of argument would arise again after the Second World War 
when the status of the Sinai was again contested. 
5.6 The Egypt - Palestine International Boundary 
Although the boundary between Egypt and Ottoman Palestine had been 
settled on both sides in 1906, the matter was by no means final, as after the 
First World War during the conferences in Paris when the victorious allies 
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divided up the Middle East the issue was brought up again. Britain, 
having made a commitment to establish a Jewish national home in 
Palestine and consequently expecting to eventually lose control over their 
mandate, was now more than ever eager to secure the best possible 
strategic position for herself in the Sinai Peninsula. The British authorities 
in Cairo had good insight into the various aspects that had to be considered 
from a geopolitical point of view. First, there was the military security of 
the eastern access to the Suez Canal. During the war the shortcomings of 
having a mere straight line as a border between Egypt and its neighbour 
became all too apparent. The boundary did not adhere to any physical 
features such as valleys or mountain ranges, which made it very hard to 
patrol against smugglers and infiltrators, or defend it in case of war. 
Second, there was the issue of arable land and aquifiers necessary to 
sustain the local population. Third, Britain had built the Palestine Railway 
at great expense and was planning to exploit mining operations on the 
Dead Sea and would have liked to see an access corridor from the mines to 
the Mediterranean included in the boundaries of Egypt. Fourth, there was 
the Zionist organisation, which wanted to secure a maximum of territory 
for its future Jewish homeland. Fifth, there was the problem of dividing 
traditional tribal territory borders which would put bedouin from the same 
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tribe on two different sides of an international boundary, under two 
different state jurisdictions with the social and political implications this 
would entail. Sixth, Britain had agreed not to increase its colonial 
possessions or spheres of influence at the expense of Germany and its 
allies, in this case Turkey, without equal territorial concessions to be won 
by the other allies. "Article 13 of Agreement between Allies and Italy of 
April 26th 1915 provides that i f France and Great Britain increase their 
Colonial possessions, at Germany's expense, those two powers recognise 
in principle that Italy could claim equitable compensation notably in 
settlement in her favour of question concerning frontiers of Italian Colony 
of Eritrea, Somaliland and Lybia and neighbouring British and French 
Colonies."17 (FO 141/664/8002 : 1918) 
And, finally, there were the Egyptian nationalists to please and in 
consideration of the tense political atmosphere leading up to the 1919 
revolution and Egypt's independence this could not be taken lightly either. 
Leading the negotiations in Paris on behalf of Britain was Lord Balfour. 
He was left with the thankless task of trying to balance all these sides. He 
therefore was in constant communication with the High Commission in 
Cairo seeking the advice of British officers who were much more familiar 
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with the actual situation in Sinai and Palestine. A particularly 
controversial issue was that both Palestine and Transjordan wanted to 
retain at least a narrow strip of territory which would give them each an 
access to the Gulf of Aqaba and Red Sea, thus separating Egypt from 
Arabia. As negotiations in Paris were proceeding Balfour consulted Cairo 
: "A provisional Southern Boundary for Palestine has been drawn up by 
British delegation here, which starts from a point five miles west of Et-
Tafila and runs due west till it strikes Sinai frontier just below El Auja. It 
has been so drawn as to leave room for a line of railway from south of 
Dead Sea (where it is supposed that works might be established for dealing 
with Dead Sea mines) to Beer Sheba. Is there any objection from an 
Egyptian point of view to line striking Sinai frontier just below El Auja 
?"18 (FO 141/664/8002 : 1919) This would have meant expanding 
Egyptian territory into the Negev Desert at the expense of Palestine's 
access to the sea, and giving Palestine the north e3 astern p-art of Sinai, 
thus altering the boundary of 1906. 
The High Commission forwarded Balfour's question to seek the inputs of 
the Frontiers Districts Administration and Lt. Col. Parker, the governor of 
Sinai, as well as Field Marshal Edmund Allenby, G.O.C. British Forces in 
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Egypt. Their answers seemed to reflect the various considerations 
mentioned above : 
"On the one hand it seems desirable that all cultivated or cultivable land on 
the southern borders of Palestine, in the neighbourhood of Gaza, Rafa, and 
Beersheba, should go to Palestine. But, on the other hand, it would be 
preferable that the Palestinian State should not have jurisdiction over 
Bedouin tribes. The tribes south of the Rafah - Beersheba line and west of 
the Wadi Arabah go naturally with those of the Sinai peninsula, and the 
pre-war frontier between Turkey and Egypt, which separates them, was 
quite an arbitrary line. It might be desirable, therefore, therefore to attach 
this triangle of former Turkish territory to Egypt. But the consent of the 
inhabitants would have first to be manifested in some clear form, in order 
to preclude any possibility of misinterpretation. For, since Egypt is a 
British protectorate, the attachment of these tribes to Egypt might 
otherwise be represented as an annexation of free Arabs to the British 
Empire."1 9 (FO 141/664/8002) 
From the Egyptian (or, at present, the F.D.A.'s) point of view I see no 
objection if, in any case, the pre-war Egyptian frontier line is to be adhered 
to (as this telegram seems to imply). It matters little at what point a 
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tangent starts eastwards, separating "Palestine" from "Hejaz". But I can 
conceive some advantage to Egypt i f no such tangent were drawn from its 
frontier at all; i.e. i f the present Egyptian frontier itself were taken as the 
south-western boundary of Palestine; and a line of demarcation were 
drawn southward from Tafila to the Gulf of Aqaba in such a way that 
Egypt would be at no point conterminous with Hejaz. In that case, i f 
Palestine fell under a civilised government, Egypt would be spared 
difficulties of tribal control and contraband prevention, which a frontier 
with Hejaz is sure to occasion in a greater degree than a frontier with 
Palestine."20 (FO 141/664/8002 : 1919) 
Lt.Col. A.C.Parker, who had first hand knowledge of the peninsula, did 
not quite agree : "The present boundary line of Sinai coincides with no 
physical feature, nor is it a satisfactory dividing line between Arab tribes, 
cutting as it does the territory of three large Arab tribes, namely the Teiaha, 
the Terabin and the Lehaiwat. The line which has been suggested as 
separating Palestine from the country under Arab dominion, from a spot 5 
miles west of Tafile to the Egyptian frontier immediately south of Auja, 
follows no natural feature. Such a line leaves to the south of it a mass of 
rough country, the ready refuge for thieves, raiders, and malefactors 
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operating both in Sinai to the west and in Palestine to the north; nor is it 
possible to believe that the Arab Authorities will ever attempt to 
administer or control the Arabs there resident. What may be called the 
Sinai Arabs are quite distinct from the Hejaz Arabs. They extend only to 
Bir Sheba and to the western edge of the Wadi Araba. A line is marked on 
the attached map ... Such a line would give to Egypt all the Arab tribes up 
to Wadi Araba. It would give to Egypt control of all the passes from Wadi 
Araba into Sinai. While leaving some Arab owned lands north of the 
Wadis Ghazze and Saba, it would secure to the Arabs a large area to the 
south of these Wadis which they would be free to develop without fear of 
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penetration and occupation by the Jews." (Parker : 1919) 
Thus the High Commission summarised its concern to Balfour in Paris. 
This was also the view expressed by Field Marshall Allenby, who of 
course had excellent knowledge and experience of the area in question. : 
"The provisional southern boundary of Palestine proposed appears to 
presuppose no change in the existing Eastern boundary of Egyptian Sinai. 
I f there is to be no such change, the proposal is open to serious objection 
from the point of view of the administration of Egyptian Sinai for these 
reasons : 
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A. It will subdivide still further certain bedouin tribes ... and 
render tribal control, already unsatisfactory, still more difficult. 
B. The boundary dividing Egypt from this will be a conventional 
one, following no line of demarcation or of strategic defence. 
C. The desert point where three territories meet ... will present 
special attraction to contrabandist and escaping criminals. 
These difficulties will be lessened i f the present Egyptian frontier ... were 
advanced to the crest of the western escarpment of the Wadi Arabah ... 
Still better however would be a rectification of all her Sinaitic frontier 
carried out so as to include in Egyptian Sinai all that lies south of the Wadi 
Ghuzzeh, together with the town of Beersheba, the frontier being 
prolonged thence to the foot of the Dead Sea and returning south down the 
western crest of the Wadi Arabah to the Gulf of Akaba." 2 2 (FO 
141/664/8002 : 1919) 
Balfour agreed with the recommendations and tried to include them in the 
negotiations, but he was weary of Zionist opposition. He therefore 
suggested to trade arable land in Northern Sinai, between al-'Arish and 
Rafah, which previously had been the target of Jewish colonisation 
attempts, for the Southern part of Palestine : "We agree as regards West 
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escarpment of Wadi Araba as Eastern Frontier of Egypt and will 
endeavour to obtain this line. As regards Northern Frontier, in the event 
Great Britain not obtaining a mandate in Palestine, we would endeavour to 
obtain line recommended. I f we do obtain a Mandate it will be difficult 
and in fact impossible to begin our regime by insistence on a territorial 
rearrangement which Jews would consider greatly to their disadvantage." 
2 3 (FO 141/664/8002 : 1919) 
The High commissioner also had the concerns of the Egyptian government 
in mind : " 1 . Proposed boundary gives to Palestine practically all the land 
in Sinai which is of any value in exchange for a worthless tract of country. 
2. It hands over to Palestine sedentary Arab people who have always been 
under Egypt. In view of the above two considerations the proposal is 
hardly likely to be well received in Egypt, especially at present." (FO 
141/664/8002 : 1919) 
Balfour tried to incorporate the suggestions received from Egypt, i.e. 
extending Egypt's territory to the Dead Sea without giving away any 
territory in Sinai. He did not, however, succeed and finally had to yield to 
Zionist and French pressure. On April 15th he telegraphed to Cairo : "The 
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objections to including Beersheba within Egypt appear insuperable. ... It is 
generally agreed that the Western Escarpment of Wadi Araba should be 
Western Boundary of Arabs. In the circumstances it is suggested that the 
pre-war Frontier of Egypt should stand and that the triangle between 
Akaba, Rafa and the southern End of the Dead Sea should be included in 
Palestine. ... Egypt will thus avoid a common frontier with Arabs."25 (FO 
141/664/8002 : 1919) 
The High Commission made a last attempt to persuade Balfour to try 
again, rightly pointing out the grave deficiency of maintaining the straight 
line from Rafah to Taba, explaining the reasons, but to no avail. " I note 
that there are held to be insuperable objections to the inclusion of 
Beersheba in Egypt. I must make it clear that the frontier, which I 
recommended in my telegram No. 293, includes the only satisfactory line 
of defence of the Suez Canal. By maintaining the present frontier we 
abandon the whole system of strategic railways constructed during the 
campaign as well as the defensive positions against an attack on Egypt. In 
the event of attack we should be forced to fall back on the line of the Canal 
which is rendered useless as a line of defence to Egypt by the recent 
development of long range gunfire and aeroplane activity. Hence the 
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present frontier is most unsatisfactory from a military point of view unless 
we obtain complete and permanent control of Palestine. In any case I am 
opposed to interposing between Sinai and the Arab territories a narrow 
triangle such as that proposed in the latter part of your telegram which will 
be under the administration of Palestine. I would prefer the frontier to 
follow the line originally suggested by you." 2 6 (FO 141/664/8002 : 1919) 
Sir Milne Cheetham was of course right and his words would resonate for 
the rest of the twentieth Century as every military conflict in Sinai has 
proven. But the agreement was sealed and thus came about the straight 
line international boundary between Sinai and southern Palestine, and 
between Palestine and what later became Jordan, which are still in place 
today. 
The boundary itself had thus been settled but there were also practical 
i 
administrative arrangements to be considered in controlling the newly 
established international boundary. The tasks of controlling contraband 
activities, health and passport controls had to be adjusted to the new 
situation. In view of Egypt's independence the issue was also of sensitive 
political importance. 
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In preparation of the resumption of control by the Egyptian government 
over the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula another question remained 
unresolved: exactly where should the actual customs, quarantine and 
passport control be carried out. Several points were under discussion : 
Kantara on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal being the railhead of the 
Sinai railway and was previously the main customs check point; or, al-
'Arish where the main caravan routes and roads across the peninsula 
converge; or, Rafah the small border town situated on the actual political 
frontier between Egypt and Palestine. Several arguments were put forth by 
various British entities in Jerusalem and Cairo and the Foreign Office in 
London was consulted. The authorities in Jerusalem took a practical 
standpoint and were thus in favour of establishing a joint Egyptian-
Palestinian Customs and Quarantine station at al-'Arish for travellers by 
road, and Kantara to be the checkpoint for the railway, rather than at the 
exact border. Although several precedents were given of similar 
arrangements existing for example between Switzerland and Italy on the 
Simplon railway, and between Holland and Germany, Brazil and Uruguay, 
this proposal was wholly unacceptable for the Egyptian government in 
Cairo. They objected to having Palestinian authorities operating inside 
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Egyptian territory and favoured the actual border point at Rafah to be the 
location of all customs, passport and health formalities. The Frontiers 
Districts Administration, at that time still under British command, 
favoured al-'Arish for practical purposes of being the topographically best 
suited point of effective border police control. The Public Health Ministry 
also preferred to base its facilities in al-'Arish in order to more effectively 
control road traffic. This was also supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, which was concerned about infected produce from the Rafah 
area reaching Egypt proper without inspection. The Customs Authority 
preferred to retain their former checkpoint at Kantara, the Suez Canal 
being a most effective barrier for controlling the influx of contraband from 
Sinai. They also considered the loss of income from duties on from 
imports of sheep and camels raised in Sinai for sale west of the Canal, 
particularly since it was much more difficult to control the movement of 
livestock into Sinai from Palestine and Arabia. 2 7 (FO 141/443/12136 : 
1920-25) 
The discussions continued until April 1921 when an acceptable 
arrangement was agreed upon and a period of trial and error followed. The 
different authorities agreed that the real line of fiscal and health defence 
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should be maintained, as it was before the war, along the Suez Canal with 
the coast guard patrolling the western bank of the Canal. This meant that 
quarantine for livestock and agricultural produce, and customs were to be 
located at Kantara and east of Suez, while passport controls would be 
performed on the train between Kantara and al-'Arish for eastbound travel 
and between Ghazza and al-'Arish for travellers from Palestine to Egypt. 
Other travellers were to be checked at the Suez Canal facilities. This 
effectively made the Sinai peninsula "infect" from a quarantine point of 
view and extra territorial from a customs point of view, thus effectively 
isolating its inhabitants from mainland Egypt, (ibid.) A situation which 
prevailed well into the 1980's. 
5.7 Egypt's Independence 
Egypt's national movement was of course at the forefront of British 
attention and it was clear to the High Commissioner in Cairo Egypt will 
eventually have to become a sovereign state. Yet it was not beneficial for 
the interests of Britain to have independence come too soon and the 
political activities that swept the country right after the First World War 
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were seen with great concern. The Egyptians were very hopeful that as 
soon as the war ends the military restrictions and martial law would be 
lifted and the country would become independent. But the British had 
very little intentions to live up to their promises of granting Egypt 
independence although their control over the country became increasingly 
difficult to sustain. T.E. Laurence, who himself felt rather cheated and 
embarrassed, vented his disenchantment in various newspaper articles that 
became more and more critical of British policy in Egypt. In an article that 
appeared in the Sunday Times on 30.5.1920, titled "The Middle East - how 
we are losing prestige", he wrote : "... Egypt expected the end of martial 
law and a return to the path of self government, toward which affairs had 
been slowly moving in the days of Eldon Gorst, and which had been since 
Muhamed Ali Pasha her ideal. Everywhere...it was felt that the war cloud 
had lifted, and that the brown peoples who had chosen to fight beside the 
Allies would receive their need of friendship in the work of peace, that 
new age of freedom of which victory was the dawn. Since November 
1918 disillusionment had come upon these peoples of the East. The delay 
of framing the Peace Treaty with Turkey was made the excuse for 
continuing the irritating restrictions of military administration. Al l 
constructive measures - political, industrial, social, commercial - were 
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blocked everywhere. This excuse of the incomplete peace was dishonest. 
... In days of peace Egypt used to have a garrison of five thousand British 
troops, and there was an embryo Parliament, the Legislative Assembly, for 
the educated Egyptian. Unfortunately, this class are nationalist now, and 
will not endure either our appointed ministries, or our Sultan of Egypt. 
Consequently we have suppressed the Legislative Assembly, and, in 
compensation, increased our garrison. The Streets of Cairo have become 
unsafe for Englishmen, and they are no longer able to wander without 
escort in the provinces." (Laurence : 1920) 
The situation of uprising and anti-British agitation in the provinces was 
closely monitored by a number of British intelligence officers stationed in 
all the various provinces of Egypt. They reported that the Egyptians in the 
countryside were largely indifferent to the political turmoil in Cairo, but 
they watched the developments in Cairo closely. "The only agitation 
comes from students that organized in small groups and stirred up anti-
British agitation amongst the fellahin. There is a general lack of sufficient 
police forces to contain the unrests and most police are paid too little. 
Ghqffirs for example were only paid 200 to 250 piastres per month, while 
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an ordinary labourer ears 12 to 20 piastres per day."3 (FO 141/514/12487 
: 1920) 
Although the British colonial administration was very busy keeping up 
with the developments in the urban centres of Egypt, a great deal of 
attention was nevertheless also given to the security situation of Egypt's 
boundaries. The events during the military campaigns against the Turks 
through the Sinai Peninsula and the infiltration into the Western Desert by 
Senoussi forces had left their mark on military security thinking of Britain 
in Egypt. The control of the Suez Canal, Britain's vital artery of lucrative 
trade with India and the rest of the Far East overshadowed any other 
strategic concerns at the time. The securing of the Sinai Peninsula 
therefore became a central issue to any future policy in the Middle East. 
The Eastern boundary of the Peninsula had to be firmly established in 
order for any future administration to be able to act legitimately i f military 
defense should be needed. 
As for the bedouin of Sinai, and other desert areas, the implications of 
Egyptian independence on their special status was seen with great 
suspicion. The new nationalist government clearly expressed its policy of 
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equality for all Egyptian citizens alike. Mohammed Al i had granted the 
bedouin special rights, they were exempted from taxation and military 
service. Equality under the nationalist government would now mean the 
end of tax exemption, which was originally granted to them in 
consideration of their harsh living conditions and meager sources of 
income. They also highly feared being drafted into the regular Egyptian 
army where they would be subject to abuses by their Egyptian superiors, 
particularly since they were viewed as collaborators under the British. 
Another concern was the extension of legal jurisdiction to the desert areas. 
This would mean prison sentences in an Egyptian town for even minor 
offenses. Knowing the nature of the bedouin even relatively short prison 
stays were like a death sentence. Many bedouin subjected to it died in 
custody. 
In 1920 the news was out in the deserts that Egypt was drafting a new 
constitution in preparation for independence. This constitution proposed 
the elimination of the exceptional status of the Egyptian bedouin and 
cancellation of liberties granted by the Khedives. The tribes viewed the 
imminent internal control of their areas by Egyptians with great 
apprehension. Old resentments and the traditional cleavage between 
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nomads and settlers thrived again. Moreover, many bedouin closely 
collaborated with the British occupation forces and now feared revenge 
from the nationalists. The British did, however, show great concern for 
their former proteges in the desert and the High Commissioner urged the 
British officers in the F.D.A. to report to him on the attitude of the bedouin 
under their respective jurisdiction.3 1 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
As the reports were pouring in it became all too clear that no one in 
Egypt's deserts welcomed the change of control and several tribes even 
went as far as petitioning th e High Commissioner and Gen. Allenby, 
who was a great favourite with the bedouin of Sinai, for protection. Here a 
synopsis of some of its correspondence : 
"View of the Mariut Bedouin towards the Milner-Zaghlul agreements with 
skepsis. Awlad Ali from Behera fear i l l treatment by the nationalists 
because of their open support of the occupation. But in general bedouin in 
this district will offer little opposition since recruiting will anyhow be 
restricted to the Nile valley, so that the poor bedouin will have the desert 
as a refuge and the rich will pay their exemption. Mismanagement as well 
as heavy taxation is a greater factor of alienation." 3 2 (FO 141/514/12462 : 
1920-26) 
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"The transfer of control from the British to the Egyptians is viewed with 
great disfavour. The Shaikhs of the Ababda, Assabab, Jouazi and Gincha 
tribes have freely expressed their unwillingness to serve under Egyptian 
control in protecting the railway line. There also seems to be a widespread 
ignorance as to how the changes will affect them ... little propaganda. 80 -
100,000 Arabs in the Nile Valley would constitute a serious obstacle for 
the government should they be alienated. In Luxor views circulate that the 
Egyptians would be incapable of running the country." 3 3 (FO 
141/514/12462 1920-26) 
"Shaikhs and inhabitants view the proposed independence with 
uneasiness. They trust the integrity and justice of the British government 
and fear the corruption of 40 years ago, and the oppression of the ma 'mur 
and tax collector. The British also built wells and hospitals in both oases, 
now they fear to be neglected as before. " 3 4 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-
26) 
The Sinai bedouin went as far as presenting a long well written petition to 
Allenby. They asked him to interfere on behalf of them regarding the 
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suggestion of the "Dastour" [constitution] Commission to abolish special 
right for bedouin. They refered to Allenby's letter of 22nd of February 
1922 on the Protection of Minorites, which they considered applied to 
them in view of their census. They related that they aided Mohammed Al i 
against Syria and Sudan and in return were exempted from military service 
and Corve* [tax]. They also did not take part in the 1919 uprising against 
the British and alleged that Saad Zaghlul threatened to deprive them of 
their rights. 3 5 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
The petition was accompanied by a 24 page booklet titled Al *arab al badu 
fi misr : bahth haul imtiyazatihim ( The bedouin Arabs in Egypt - a study 
about their priviliges) by Abdel Megid Lotfi Bey, a nobleman from the 
Khowayled tribe dated 25.9.1922, here a brief content: After a preface of 
bedouin history and past military services since Mohammed Al i the writer 
deals with the customs of the bedouin pointing out the differences to 
sedentary Egyptian society. The writer does not aim at getting exceptional 
rights for the bedouin, but explains how these arose. The bedouin always 
responded to an appeal for military service as they are naturally warlike 
people, but they want to perform this duty according to their own habits 
and in due time. As for the "Duty of Nile Protection" (wajib hefz al nil) 
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they bring forward the fact that the bedouin are guarding the boundaries 
near the hills and desert at all times and should therefore not at the same 
time be recruited for Nile Protection. They were also excluded from 
receiving free government medical service a disadvantage that they have 
not realized it to be. All rights previously granted to the bedouin are in 
conformity with the laws, which should be respected by all, and they are 
confident that these laws will be respected as long as the house of 
Muhamed Al i is reigning in Egypt."3 6 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
The bedouin had one representative in parliament who also served on the 
constitution committee; he tried to petition the High Commission for 
intervention. "In your absence I interviewed Saleh Pasha Lamloum and 
another bedouin omda who came to ask for British intervention at the 
Constitution Committee. I told him that it would be up to the Council of 
Ministers and the King to make decisions on such a principle. S. Lamloum 
will meet with bedouin and come again to see H.E. since they had hitherto 
been accustomed to look to the Residency for protection." 
(141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
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Allenby wrote back in January 1923 : "You had asked for British 
interference to secure your privileges and I told you that it was up to the 
Egyptian government to decide. The Constitution Commission, of which 
Saleh Lamloum Pasha was a member, recommended that the rights and 
duties of all Egyptians should be the same. 20 Years ago Cromer promised 
to preserve these privileges granted by Khedive Ismail in 1264H provided 
you use them as privileges and not as means of making money by securing 
exemption from military service for fellahin who called themselves Arabs. 
Also when these privileges were given the bedouin were expected to 
provide horsemen i f needed, such volunteers are no longer required. 
Times changed in England and are now changing in Egypt : all people 
have the same rights and privileges." He then continued to praise the 
Arabs and their great role in the past war and suggested that they should 
lobby for the formation of a purely Arab battalion to avoid discrimination. 
3 8 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
But the Sinai bedouin would not give up easy and tried to persuade 
Allenby again to intervene on their behalf. They wrote back to him 
assuring him of their continued loyalty and friendship and thanked him for 
his valuable suggestion regarding a purely Arab battalion. However, they 
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argued, that although they do agree to supply men at wartime, there is no 
need to do service in Nile Protection as they are anyway engaged in 
guarding the hills at all times. Furthermore, shaikhs that included fellahin 
in their census count by passing them off as Arabs, were fined. At the 
Constitution Commission Saleh Lamloum Pasha was the only one to speak 
up for them with the result that it was decided to grant privileges only to 
bedouin who live under canvas (wanderers). This led to Arabs who 
possesed no land to join the nomads. Because voluntary horsemen were 
no longer needed did not mean that they were not willing to fulf i l l this 
obligation and Arabs never absented themselves from war. The bedouin 
also brought up a good point by arguing that Egypt was different from 
other purely Arab countries who had a good disciplined army because of 
their uniform education level in all parts of the population. When 
education in Egypt were to be extended to the bedouin, more interaction 
with the rest of the population would result. The High Commissioner 
should, therefore, have reconsidered helping the Arabs. 3 9 (FO 
141/514/12462 : 1920-26) They received a firm and final answer on the 
same day: that the British government declared the independence of Egypt, 
and it was therefore up to the Egyptians to decide what to do about the 
bedouin issue. As for the protection of minorities, the government must 
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treat all the Egyptians as equal, only i f it discriminates against a particular 
group would the British defend it. So the matter was to be laid before the 
King, the descendant of Muhamed Al i , who granted the privileges in the 
first place.40 (FO 141/514/12462 : 1920-26) 
The argument continued for years and in 1926 even the Egyptian director 
of the Frontiers Districts Administration, Lewa Ahmed Shafik, took their 
side. Having been in his post for several years by then, he came to 
appreciate the military effectiveness of the bedouin when allowing him to 
operate on his home turf, rather than being arbitrarily displaced as a recruit 
in the Egyptian Army. He therefore explained the matter to his superiors 
at the Ministry of War and Marine. Bedouin despite their warlike nature 
resent drafting which is contrary to their way of life. This was the motive 
for Muhamed Al i to exempt them and only call on them when needed at 
times of war. The Khedive Ismail tried to restrict the bedouin and failed 
and now it is still not the time to try again. Forcing them will result in 
them evacuating the Western desert and Sinai, which many of them have 
done already. Ahmed Shafiq therefore suggested the formation of 
voluntary police units that could operate in the desert much better than the 
regular forces as experience has show. The F.D.A. has taken men 
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successfully into the mounted and dismounted police, the Camel Corps 
and Armed Car Patrols to act as anti contraband and public security force 
in addition to defense. This would also decrease unemployment in the 
desert areas. "The artillery forces in the forts of Sinai in Akaba, Nuweiba 
and Nekhl were once from local Arabs. One way of securing many 
volunteers was by posting them near their native province as was the 
policy before. It should also be encouraged to appoint N.C.O.'s and junior 
officers from among the sons of shaikhs. The cost of a volunteer equals 
the recruit, as the former has higher salary but causes much less wastage 
on provisions, clothing and accommodation. Their income will provide 
for their families during times of barrenness." 4 0 (FO 141/514/12462 : 
1920-26) 
His suggestions were eventually but only partially implemented, with the 
exception of Sinai. Maj. C.S. Jarvis was ruling the peninsula like a 
colonial governor and was not too interested in following guidelines from 
Cairo. As most Sinai bedouin were anyway classified as living under 
canvas, they managed to continue to evade recruitment and stay outside 
the main system of Egyptian jurisdiction. Jarvis as governor did make use 
of them though and preferred to recruit them into various functions of 
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military and police services. He greatly relied on his bedouin subjects in 
keeping law and order in the peninsula as well as securing the Eastern 
approaches to the Suez canal which became his main objective for the 
following decade to come in line with British policy for Sinai. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War meant 
major political adjustments were to follow, with important consequences 
for the status and control of the Sinai Peninsula. The formation of new 
nation states, namely Jordan, Arabia, Palestine, would carry far reaching 
implications for the political situation of the time. Three factors were 
central to the shaping of British Middle East policy : Arab nationalism 
and the war time promise of creating independent nation states just bejond 
Egypt's eastern border to replace the Ottoman Empire ; the Zionist 
movement and emminent creation of a Jewish state in Palestine; and 
preparations for granting Egypt independence. Al l these factors would 
overshadow Britain's main concern of maintaining control over her naval 
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communications through the Suez Canal. This chapter discussed how 
these interrelated issues were addressed and dealt with by Britain. 
Although the Ottoman Sultan as the head of the Islamic world tried to rally 
for Arab support against the "infidel" foreigners invading his Empire, his 
efforts were met with an Arab revolt against the Turks, which eventually 
resulted in the expulsion of Turkish government from the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Levant. Britain therefore started formulating her "Arab 
Policy" to serve as a blueprint for the formation of new states during 
negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The guidelines for this 
policy was also based on the Sykes-Picot treaty which had been concluded 
in 1916 and set out the terms of how Britain and France would split their 
respective spheres of influence in the Middle East after defeating the 
Ottomans. Thus, the setting of the eastern boundary of Egypt became a 
major issue at the Peace conference because this new international 
boundary had to take a number of issues into consideration. The new 
boundary had to satisfy several criteria : the military security of the Sinai 
and the approaches of the Suez Canal, the fair allocation of arable land 
and water resources along the border, the unity of tribal territories located 
along the border, the fate of existing infrastructure such as the Sinai-
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Palestine railway which was constructed during the War, clarification of 
the status of Zionist immigration and the push towards the formation of a 
Jewish state in Palestine, and, finally, the rivalry between the European 
powers for increasing their colonial territory and political influence. These 
issues were more or less resolved by 1921 and the final international 
boundary was fixed. 
The impending independence of Egypt created another problem for the 
British control of Sinai. In practical terms it meant that the British officials 
previously employed by various government departments would be 
gradually replaced by natives, and the colonial control over Sinai would 
have to cease. This problem was overcome by the circumstance that the 
administration of Sinai was run by the Ministry of War and the unilateral 
declaration of Egypt's independence included the so called "Reserved 
Clauses". These clauses provided that Britain will remain in charge of 
Egypt's independence and therefore the command of the Egyptian Army 
was headed by British officers. Their presence in the Frontiers Districts 
Administration ensured that the governor of Sinai would remain an 
Englishman. 
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CHAPTER 6 
British Sinai After Egyptian Independence 
6.1 Introduction 
Britain granted Egypt independence in 1922, but did not intend to hand 
over total control to a nationalist government that would then be in a 
position to compromise Britain's geopolitical and colonial interests. 
Therefore an abundance of British officials in the service of the Egyptian 
government was seen as an insurance of continued influence in the 
domestic affairs of its former protectorate. Questioning their loyalty, a 
reduction of English civil servants in the employ of the Egyptian 
government became a primary objective on the agenda of the new 
independent government. The British embassy, on the other hand, made 
it its primary mission to legitimise to the Egyptians retaining each and 
every Englishman. Nevertheless, the number of British, as well as other 
foreigners working for the various ministries in Cairo, was drastically 
229 
reduced in the years following independence and their influence in 
administering the country was greatly diminished. 
This was the case everywhere, except in Sinai which was still ruled by a 
British governor in the traditional colonial manner, presiding over his 
own courts and being more responsible to Whitehall and the British 
Embassy than to his Egyptian superiors in Cairo. This feat was possible 
because Britain paid particular attention to retaining control of the 
Frontiers District Administration of which the governor of Sinai was an 
officer. The "reserved clauses" of the unilateral declaration of 
independence gave Britain unlimited control over the defence of Egypt, 
the security of British communications, primarily in form of the Suez 
canal, being the reason. This meant that Britain would remain in control of 
the Ministry of War, along with the requisite continued presence of British 
troops in Egypt, much to the annoyance and resentment of the Egyptian 
nationalists. 
British officials went to great pains to legitimise their situation in Sinai, 
pointing out both international threats to the eastern boundary of Sinai, and 
domestic problems of administration that may destabilise the strategically 
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important peninsula. On the international front boundary security became 
Britain's major policy issue in Sinai. The threat to the boundary of Egypt 
by "hordes of invading Arabs" was always grandly communicated to 
London emphasising the need for continued British control over the Sinai 
to ensure the safety of Egypt and, of course, the Suez Canal. 
The Wahabi uprising in Hejaz made the threat of cross boundary raids 
into Sinai by bedouin from neighbouring countries a reality which 
became a major concern for Maj. C.S. Jarvis who governed the Sinai 
from 1922 until 1936. When Trans-Jordan was proclaimed an 
independent state in 1924, with southern boundaries wedged between the 
Hejaz and the protectorate of Palestine, the problem was further 
exacerbated. Questions of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction on 
boundary control were evoked. 
Britain also took a keen interest in undertaking several investments for 
improving the infrastructure of Sinai. Although meant to serve British 
imperial interests in preparation for the defence of Egypt in World War I I 
the improvement of the Sinai railway, the construction of military roads 
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and expansion of modern communications with the Sinai telegraph route 
also benefited the local inhabitants. 
On the domestic side British diplomats were quick to point out that their 
military administrators were more efficient in the F.D.A. than their 
Egyptian counterparts. This claim was not entirely without foundation as 
several very able administrators emerged from the ranks of British 
officers. The concerns of the British governors for welfare of the 
bedouin inhabitants of Sinai, their understanding of bedouin customs and 
desert environment was in contrast to Egyptian officers who regarded the 
posting in the hostile desert as a punishment for inferior personnel. 
The independence of Egypt was also not particularly welcomed by the 
bedouin, and the tribes did not fail to show their preference for British 
administration. This was because they rightly feared the cancellations of 
their special rights, exempting them from military service and taxes, 
which were granted almost a century earlier by Mohammed Al i . 
However, the bedouin's collaboration with the British occupation made 
them the target of retaliation and abuse under Egyptian administration. 
The extension of Egyptian civil and criminal law to the desert areas in 
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replacement of bedouin customary law, which had continued to be 
applied by the British governors, was another point of dispute. 
Britain, therefore, remained directly in control of Sinai despite nationalist 
resentment to British involvement in domestic administration. The threat 
of War and the Anglo Egyptian treaty of Alliance in 1936 again revived 
the legitimacy of continued British control. And when martial law {Etat 
de Siege) was proclaimed in 1939 British troops eventually reoccupied 
Egypt and Sinai. 
6.2 The Wahabi Uprising and Security of the Eastern Border 
After the official declaration of independence of Egypt all British officers 
employed in the Egyptian armed forces came under Egyptian command, 
rather than being part of the British army as had been the case before. This 
meant that the British Governor of Sinai was no longer reporting to the 
British authorities but to his superiors at the F.D.A.. However, unofficially 
his links with the High Commission in Cairo were very much intact and 
British policy was followed in every way. The main concern of Britain for 
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holding the Sinai was of course the security of the Suez Canal. Therefore, 
Britain had to rely on the few British officers who remained employed in 
the service of the Frontiers Administration, one of these was Major C.S. 
Jarvis who was the governor of Sinai From 1922 until his retirement in 
1936 and looked after the defence of the Eastern border. 
Although it was Britain that encouraged and armed the Arabs of Hejaz 
during the War against Turkey, they soon proved to be a menace for the 
security of Sinai and southern Palestine, which had come under British 
mandate. In September 1922 a force of 1500 Wahabis advanced on Aqaba 
and Ma" an which alarmed the British and steps had to be taken to contain 
this threat from the East.1 (FO 141/504/14928 : 1922) An emergency 
meeting was held on the 13th of September 1922 attended by the six most 
senior British officers in Egypt representing the Egyptian Army, Royal 
Airforce, and F.D.A. to draw up a contingency plan on how to deal with a 
possible invasion of Egyptian territory from the East. It was clear to all 
present that it would be impossible for the Governor of Sinai with his 
limited F.D.A. troops to oppose any significant size of enemy forces larger 
than small raiding parties which they were able to contain on their own. It 
was therefore decided to reinforce the existing troops with a company of 
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Egyptian Infantry, a machine gun platoon, light car patrols and two Bristol 
fighters from the Royal Air Force. Maj. Jarvis would coordinate all the 
operations under his command. Elaborate arrangements had to be made 
for supplies of these troops and also for the maintenance of any refugees 
who may be driven ahead by the invading Arabs.2 (FO 141/504/14928 : 
1922) Although by that time it was under consideration to change the 
status of the F.D.A. and the involvement of British troops in general due to 
the independence of Egypt, the country was still under martial law which 
gave powers to the British to act i f there was an attack from abroad.3 (FO 
141/504/14928 : 1922) 
The boundary had thus been secured and the Arab invaders decided it 
would be too costly to oppose the British in Sinai, but the build-up of 
troops in Sinai was seen with great apprehension by the Wahabis and they 
were under the impression that Egypt had plans to take over Aqaba, which 
had become part of Hejaz. In addition, there was quite some controversy 
between Egypt and the Hejaz regarding the responsibility for carrying the 
mahmal during the pilgrimage and where it would be handed over from the 
Egyptians to the Arabians. Some clashes with raiders from Arabia and the 
Egyptian F.D.A. added to the anxiety of the rulers of Hejaz. This 
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prompted the chief British representative for Transjordan, J.B. Philby to 
write to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem : "Both Amir Abdullah and 
King Feisal are under the impression that the Egyptian government has 
designs on the Hijaz port of Aqaba. They are highly alarmed at the 
impending visit of Mohammed Azmi Pasha the Egyptian Minister of War 
to the Sinai and possible visit to Aqaba itself."4 (FO 141/793/16674 : 
1923) Col. Parker the director of the F.D.A. explained that they had never 
planned to visit Aqaba, nor has anything to that effect ever been 
mentioned, but they would only be inspecting the eastern frontier by motor 
car and would stay well within the border of Egypt. This information was 
passed on to all concerned authorities to alleviate their tension. 
The problematic security situation on the Eastern border of Sinai was 
further complicated when the new state of Trans-Jordan was founded in 
1924. the news was distributed by REUTER's : "Jerusalem, 18th March 
1924. Since King Hussein has ceded Aqaba and Tebuk from his original 
territory to that of Transjordan, the Emir Abdullah has created a new 
villayet including these territories with the world reknowned and ancient 
City of Petra with Maan as the Capital, and Major General Ghalib Pasha 
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Shalan has been appointed Governor General and Commander." 5 (FO 141 
813/17052) 
In 1924 the King of Hejaz ceded the port of Aqaba to the newly 
established Territory of Trans-Jordan, which would be ruled by Prince 
Abdullah. The problem of defending against cross boundary raids was 
further compounded when this separate mandate was established in Trans-
Jordan which included Aqaba and meant a meeting of three jurisdictions in 
very close proximity at the head of the gulf of Aqaba. Now there were 
three independent states whose territories met in a narrow stretch of land. 
In fact it is only about six kilometres from the Egyptian border at Taba 
across Palestine, which today is the port of Elat, to Aqaba. 
Therefore, the main concern for the Sinai administration of Major C.S. 
Jarvis were the frequent cross border raids into Sinai by bedouin tribes 
living under the independent Arabian jurisdiction of the Hejaz and Jordan. 
He frequently had to follow raiders across the eastern border of Sinai and 
various correspondence shows that he had established good cooperation 
with the police force in British Palestine. In June 1924 he verbally asked 
the British governor in Jerusalem for a definition of the eastern boundary 
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Governor of Sinai since the latter was an employee of the now independent 
Egyptian government. The message from Jerusalem would be forwarded 
to Sinai in an unofficial manner as noted in the minutes of the residency : 
"This is slightly awkward as we cannot communicate directly with Mgr 
Jarvis nor through official channels to him as we were not in the first place 
approached by the Eg. Govt, on the subject.... I have written privately ..." 7 
(FO 141 813/17052 : 1924) 
He therefore had to somehow make his own arrangements in order to 
insure efficient border security. His main problem was not being allowed 
to pursue raiders across the boundary, but being a practical man he found 
his own solutions. He did, however, regard the new boundary between 
Palestine and Jordan as an expansion of his British jurisdiction as he 
related to the High Commission : "Many thanks for your 23rd... I gather 
from the extract that all the country between the Centre of the Wadi Araba 
& the Egyptian Frontier in Sinai is Palestine. This is very useful 
information as I have a private arrangement with Palestine by which either 
side can cross over the Frontier when chasing raiders. That means I can 
now cross over as far as Wadi Araba in the South ... I shall have to go 
carefully as the Hashemite government claim I keep a post of police a 
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of Palestine to be communicated to him through official channels. Sir 
Herbert Samuel wrote back to the High Commission in Cairo on 
13.06.1924 : ... The following extract from Command Paper No. 1785 of 
1922 provides the definition : "The following provisions of the Mandate 
for Palestine are not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, 
which comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a point 
two miles west of the town of Aqaba on the Gulf of that name up the 
centre of the wadi Araba, Dead Sea and river Jordan to its junction with 
the River Yarmuk; thence up the centre of that river to the Syrian Frontier. 
I shall be grateful i f your lordship will cause this information to be 
conveyed to Major Jarvis; it is required by him in connection with the 
measures which he is called upon to take from time to time to co-operate 
with the Palestine Police and Gendarmerie when engaged in pursuit of 
raiding parties from across the Jordan." This was also the definition of the 
territory of Transjordan approved by the League of Nations on 23 rd 
September 1922.6 (FO 141 813/17052 : 1922) 
Although Jarvis wished to cooperate with the British authorities in 
Palestine he was not allowed to do so directly. Also the High Commission 
in Cairo was officially not allowed to communicate directly with the 
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good bit west of the line i.e. at Bir GATTAR on sheet 4 1:250,000 Sinai -
Aqaba. It will probably be advisable to wait till the Palestine people 
establish their claim before I cross over as I don't want to embroil Egypt 
with the Hejaz. Moreover the arrangement is a purely private one that I 
have with the Inspector of Police, Jerusalem, & Governor of Gaza. It is, 
however, an eminently satisfactory & sensible one & has completely put a 
stop to raiders & bandits crossing the frontier ... the pursuit got too hot." 
(FO 141 813/17052) 
Back in London the issue of who owns Aqaba was still unclear. Even one 
year later, there still was a major perception that this town is within the 
boundaries of Egypt prompting questions and answers in the British 
parliament : "Although between 1841 and 1892 the Porte permitted the 
establishment of the Egyptian police posts at certain places on the Eastern 
shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, including Aqaba itself, for the protection of 
the Egyptian pilgrims, the Sultan resumed possession of these posts in 
1892 and no objection was raised from the Egyptian side. The line 
dividing the territories under Egyptian and Turkish administration 
respectively was defined in 1906 by a boundary commission and has not 
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since been modified. Aqaba lies a few miles east of this line." 9 (FO 
141/4074/68/91) 
By 1925 the problem of Arab raiders on Eastern Sinai was still not 
contained and the issue became one of international law. In fact, cross 
border raids by bedouin from Palestine into Sinai actually intensified. It 
seemed that the bedouin understood the limits placed on the Egyptian 
Frontiers Administrations of not being allowed to pursue them across the 
boundary now separating two sovereign states. This led to a formal 
complaint being sent by the Egyptian government to the High Commission 
for Palestine explaining the situation, accusing the Palestine administration 
of a lack of control over their bedouin and asking for permission to allow 
Egyptian forces to cross the border in pursuit of criminal raiders.10 (FO 
141/508/18236 : 1925) 
The matter seemed to be such a great nuisance for the Governor of Sinai at 
the time that he even raised the issue formally to Mr Austen Chamberlain 
during his visit in London. He asked for urgent instructions to be given to 
Jerusalem and for a formal agreement to be entered into by both countries. 
The Palestine government sent its approval on 25.10.1925. But, as 
241 
thoroughness of British administration has it, matters were taken even 
further and an ordinance was drafted that should detail under what 
circumstances and how far Egyptian police were to be allowed to enter 
into Palestine territory in pursuit of criminals, exactly who may be arrested 
and how long such a person may be detained pending an application for 
his extradition. Similar arrangements were also proposed for the Syrian 
and Transjordan boundary with Palestine.11 (FO 141/508/18236) In the 
view of the High Commission in Egypt this was really taking matters too 
far: "The Colonial office have made a mountain out of a molehill of the 
request of the Eg. Govt, for an informal arrangement with the Palestine 
Govt, for the occasional pursuit of a few stray marauders over the 
frontier." And this was quite true considering the flood of correspondence 
that followed concerning this matter. It was of course worked out in detail 
and the line until which the Egyptian police was to be allowed to operate 
ran through the police posts at Khan Yunis, Imara, Beersheba, Asluj and 
Auja Hafir. Suspected criminals i f arrested by the Egyptians inside 
Palestine would then have to be handed over to Palestinian police pending 
extradition procedures and would also have to appear before a Magistrate. 
The agreement should also be on a reciprocal basis. The matter was 
elaborated to great length, but in the course of various correspondence and 
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negotiation the original wishes of the Administration of Sinai had been 
entirely lost sight of. The F.D.A. was seeking permission to chase into 
Palestine bedouin who had stolen cattle in Sinai. These persons were 
coming from the Palestinian side and then returning there. The Colonial 
office on the other hand had drafted a lengthy ordinance of guideline for 
the pursuit of fugitives from Sinai that cross the boundary to escape the 
law in Egypt. In short, much more correspondence was necessary until the 
agreement finally went into effect almost one year later, but it opened the 
door to further cooperation between the administration of Sinai, under 
Maj. C.S.Jarvis, and neighbouring Palestine on matters of public security 
and boundary control. In 1926 the Palestine Government further improved 
control of the bedouin on its side of the border by establishing another 
police post at Al-Auja. 
The British also paid great attention towards improving the infrastructure 
of Sinai to support and expand Imperial communications, but this also 
benefited the inhabitants of the peninsula. A conference to discuss the 
establishment of wireless communications between the different police 
posts of Egypt, Transjordan and Palestine was held at Cairo from 
December 15th to 18th 1926 and the Sinai administration proposed 
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wireless telephone services for police posts on both sides of the border to 
improve security. The Transjordanian government was unfortunately 
unable for financial reasons to participate in a wider communication 
scheme but the Egyptian and Palestine government certainly took their 
cooperation much further and the proposed wireless services were installed 
to help police on both sides to pursue offenders. By 1929 several treaties 
regarding joint efforts for the security of this boundary were effected. A 
powerful wireless station went into operation in 1929 at Giza near Cairo 
which was able to communicate effectively with stations in Sinai and other 
desert areas conveying messages regarding border security, civil aircraft 
messages, meteorological routine messages and various emergency 
communications.12 (FO 141/508/18236 : 1929) 
The British also saw it as vital to retain control of the communications in 
Sinai. The Palestine railway line was rented out to the Egyptian 
government and they had an option to purchase it which the British were 
pushing to be exercised. But when operating the line, which had been 
built as a strategic supply route during the First World War, became no 
longer viable the Egyptians wanted to discontinue their rental contract and 
discontinue the service. This was, however, not in the interest of Britain 
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and a new policy was adopted not to press Egypt to purchase the railway 
and also not to insist on rental payments. This policy was mentioned by 
the British air vice-marshal in Egypt : " I have the honour to refer to the 
previous correspondence ... to say in deference to the wishes of his 
Excellency, The High Commissioner, that no steps be taken which might 
possibly raise the larger issue of the acquisition of the Sinai Railway Line, 
no further requests for payment of rent, even on the old basis, have been 
preferred since April 1929. A year's rent on the old basis viz : LE 880 and 
600 m/ms ... up to 30th April 1930, has, however, been received from the 
Minister of Communications, and it is thought that you would wish to be 
informed of this." 1 3 (FO 141/708 : 1931) 
6.3 Domestic Policy ; Concerns over Reduction of British 
Control in the Frontiers Districts Administration 
It was the Egyptian government's policy after independence not to renew 
the contracts of British officers in their service upon expiration and 
replacing them with Egyptians. As the number of British officers in the 
F.D.A. was steadily declining in line with this policy the quality of the 
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administration was also rapidly deteriorating. Foreign staff had been 
reduced by 85% and the F.D.A. was being held together by the few 
remaining English officers. "Egyptians of the official class are quite 
unsuited for desert conditions. They do not like the isolated life even for 
short periods. Frequently they do not command the respect of the 
independent Arab." 1 4 (FO 141/514/1411/60) 
It was therefore seen by Britain as being of utmost importance to retain 
British control within the F.D.A. for both political reasons and security 
concerns. I f Britain was to guarantee the military security of Egypt she 
must retain a number of British officers within this administration for the 
reasons given in the first report. Much correspondence to that effect took 
place between the Foreign Office and the War Office and the High 
Commission in Egypt. One point raised was that the pensions of officers 
should be paid by the Egyptian Government, since the British Officers in 
question are in the service of the Egyptian army. But on intervention of 
the High Commission it was pointed out that this matter should not be 
raised as it might affect the reappointment of British officers, which should 
be retained even at extra cost to the British government for strategic 
reasons given above. I f the F.D.A. was abandoned as a separate body and 
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its function were integrated into the Egyptian armed forces, then the troops 
will be put under the command of the Coast Guard, with headquarters in 
Alexandria to cover the Western Desert, and Port Said covering the Sinai. 
This was to be avoided at all cost since it would prove disastrous for the 
security of the country.15 (FO 141 576/4253) 
By the beginning of the 1930's British control of the F.D.A. and the Sinai 
Peninsula was being curtailed. Two policies were being put forward 
towards that end : One was to push for turning the FDA into a civilian 
administration. The most apparent feature would be that the officials 
would not wear uniforms anymore. And second, that British officers in the 
high ranks of the FDA leaving the service would not be replaced by 
foreigners. And, finally, there was great discussion to not only end the 
military control of the FDA, but to disband this specialised administration 
altogether and integrate the districts into their pre-war attachments.16 (FO 
141/726/18- 1931) 
In 1931 C.S.Jarvis was still Governor of the Sinai, Green Bey governor of 
the Western Desert, Hatton Bey Commander of the Camel Corps and 
Wallace Bey Deputy Director General of the FDA. Major General Spinks 
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was the Inspector General of the Egyptian Ministry of War and Marine. 
Before 1922 frontier officials wore British uniforms, but after the 
independence of Egypt this practice was discontinued and they were put 
into Egyptian uniform, without badges which resulted in the diminishing 
authority of these officials. Responsible for making decisions in this 
regard was the Army Council and the officers' Committee, which were 
instituted in January and May 1925 respectively. The question of uniform 
was first raised in 1926 when a board was formed at the War Office to 
discuss the matter.17 (FO 141/703/45 : 1931) 
This question came up again in an acute form in the spring of 1931 and 
resulted in disputes among the British officers themselves. General Spinks 
suggested that the FDA officials should have their status reduced to that of 
civilian officials. This would have meant a great loss of prestige and 
authority for FDA personnel, particularly when dealing with the bedouin 
in the desert.18 (FO 141/703/45 : 1931) 
Major C.S. Jarvis, governor of Sinai in 1931 based in Arish, tried to get his 
son in law, Captain H.S.Eagle the post of second in command of the 
Frontier Administration Camel Corps and light Car Patrols. The latter had 
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previously served in Sinai in the Camel Corps from August 1921 until 
September 1922. But there was already great resistance from the Egyptian 
government under Sidky Pasha to the further appointments of Englishmen 
to high military posts. On the other hand, attempts were made to prolong 
the service of Egyptian officers. The first Egyptian appointed to the post 
of Director General of the FDA was Ahmed Shefik Pasha. He was to retire 
on reaching the age of 60 on 4.9.1931 but was granted a two year 
extension of service. This was met with a large number of complaints by 
other army officers who have not been promoted to the rank of Lewa. 1 9 
(FO 141/703/45 : 1931) 
Finally came the recommendation by the Financial Committee of the 
Senate to abolish the FDA altogether. Mahmoud Azmi Pasha, former 
Minister of War with a known anti-British attitude, was behind the move. 
Another suggestion was that the FDA would be amalgamated into the 
coast guard, which was opposed by the Wafdist government, unless it 
would be under the command of an Egyptian officer. The British would 
have been willing to go along with the scheme i f this commander was to 
be Ahmed Shafik Pasha with whom they had a very good relationship. 
(FO 141/703/45) 
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But the FDA survived these attacks to its status and its excellent 
performance in securing the desert areas of Egypt was recognised by all 
sides alike. By Spring 1934 Major Wallace was even in the position to 
come forward with a request for more equipment and men to improve his 
light car patrols and the Camel Corps. He mentioned in his petition that 
the present performance of the FDA was being highly praised by everyone, 
but the corps needs the expansions proposed in order to cover the large 
areas of desert it was in charge of. The main security problem the FDA 
was facing at the time is bedouin smugglers along the coastlines and 
bedouin raids. But with the internal political situation in Arabia 
deteriorating there was also fear of trans border attacks from Hijaz that 
may even threaten the Suez Canal.21 (FO 141/718/709 : 1934) 
Also the replacement of high-ranking British officers in the FDA by 
Egyptians was halted, although the salaries of these officers were paid by 
the Egyptian government. Thus we find for example that R.D.W.Uniacke, 
Officer Commanding Area in the Camel Corps and Light Car Patrols, was 
replaced by Capt. A.J.Bather in August 1934.22 (FO 141/718/709 : 1934 ) 
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In 1935 the general defence scheme for Egypt was being studied and in the 
course the F.D.A. was being re-examined again. Discussions were held at 
the High Commission regarding its organisation "drawing attention to the 
special position of Sinai which Col. Jarvis governed like a colonial 
governor, administering tribal law, etc. ... The G.O.C. pointed out that as a 
defence scheme for the Suez Canal was based on Sinai it was essential that 
the Governor of the Sinai should be an Englishman." It was decided to 
examine what value the FDA were to the British Army and that the High 
Commissioner himself would visit Sinai. It was also pointed out that it was 
desirable to increase the number of British officers in the FDA despite the 
Egyptian resentment to have resigning British officers replaced by 
Englishmen.23 (FO 141/539/578 : 1935) 
It was clear that the British never had the intentions of loosening their 
control over the FDA or the Sinai peninsula in particular. So it was rather 
alarming when their friend Shafik Pasha was likely to resign from his post 
of Director General of the FDA. "In view of the great importance of 
getting a new Director General who will work to be a rubber stamp" the 
question of a successor could not be left to chance. " (F0141/539/578 : 
1935) 
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Just a month later Lewa Mohammed Tawfik Pasha was appointed 
Director-General of the FDA who seemed to be the person they wanted. 
Col. Forbes in a letter from the Ministry of War to the High Commission : 
" I have a good opinion of this officer, while not being of the clever type 
and perhaps rather stupid, I consider him loyal to the British and straight-
forward. I have consulted Wallace Bey and he likes what he has seen of 
him so far, and thinks that he will be able to work amicably with him." 2 5 
(FO 141/539/578/21/35 :1935) 
Meanwhile a report was compiled on the value of the FDA to the British 
army. It held that it was of utmost strategic importance that British 
officers would continue to command the detachments in the Western 
Desert and Sinai, to ensure efficient security at both borders, and the 
restoration of the British second in command of the Frontiers Defence 
Force. Thus the British set out to lobby the Prime Minister regarding the 
desirability of having a British second in command, who agreed, and the 
appointments were officially approved by the Council of Ministers on 
15.8.1935. They would have the rank of Bimbashi with full pay and 
privileges under the Egyptian Army. 2 6 (FO 141/539/578) 
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Relations with the new Director General, Lewa Ahmed Shaflq, soured by 
mid 1936. He proved not to be as stupid as had been assumed and he 
made some cunning moves. In June 1936 he brought charges against 
D.J.Wallace his deputy in an attempt to sack him and have him replaced by 
an Egyptian. He maintained that Wallace was guilty of serious misconduct 
by attempting to obstruct and acting against the orders of the director 
General, illegal usage of government money, and hindering the orders of 
the High Authorities. Wallace vehemently denied any wrongdoing and 
held that it was the Director General who persistently acted against his 
recommendations. But Ahmed Shaflk was not a rubber stamp like his 
predecessor and did his best to get rid of Wallace. Even C.S.Jarvis came 
to the latter's defence, although they were never close, and wrote to Sir 
Miles Lampson praising Wallace.27 (FOl41/604/146/49/36) 
Also the Residency came to Wallace's rescue and the charges were finally 
withdrawn. It was not much later that Green, the governor of the Western 
Desert had a row with the Director General of the FDA. "The latter seems 
once more to be going out of his way to make trouble. He has challenged 
the right of the local Governors to move their men about at their 
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discretion." Although under the regulations of the Council of Ministers 
clearly have this discretion left to them. 2 8 (FOl41/604/146/64/36 : 1936) 
But the incident clearly reflected the general atmosphere of anti-British 
feelings perpetuated by the Wafdist government of the day and the 
discussions regarding the future of British control within the FDA went all 
the way to London. The War Office, in consultation with Sir Anthony 
Eden, agreed "that it was very desirable that the Frontiers Districts 
Administration should remain under the Egyptian Minister of War, [rather 
than become a civil administration which would mean that the British 
Military Mission would loose its control over it] and that the Governor of 
Sinai and the Governor of the Western Desert should be British subjects." 
2 9 (FO141/604/146/56/36) 
Meanwhile the whole existence of the FDA was being overshadowed by 
the developments of the Alliance Treaty between Britain and Egypt which 
was due to be signed in September 1936. The entire defence of Egypt 
would be reorganised as soon as the Military Mission arrived from 
England. In October 1936 Major Wallace was replaced by Lewa Abdel 
Magid Pasha who became Deputy Director General of the FDA, while 
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Wallace was given the lesser post of legal secretary. And there was 
trouble again in November between Green, Wallace and the Director 
General. Green eventually retired from the service in March 1937.30 
(FO141/604/146/66 to 68) 
The Alliance Treaty had stated that British officers would be withdrawn 
from the Egyptian army and the Egyptians acted upon that. This caused 
great concern for the British regarding border security on smuggling and 
the Italian reinforcements along the western border. These concerns were 
expressed in a report by the Military Mission. The report pointed out that 
the FDA although not directly linked to the Army is doing a great job in 
patrolling the desert against incursions and smugglers. The efficiency of 
the FDA has been built up and maintained by the devotion of British 
officers and their Bedouin voluntary recruits, who had a very close 
acquaintance with the environment and sympathy for the nomad 
inhabitants. The special nature of their work could not be carried out by 
conscripts or natives of the Nile Valley. The Frontiers Administration 
formed a vital screen for intelligence and security essential for the British 
troops stationed in Egypt. Furthermore, the Egyptian Army did not have 
officers experienced in intelligence work nor trained administrators 
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accustomed to dealing with Arab Tribes. It was therefore essential to 
retain British control of the Sinai and Western Desert. 3 1 
(F0141/534/286/11/37 : 1937) 
C.S. Jarvis had one of the most illustrious careers in the Administration of 
desert areas in Egypt and could claim an extensive experience and 
knowledge of the Bedouin. He joined the FDA in 1918 and served as 
director of the Amria district, a desert outpost west of Alexandria until 
1920. Then he spent two years governing the Kharga Oasis until he 
became governor of Sinai in 1922. He asked for a raise in pay in a letter 
to the Ministry of War dated 28/11/1935, which was refused. Thus he 
retired from the service in Egypt upon the expiration of his contract in 
1936. 3 2 (FO141/539/578/50/35) He was replaced by Major Hamersley 
who was appointed the new Governor of Sinai on 1.7.1936. It did not seem 
that this officer's dedication was the same as Jarvis as he went to great 
length to get a leave starting 10.7., just ten days after taking up his post. 
This was postponed to 25.7. and it was well that he stayed behind as 
during these two weeks there were attempts to sabotage the railway line 
and bomb the Jerusalem Express. Hamersley's contract would end in July 
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1939, thus marking the end of an era, as the last British governor of the 
Sinai peninsula.33 (FO141/604/146/60/36) 
The Egyptian government under Mustafa El Nahas Pasha was not very 
sympathetic towards retaining any Englishmen in the FDA. Wasfi Bey 
was appointed Governor of the Western Desert and Al i Bey Abdel Wahab 
Governor of the Southern Desert Province. But the British held on to the 
Sinai which they considered unalienable from the vital security of the Suez 
Canal. However Major Hamersley, governor of Sinai, was severely 
criticised by the press, which publisized that he received secret 
correspondence from the British Embassy and from Palestine, he had five 
servants paid for by the Egyptian government, great luxuries such as a 
large garden, a tennis court, a lavish house, usage of cars to entertain 
friends and family, etc.3 4 (F0141/534/286/8/37 : 1937) 
The British also had to take flack from their own camp. Thus the British 
Financial Adviser to the Egyptian government pointed out to the 
Ambassador that their actions were contrary to the Alliance Treaty which 
holds that H.M.G. should refrain from pressing the Egyptians to retain 
British personnel they did not want, and that no Englishman in the 
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Egyptian government service should work as a British agent. 
(F0141/534/286/23/37) 
Thus the British were compelled to tone down their demands in their 
meeting with Nahas Pasha who maintained that all British officers must 
leave the Egyptian Administration. It was pointed out by the British 
Ambassador that Major Hamersley's position as governor was a civilian 
post under contract and he should be retained until that ends in 1939. It 
was agreed that the British governor in the Western Desert was to be 
replaced by an Egyptian, while a British liaison officer was to be appointed 
to work under the governors in the western and southern desert. As for 
Sinai, Hamersley should stay until the end of his contract and during this 
time he was to train the Egyptian deputy governor to take over. (Minute of 
meeting British Ambassador, G.O.C. British forces in Egypt and Nahas 
Pasha, Prime Minister on 29th June 1937.36 (FQ141/534/286/46/37) 
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6.4 Conclusion 
The independence of Egypt changed the status of Britain from a colonial 
power in control of all aspects of government to a tolerated military 
presence under the pretext of defending Egypt from foreign agression. 
This chapter has shown that it took some careful diplomacy to further the 
geopolitical interests of Britain without offending the Egyptian nationalist 
government. In order to remain in control of the Sinai the British Embassy 
was quite busy to legitimize the presence of every Englishman in the 
employ of the Egyptian government. We can deduce from the consular 
files and correspondence that there was a conscious policy to manipulate 
the opinions of both the Egyptian government and the international 
community to accept the continued British control of Sinai. 
On the international level Britain exaggerated the threat of a possible 
invasion of the Sinai from the east by Arab tribesmen, to justify the 
presence of British troops in the peninsula. On the domestic level the 
continued control of the command of Sinai was legitimized by showing 
how much more competent the British administrators were in comparison 
to their Egyptian counterparts. Consequently, great care was taken to find 
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very dedicated English officers to serve in the Frontiers Districts 
Administration, while highlighting the aversion of Egyptians towards 
service in the desert. 
Another policy pursued by the British authorities was to point out the 
animosity between the local bedouin inhabitants and the central 
government in Cairo. The new independent status of Egypt would mean 
that a uniform system of law would be extended to all regions and citizens 
of the country. The bedouin previously had been granted certain 
privileges, which would now be cancelled in order to bring then into line 
with the rest of Egypt. This was of course resented by the bedouin and the 
British showed sympathy towards them in order to gain their support for 
continued British administration of the Sinai. 
The threat of war led to the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 
alliance in 1936, which came as a great relief, because it would secure the 
continued presence of British troops in the Canal area and Sinai. Thus at 
the outbreak of the Second World War, Sinai was still firmly in British 
hands and when a state of emergency was proclaimed for the whole 
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country the Sinai and the Canal Zone was converted into a huge military 
camp for Imperial troops in preparation for the War. 
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Chapter 7 
Word War II and the Last British Attempts to 
Maintain Control over the Sinai 
7.1 Introduction 
The threat of War and preparations for conflict in the Middle East gave 
Britain the opportunity to renew her control over the Sinai given its 
strategic importance. The Sinai, along with the Suez Canal zone, was 
reoccupied and Al-Kantara again saw a revival of its heydays becoming a 
huge barrack for Anzac and Indian troops and the central base for 
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Keeping the supply routes from 
Asia to the Mediterranean open became a primary objective for the 
British command. Although there was no repetition of the events of the 
First World War, i.e. no land based combat taking place in Sinai, the 
Canal came under bombardment from the air, thus heavily curtailing 
navigation during the war. For the duration of the war Britain's position 
in the Sinai and the Canal was never seriously challenged, but with the 
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end of hostilities in 1945 the spectre of Egypt's independence would 
again lead to a diplomatic battle over the sovereignty of the peninsula. 
The nationalist government resented all British attempts to reinstate 
military and administrative control. The strategic importance of the 
peninsula produced the last attempts for Sinai to be contested by Britain. 
A champion of the British cause was Col. Jennings Bramley, a retired 
officer and expert on Egypt's desert, who made it his personal crusade to 
persuade the British government to retain the Sinai indefinitely. His 
argument was based on the question whether the peninsula was really 
under Egyptian sovereignty at the time when the Ottoman Empire 
disintegrated, or i f it had only been administered by Egypt on behalf of 
the Ottoman sultan. In the latter case this would mean that during the 
First World War it was not part of Egypt and therefore it was acquired by 
conquest by the British during their campaigns against Turkey. It was 
therefore suggested that Britain is the rightful sovereign in the territory 
and should therefore put forward her claim, i f necessary by military 
force. Egypt was thus again in the precarious situation of having to fight 
a diplomatic battle to establish her rights over Sinai. The situation was 
exacerbated by the Arab-Israeli conflict that followed the declaration of 
independence by the Jewish state in 1948. Zionist attempts to annex the 
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Sinai also interfered with British ambitions for the creation of a strategic 
base from which it would be possible to control the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the vital maritime access route to Asia. This chapter 
will discuss the events of the Second World War in Sinai and the 
subsequent last attempts by Britain to retain the peninsula in 1949. 
7.2 World War II in Sinai 
The Etat de Siege was proclaimed on the 2nd of September 1939 and 
diplomatic relations with Germany were severed four days later, however, 
Egypt did not declare war on Germany. Article 10 of the Etat de Siege law 
of 1923 which was reinforced by the proclamations of Aly Maher, Prime 
Minister of Egypt, in September 1939, stipulated that martial law would be 
installed in Egypt i f Britain goes to war. This essentially meant the 
reinforcement of British control over Egyptian politics by using 
censorship, requisitioning for military purposes, reservation of 
communications for military purposes and various security measures to 
further their goals. Particularly the misuse of censorship was highly 
criticized by the opposition Wafd party who saw their political freedom 
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curtailed by the government. Modifying the martial law status was 
opposed by all British officers consulted as it would highly limit their 
freedom of action and they would have to deal with the delays and possible 
complications of normal legislative procedure.1 (F0371/24598/15 pp. 
139-149) 
Egypt's commitment to the war effort on Britain's side was by no means for 
free, in fact, the Egyptian government was compelled by the treaty to pay 
for all the military assistance it received from England. In late 1939 the 
Foreign Office in London produced a report on finances needed for the 
defense of Egypt. Military hardware supplied from England alone 
amounted to L.E. 5,800,000. In addition Egypt would be responsible for 
expansion and development of Alexandria harbour L.E. 3,000,000 ; coast 
defenses at Alexandria and Mersa Matrouh L.E. 1,000,000 ; and other 
miscellaneous items such as war-time coal reserves at L.E. 650,000, civil 
defense measures, strategic communications, etc. In addition, Egypt had 
committed herself under the treaty to build accommodations for British 
troops in the Canal Zone at a cost of L. 14,000,000 half of which Britain 
would reimburse. Nevertheless, this was an enormous burden on the 
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economy of Egypt considering the total government expenditure budget in 
1939/40 was L.E. 41,847,000.2 (FO 371/24608/31 folio 185-190) 
Consequently, it became more and more evident that the Egyptian 
government was neither able nor willing to repay the military expenditures 
related to the preparation for the defense of Egypt. These debts would 
become a major point of dispute after the war. But not only direct military 
expenditures burdened Egypt but also participating in economic warfare 
meant putting various produce under the disposal of "war-time supplies". 
Thus, Egypt became a major source of agricultural produce, raw materials, 
cotton, etc. for the Imperial armed forces and their allies throughout the 
Mediterranean. 3 (FO 371/24611/31 folios 110-298) 
The declaration of September 1939 (Etat de Siege) asked for the creation 
of special military zones for the defense of Egypt. Zone 3 was the Suez 
Canal Zone, which initially covered specified areas west of the canal and a 
strip 50 kilometres wide east of it. This would have left the rest of the 
Sinai under the Frontiers Districts Administration, a division of the 
Egyptian government. Although the governor of the Sinai was still an 
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Englishman he was not under control of the British Armed Forces. The 
discrepancy was again brought up in May 1940. 
In addition to the Sinai railway, water pipeline and telegraph 
communications, Britain was anxious to improve roads in the peninsula. 
By early 1940 it was evident that Egypt would be involved in military 
action as the war was spreading from Europe. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
of alliance signed on August 26th, 1936 contained a program of road and 
rail construction which now had to be revised and modified to serve the 
British war effort. The treaty was highly criticized by Egyptian political 
and official circles for the large amounts of funds that Egypt was spending 
in supporting British imperial interests. The British insisted that the 
Egyptian government spend 160,000 pounds on building a first class road 
across the Sinai peninsula to meet their strategic requirements. The 
Egyptian criticism was well founded, particularly since the British did very 
little to complete the road on the Palestinian side between A l Auja and 
Beersheba. In anticipation of military activities the road completion 
became an urgent priority and moneys were requested by General 
A.P.Wavell, Commander in Chief of the Middle East Forces.4 
(F0371/24598/15 pp. 91-93) 
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On February, 12th 1940 the first contingents of Australian and New 
Zealand troops arrived. This was to coincide with the visit of Sir Anthony 
Eden, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Egypt. On 15.2.1940 he 
traveled to Ghazza to greet and inspect the Anzac troops.5 (FO 
371/24609/31 folios 93-100) 
The entry of Italy into the war transformed the British position in the 
Middle East by bringing the entire shipping corridor from Gibraltar to Port 
Said under the influence of Axis air-power. This made Britain's 
Mediterranean command a beleaguered garrison connected to England 
only by the over 12,000 mile sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. In 
essence the Suez Canal became a back door to the Mediterranean rather 
than a short cut to Asia. The joint Anglo-French control over Syria and 
British presence in Palestine, however, at least kept the Eastern flank free 
i 
from enemy attack. This was, however, compensated by Italian air raids 
on the Canal Zone launched from Sicily which reached their peak in 1941. 
Moreover, German submarine activity against Allied shipping in the 
Mediterranean trapped ships in Egyptian ports. Hitler's plan, after 
advances in Russia, to launch an offensive against Persia and Egypt would 
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connect Germany and Italy with Japan and complete Axis supremacy in 
the Mediterranean. This compelled Churchill to send reinforcement troops 
to Suez for a last ditch attempt to defend Egypt. The Mediterranean fleet 
was removed from Alexandria to Haifa, Port Said and Beirut and the air 
head-quarters were moved from Cairo to Ismailia on the Suez Canal. The 
Americans criticized Britain for making too many sacrifices to maintain an 
undefendable position in Egypt, particularly at a time when Japan was 
expanding her territory in Asia opening a third front for defense of the 
British Empire. The German threat to Egypt inspired Churchill to fly to 
Cairo where he ordered the building of a bridge for the Sinai railway to 
replace the ferry at Kantara which made a through-journey from Cairo to 
Beirut possible.6 (Farnie: 1969 , pp.620-630) 
Montgomery's successes in El-Alamein turned the tide against the Axis 
powers and reaffirmed British supremacy in the Middle East by autumn of 
1942. The Anglo-American invasion of North Africa and the Russian 
breakthrough at Stalingrad in November of the same year turned the 
attention of Germany away from Egypt and the Canal Zone. Sinai from 
then on was turned into a vast training ground for Allied troops bound for 
warfare in Europe and the Far East. The Canal region had become an 
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enourmous military base with 150 depots the largest at Tel el Kebir had a 
circumference of 28 miles.7 (Farnie : 1969, p. 632) This expansion of 
British military presence was greatly resented by the Egyptian government 
as it exceeded by far the limitations agreed upon in the 1936 Treaty of 
Alliance both in number of troops stationed and in the size of area 
occupied. The Wafdist government had come into power in 1942 and 
forced King Farouk to accept the latently anti-British Nahas Pasha as 
Prime Minister. The Middle East and Sinai as its fulcrum, on the other 
hand, had been the focus of the British war effort and the fate of the Suez 
Canal was given almost the same importance as the defense of England 
itself. 
7.3 Last British Attempts to Retain Sinai under their 
Control 
i 
After the end of the Second World War in 1945 Egypt, like a number of 
other British controlled nations, was striving to achieve full independence 
and the departure of all British troops from her territory. The British 
government on the other hand tried its best to retain control over the 
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country and protect its strategic and economic interests. Major points of 
contention were control of the Suez Canal and the future of the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan. Negotiations with the government of Sidky Pasha were 
breaking down as the Egyptians were not willing to make concessions on 
their sovereignty. 
The 20-year treaty of 1936 between Egypt and Britain, which was signed 
in the light of the Italian threat in the Mediterranean, gave the latter the 
right to station troops in the Canal Zone and Sinai. With the end of the 
War Egypt sought to cancel the treaty and resume complete sovereignty 
over her territory. But it was precisely at this stage that the Cold War was 
starting to take shape and the presence of Britain in Sinai was regarded as 
a formidable launching ground for an attack against the Soviet Union to 
supplement military action in Europe. (Slonim : 1987, p. 137) 
Negotiations between the two countries resulted in deadlock and anti-
British sentiments in Egypt ran high. Col Wilfried Jennings Bramley 
whose knowledge of Egypt and its deserts was highly respected by the 
British government, came up with an idea to retaliate for the anti-British 
resistance and demonstrations condoned by the Egyptian leaders. He 
proposed that Britain should challenge Egypt's rights over the Sinai 
Peninsula by claiming that it was Turkish territory before the First World 
War only "administered" by Egypt. Since Britain beat Turkey, she should 
claim back "what really belongs to us ... a small portion of the country we 
gave you." 9 (FO 371/53433/3264 : 1946) British officials in Cairo took 
to discussing the "geographical aspect of the Egyptian Question" which 
would highlight the importance attached to the continued British claim to 
the Sinai. The experience of the war showed that the Suez Canal itself was 
vulnerable to ever improving air-force capability and may be rendered 
useless i f blocked by sunken ships. The Sinai, however, i f remaining in 
British hands, would still provide the central operation base in the Middle 
East : "...the possession of the Canal is desirable, but that of the Sinai 
Isthmus, which means the Sinai Peninsula, is vital." Furthermore, the 
peninsula was of little economic importance to Egypt, but of great strategic 
importance to Britain. The acquisition could be financed through taking 
over of Egypt's debts to England. A new inland port would be built in the 
Kantara region that would also service British Palestine and the Sinai 
would be transformed into an "Imperial training ground where British, 
Indian, Australian and New Zealand troops and flying units could work 
out problems together."10 (FO 141/1139 ; 1946) 
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Although the proposal was very appealing, as it would give Britain a 
permanent presence in a highly strategic position, it was not taken further 
at that point in time as they recognized that it would undermine the already 
troubled relations with Egypt. However, Col. Bramley continued his 
crusade from his retirement in his desert home in Burg Al Arab near 
Alexandria by communicating his ideas regarding the Sinai to various 
politicians in London. The basis of his argument was the question of 
sovereignty over Sinai and he insisted that the boundary agreement of 
Egypt and Turkey in 1906 gave only administrative rights to Egypt, a 
status, he claimed, that remained unchanged after the settlements of 1918-
19. Therefore, when Britain beat Turkey in the First World War it 
acquired Sinai by conquest and should now exercise her legitimate rights.11 
(FO 371/53433/3264: 1946) 
The issue was taken up by Sir M. MacDonald and a member of parliament 
Brig. Maclean, as well as H.Mcneil at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
became the subject of their correspondence with Anthony Eden in July and 
August 1946. They suggested that i f Egypt was not willing to sell the 
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Sinai maybe a 99 year lease would be in order, or even a trade, Sinai in 
return for the Sudan. 
My Dear Anthony, 22nd August 1946 
It looks as i f the Egyptian negotiations were breaking down 
completely. Does that not give us a chance of re-opening the 
whole situation on what I believe would be a much more 
hopeful basis, I mean the suggestion which I put to you two 
or three years ago, that we should stay on the other bank of 
the Canal with a 99 year lease of Sinai and in return let the 
Egyptians have the Arab-speaking Sudan up to Fashoda, we 
retaining the Nilotic Sudan as going naturally better with 
Uganda. That would not only give as an admirable central air 
base in between Egypt and Palestine without directly 
occupying Palestine itself, but would also make us a riparian 
sharer in the control of the Suez Canal." (FO 
371/53433/3264 : 1946) 
The correspondence shows that the matter was not taken lightly and 
various investigations were made towards its feasibility. The proposal of 
purchasing or trading the Sinai for part of Sudan, met with great 
opposition from the Egyptian government and the British were forced to 
tone down their request and asked for a 99 year lease on Sinai instead. 
However, the Egyptians stood firm on their rights and even refused the last 
British attempt to control some airfields and technical installations in 
Sinai, and insisted on complete evacuation of the peninsula. Britain's 
politicians now had definite grounds for certainty that no Egyptian 
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government would look at the Sinai proposal favourably and in his speech 
at Tanta on 10.10.1946 Sidky Pasha took the credit for having stood his 
ground and having pushed the British out of the suggestion.13 (The 
TIMES 11.10.1946) 
Another onslaught on the sovereignty of Sinai in 1946 came from the 
Zionist camp. Immigration of European Jews to Palestine in the aftermath 
of the war had increased manifold and started to pose a serious problem for 
British control of the country. Jewish terrorism against British personnel 
and installations had risen drastically and the problem had been further 
complicated by President Truman's demands for unlimited immigration of 
a large quota of Jews into Palestine. Immigration numbers had previously 
been limited by the British administration and the number of immigrants 
was not to exceed one third of the total population. Also, the policy of 
interning the intending immigrants in camps in Cyprus was seen as a 
temporary measure particularly since it increases their hostile attitude 
towards Britain. The Jewish underground was increasingly looking 
towards the Soviets for support, very much to the dismay of the Western 
powers in the wake of the Cold War. However, the Zionists proposed a 
solution to the British Foreign Ministry which would appease themselves 
and, so they assumed, would also satisfy the interests of Great Britain : 
they proposed to transfer the Sinai to their control. They would develop 
the untapped resources of the peninsula and turn the desert into arable land 
that would provide sufficiently for the settlement of hundreds of thousands 
of colonists. This solution would be welcomed by the Zionist movement 
and its supporters particularly due to the historical biblical connections of 
the Sinai which would motivate ample cooperation internationally. 1 4 (FO 
371/52562/10506 : 1946) 
Egypt's intervention in the Palestine conflict in 1948, oddly enough, led to 
an improvement in Anglo-Egyptian relations. Egypt refrained from 
invoking the Treaty of 1936 and inviting of British troops to aid in the 
defense of Egypt even when Israeli forces managed to cross the 
international boundary and approached Al-Arish. After this war the 
Egyptian tone towards Britain changed as Egypt needed fresh supplies of 
arms and ammunition in order to launch a second round in the Palestine 
War. Britain was delighted to oblige with the supply of arms since tying 
Egypt into her defense scheme would not only repel Soviet expansionism 
in the area but would also attenuate the dispute over British presence in the 
Suez Canal Zone and Sinai. 1 5 (Slonim : 1987, p. 138) 
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Col. Bramley, however, continued his efforts in early 1949 mobilizing all 
his connections in England and Egypt to press for a revision of the status 
of Sinai. Having not succeeded in 1946 in gaining acceptance for his 
assertions regarding Egyptian sovereignty over the peninsula, he toned 
down his claims and urged British officials to ask for Southern Sinai only. 
He based his argument on the Sultan's firman of 1841 giving sovereignty 
over Egypt to Mohammed Ali and his successors which included a map 
showing the boundary between Egypt and the rest of the Ottoman domains 
to be a straight line between Suez and Rafah. The land south of this line 
would therefore be part of Hijaz and since the British conquest of 1917 
therefore belong to Great Britain. The issue of the boundary had, of 
course, been settled after the First World War and the British government 
was therefore not interested in actively pursuing the argument any further. 
Bramley, however, was relentless and wrote to Sir Ronald at the Suez 
Canal company : "Glad to hear that Britain still wants no one near the 
Canal." He was referring to an article in News Review on 16.2.49, and 
proposed the company should lay claim to South Sinai [according to the 
1841 boundary] as this would include 5 miles along the canal as well as 
Port Tewfik. Egypt is an unreliable partner in the Suez Canal Company 
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therefore joint control of Southern Sinai would secure British interest in 
the Company. Lord Cromer acquired only administrative rights for Egypt 
over Southern Sinai in 1906, but Allenby conquered the Turkish 
possessions in 1918.1 6 (FO 141/1372/568 : 1949) 
Bramley's last attempt to stir up the issue was by writing to Mr Bertram 
Thomas at the Shell Company, in his capacity as a shareholder, asking on 
what grounds the company was paying agreed sums to the Egyptian 
government in return for exploration and development rights of their oil 
fields in South Sinai. He urged to bring the issue of sovereignty of the 
Sinai before the British Embassy and the Egyptian government. England 
i f in control of the territory would ensure the well-being of Shell company 
and its concessions.17 (FO 141/1372/568 : 1949) 
The issue was brought up for the last time at a meeting between the British 
Ambassador and H.R.H. Prince Mohammed Ali . The British suggested at 
the meeting that their troops should be removed across the canal to 
southern Sinai which is a no-man's land in compliance with their 
evacuation of Egypt. The Prince, however, was well informed about the 
historical facts regarding the status of Sinai and eloquently explained the 
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matter, firmly rejecting the British proposal. The insinuation that Egypt 
was not sure where her boundary was would furthermore increase 
Egyptian suspicion that Britain may be playing the Israeli game by 
questioning the validity of including Southern Sinai in Egyptian territory. 
Bramley was told by the British authorities to desist : " I feel inclined to 
suggest that the time has now come to tell Jennings Bramley to pipe down, 
i f we can do that without hurting his feelings." A hand written comment 
on the same embassy minutes reads : "We said to Mr J.B, plainly enough 
when he came to lunch a few weeks ago that his idea would not suit our 
military interests anyhow, but he wouldn't take notice and I fear a hammer 
blow is required." (ibid.) 
7.4 Conclusion 
The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 had provided Britain with the 
legitimate right of reoccupying the Canal Zone and the Sinai as soon as 
war was proclaimed in 1939. British and other allied troops were again 
stationed in the Peninsula, but there was no repetition of the land based 
warfare of the first World War. However, the Canal came under serious 
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air attack which closed the waterway for navigation for most of the 
duration of the war. When the war ended in 1945 the nationalist 
government insisted on the withdrawal of all British troops from Egyptian 
soil and negotiations to that effect commanded the political scene between 
London and Cairo. This again jeopardized British ambitions to retain 
control of the Sinai. Consequently several attempts were made in 1946 to 
challenge the sovereignty of Egypt in Sinai. It is interesting to note that 
the same arguments as in 1919 were revived. Was the Sinai really part of 
Egypt when it was conquered from Turkey by British troops in 1917 ? It 
was clear to all that this was hardly a strong argument, but nevertheless it 
formed a basis for challenging the status of Sinai again. 
The geopolitical balance of power had changed though and new factors 
would be driving Britain's attempt to continue her presence in Sinai. One, 
the war had shown the supremacy of air power over naval strength with the 
development of new technologies. This reduced the importance of 
maintaining direct control over international shipping lanes, in favour of 
strategically situated air force bases. And, second, the deteriorating 
security situation of Britain in Palestine at the hand of Jewish nationalists 
that were preparing for proclaiming the independence of a Jewish state in 
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Palestine. Terrorism against British troops stationed there had reached 
alarming proportions and the war of independence in 1948 ended the 
mandate in Palestine. This increased British interest in negotiating for the 
Sinai Peninsula to become their permanent base in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Several schemes were proposed the most viable was the 
possibility of a long term lease of the territory similar to Hongkong or 
other British colonies. Britain would then develop the Sinai into a naval 
and air force base, with access to both the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. 
The Egyptian government was opposed to any settlement other than the 
permanent departure of British troops and all attempts to remain in Sinai 
failed. Nevertheless it would take several years for Britain to actually 
evacuate from the Canal and Sinai, which would not happen until after the 
tripartite assault on Egypt in 1956, which was condemned by the 
international community, and finally the peninsula would revert to full 
Egyptian sovereignty. However, the hostile climate between Egypt and 
Israel prevented any major integration of the Sinai into the Egyptian nation 
state and it remained a military area, off limit for ordinary citizens save the 
small number of original bedouin inhabitants. Even these had decreased 
greatly due to migration to neighbouring countries and infrastructure 
which had suffered from the wars was never repaired until the peninsula 
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again changed hands in 1967 when Israel occupied it during the Six Days 
War. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis is demonstrating the geopolitical importance of the Sinai 
Peninsula in the Middle East and its strategic importance in British colonial 
policy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although the peninsula 
is mainly comprised of a barren stretch of desert, sparsely populated and 
devoid of any significant resources, its location at the crossroads of east and 
west, between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea had given it a very special 
position in international politics. In the first chapters I have demonstrated 
that throughout ancient history the peninsula was always recognized as 
being part of Egypt. In prehistoric times Sinai was controlled by the Pharaos 
of Egypt who set up garrisons and mining communities, but its harsh climate 
and rugged terrain made it a very inhospitable place for settlement. 
Although this served as an excellent shield against invasions from the East it 
often did not deter conquerors, who frequently crossed the peninsula in 
either direction in quest of wealth and glory. During the Muslim invasion of 
Egypt under 'Amr Ibn al-'As historical accounts point to the fact that even at 
such an early time the Sinai was recognized as an integral part of Egypt, 
quite distinct from neighbouring Palestine. During the Middle Ages this link 
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between the rulers of Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula has been reinforced by 
the construction of fortresses, manned by Egyptian troops, to protect the by 
then busy caravan routes linking North Africa with Asia. 
When Mohammed Al i became the ruler of Egypt at the beginning of the 
nineteenth Century he reinforced his military control over Sinai, but the 
actual eastern boundary was always in flux. Whenever the strength of the 
government in Egypt increased, their influence would extend well into the 
Fertile Crecent and sometimes as far as Mesopotamia and Arabia. However 
Egypt was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire, paying tribute to the 
Turkish Sultan, and therefore it was not necessary to establish an exact 
boundary. It was not until the Middle of the nineteenth century after some 
magnificent conquests under Mohammed Al i and expansions into the Levant 
that Egypt made the first steps toward establishing her autonomy. When 
Mohammed Al i was invested with a hereditary title as the ruler of Egypt, his 
territory was defined by an Imperial firman. Britain had been involved in 
helping Turkey to contain the expansion of Egypt after the latter had 
challenged Turkey at her own shores. Britain's motives were far reaching as 
the fall of Turkey to Muhammad Al i would have shifted the balance of 
power between the empires of Europe : Russia, Austria, France and Britain 
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were all competing for the supremacy on the continent and the weakened 
Ottoman Empire was the target of their expansions. This competition 
focused their interest on Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. 
Egypt meanwhile had developed into a modern country that had to be 
considered seriously. The building of the Suez Canal opened Egypt to the 
involvement of the European powers, and the strategic importance of this 
waterway became pivotal in the colonial ambitions of France and England. 
Although Egypt herself had largely neglected claiming ownership of the 
Sinai Peninsula it did not slip the attention of Britain that it is part and parcel 
of the security of the Canal. So it was Britain that first directed her efforts 
towards including the peninsula into the territory of Egypt. As the financial 
position of Egypt deteriorated it became more and more evident that direct 
involvement by the European powers on behalf of the creditors of Egypt was 
inevitable. By the time of the Khedive Isma'il Britain and France had 
established themselves deeply in the administration of Egypt. As a 
consequence of the Orabi revolt Britain invaded Egypt in 1882 under the 
pretext of reestablishing order and started an occupation that would last for 
over 70 years. Although Egypt never formally became a British colony, 
only a protectorate, Britain would play the major role in her affairs. By the 
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late 1890's the finances of Egypt had been restored and the country 
prospered under the administration of Lord Cromer who personally 
advocated withdrawal of Britain from Egypt after having completed his 
mission. But the geopolitical considerations of Britain and the security of 
her naval communications to Asia would take precedence. Since control of 
the Sinai was necessary to effectively protect the Canal, Britain started to 
develop a special policy that would be geared towards retaining control of 
the peninsula well into the middle of the twentieth century. Thus a British 
administration was installed in the Sinai that would develop the peninsula's 
infrastructure and befriend its inhabitants to gain their loyalty and distance 
them from the government in Cairo. Alternatively, Britain embarked on 
diplomatic moves to establish a firm boundary between Egypt and the rest of 
the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was still nominally a province. As 
relations gradually deteriorated it became obvious that Britain and Turkey 
would be on opposite sides during the First World War, with the latter taking 
the side of the Central Powers. The Turkish attack on the Suez Canal across 
the Sinai proved the importance of continued British control over the 
Peninsula, which Britain took great pains in reconquering. The war also 
changed the political face of the Middle East. Several developments were a 
direct outcome of the war : the establishment of nation states in the former 
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Ottoman provinces; the Zionist movement and the drive towards establishing 
a homeland for Jews in Palestine; and the nationalist movement in Egypt 
claiming independence. Al l these factors needed the attention of Britain 
which had her own priorities for retaining a presence in the Sinai. Thus it 
was Britain that was the primary player in establishing an international 
boundary between Egypt and Palestine which would include the Sinai in 
Egyptian territory. Britain was also instrumental in establishing independent 
sovereign states in Arabia and Jordan, as well as allowing Jewish 
immigration to Palestine in wake of the Balfour declaration. Al l this would 
add to the problem of maintaining security in Sinai. Thus it became 
necessary to counter Zionist designs on gaining control of Sinai, as well as 
protecting it from Arab raiders. 
The larger threat to British control came from the impending independence 
of Egypt which had as its aim the expulsion of all British troops from the 
country, which was totally unacceptable to Britain. Therefore great 
diplomatic manouvers were necessary to remain in control of the Sinai. The 
vehicle for continued involvement was the Frontiers Districts Administration 
(F.D.A.), the department of the Egyptian Ministry of War, which was in 
charge of governing the desert boundary areas of Egypt. Since Britain had 
293 
reserved the rights of defending Egypt, even after granting independence in 
1922, the Egyptian Army remained under the command of British officers, 
and consequently the governor of Sinai remained an Englishman. 
I have shown in this thesis that during the two decades after the First World 
War there was a deliberate, although covert British policy to stay in charge 
of the F.D.A. and the Sinai, even after formally granting independence to 
Egypt. The importance of the Sinai was always highlighted by the statesmen 
of the time and the government in London condoned this policy even after 
the Second World War. The 1936 treaty between Egypt and England 
renewed the legitimate right of British troops remaining in the Sinai (and 
Egypt), and the outbreak of the War turned the peninsula into a huge allied 
garrison. 
After the war Egypt demanded the departure of the British forces but was 
met with foot dragging and a series of attempts to sever the Sinai from her 
control and it was not until armed confrontation in 1956 that Sinai finally 
reverted to Egyptian control. By that time, however, the strategic priorities 
of Britain had also changed. India was no longer a colony, and thus the 
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control of the sea lanes to Asia became less important. Also Britain had 
established alternative strongholds in Cyprus and Aden. The former became 
Britain's base in the eastern Mediterranean, and the latter was strategically 
located to control the southern access of the Red Sea. Technical 
advancements have led to the superiority of air power over the navy, and the 
improvement of aircraft carriers made the necessity for naval bases obsolete. 
Al l these factors combined to make the Sinai no longer valuable for British 
interests. 
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